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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis offers a reading of Eliot as a philosopher and poet whose creative career 
develops against the backdrop of a phenomenological world-vision which identifies 
reality with experience and defines experience as the interpretative process of 
perception. Eliot‟s career appears as a series of attempts to express this world-view: he 
elaborates this notion of reality in his philosophical writing, translates it into a set of 
premises on aesthetics in his criticism on anthropology and Shakespeare, and embodies 
it – as a realisation of these philosophical and aesthetic tenets – in his poetry. 
Part I traces the development of Eliot‟s aesthetic world-vision in his theoretical writing. 
Chapter 1 foregrounds the dichotomy that I see underlying Eliot‟s thinking throughout 
his career, the dichotomy between linguistic structure and pre-articulate extra-linguistic 
experience. I interpret Eliot‟s definition of the Absolute as the ideal of the linguistic 
order, while immediate experience is a term for the lived reality as meaningful, its 
meaningfulness shaped within and supported by language. Chapter 2 examines the 
relationship between Eliot‟s thought and non-analytic philosophical schools, namely 
Indic traditions and ontological hermeneutics, in their common attempt to answer the 
question of how experience is inscribed into the linguistic structure articulating its 
meaning. Eliot‟s philosophical work answers this question by insisting on and 
elaborating the definition of reality as dependent on the intrinsic connection between 
direct experience and linguistic meaning, while his turn from philosophy to poetry 
appears as a turn to the most adequate discourse of truth. Eliot‟s conception of reality 
underlies his notion of a work of art, the subject matter of Chapter 3. In his critique of 
anthropology and related literary criticism, Eliot identifies ritual as the perfect form for 
meaningful experience and as the prototype of the work of art: both are constructed 
forms that signify experienced reality, and both demand the immediate involvement of 
the sensing body in the act of interpretation. I demonstrate that this double requirement 
– for a work of art to be, paradoxically, both a form of mediating meaning and of 
immediate experience – determines the shift over time in Eliot‟s response to Hamlet, 
and define the Eliotic notion of aesthetic unity as the moment in which the two aspects 
of aesthetic effectiveness merge into the event of lived meaning. 
Part II examines how Eliot‟s poetry realises, intensifies and extends his aesthetic 
conception of reality. Chapter 4 shows The Waste Land to be a poem that overwhelms 
readerly perception with aborted possibilities of meaningfulness without articulating the 
event of meaning. This poem mimics in its language the structure of disordered reality, 
relying on the reader‟s natural inclination to construct meaningful unities in the 
interpretative act of reading. The poem‟s resistance to meaningful aesthetic unity is 
witnessed most clearly by the functioning of the Grail legend and of the Tiresias figure, 
both presented as centring forces but failing to serve this purpose. Chapter 5 looks at 
Hamlet as a textual bridge between the two poems, containing models of aesthetic 
representation of both the structures of immediate effects that dominate The Waste 
Land‟s vision of disorder and those of the unifying function found in Four Quartets. 
Chapter 6 reads Four Quartets as a quintessential poetic performance of the Eliotic 
aesthetic unity. This poem plays out the perceptual-and-signifying process of 
interpretative activity in which the world appears as a meaningful totality, directing the 
interpretative act towards the figure of complete meaningfulness that encloses the 
poem‟s multiple motifs: the composite image of the fire and the rose articulates the 
oneness of the two constituents of meaningful experience, the fire representing the 
experiential immediacy and the rose the structural unit that signifies the experience.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
Eliot‟s dissertation on philosophy was published in 1964, over four decades after his 
„academic philosophizing came to an end‟ (KE 10). This work is known under the title 
Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley though the title under 
which it was submitted was „Experience and the Objects of Knowledge in the 
Philosophy of F. H. Bradley‟ (KE 11). The title of the published work is undeniably 
more stylistically apt, but the original title is far more precise in naming the core focus 
of Eliot‟s philosophical attention: „experience‟ stands by itself, with no attributes 
attached to it; but „knowledge‟ comes with „the objects‟ of its analytic attention. 
This thesis is concerned with the distinction between the homogeneity of 
„experience‟ and the diacritical nature of „knowledge,‟ in the varied forms in which it 
appears in Eliot‟s philosophical, critical and poetic writing. I begin by observing the 
relationship between what Eliot terms „knowledge‟ and „experience,‟ looking into how 
the indivisible and indefinable „experience‟ comes to be the „knowledge‟ of „the world 
of objects‟ that appears in Eliot as the phenomenological world, all its existents – 
including what is conventionally thought of as the subject – emerging and living in 
experience only. I follow the development of this Eliotic vision of the world as 
embedded in human perception through his papers on anthropology and in his criticism 
that translates his anthropological insights into the tenets of aesthetics. I see this vision 
underlying Eliot‟s prose throughout his career even though it often appears rather in the 
margins of his discussions of far more specific issues covering a far wider scale than a 
theory of aesthetics – something this thesis is attempting to derive – could ever 
accommodate. Eliot‟s proto-phenomenological vision of reality as both linguistic and 
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experienced and the aesthetic tenets he finds more explicitly formulated in anthropology 
fuse into a most powerful – at times overwhelming – aesthetic effect that Eliot 
experiences in his encounter with Shakespeare, most forcefully with Hamlet. I observe 
Eliot‟s response to this play in detail, for his reassessments and shifts in the vocabulary 
used to describe the Shakespearean effect show the tensions of the aesthetic experience 
he speaks about at work. Shakespeare, Hamlet in particular, reappears throughout 
Eliot‟s writing, explicitly as well as a rather ghostly presence, as an inexhaustible source 
of aesthetically effective models that Eliot sees in the work of other dramatists and 
poets and, even more importantly, transforms into aesthetically effective structures in 
his own poetry. 
It is „Marina‟ that realises this Eliotic proto-phenomenological-anthropological-
Shakespearean aesthetic effect most intensely. This poem has been seen as „one of 
Eliot‟s most delicate poems,‟ „unparaphrasable‟ (Warren 87), „one of the strangest‟ and 
„one of the most beautiful‟ (Corcoran 116), Eliot‟s „most unconstrained,‟ „most loving 
poem‟ and, in a directly Shakespearean way, „something rich and strange,‟ with an air 
that „could not be purer,‟ not even in Four Quartets (Ricks 120, 230, 237), a poem in 
which all Eliotic tensions are momentarily resolved (Spurr 72-73). The formal 
limitations of space for this kind of study have prevented me from discussing this poem 
in detail; I have chosen to look at The Waste Land and Four Quartets instead, for these 
two poems show Eliot‟s poetic sensibility in development. I read these poems as the 
interrelated counterpart expressions of the Eliotic aesthetic vision of reality, the later 
poem punctuated by reflections on the earlier one. Four Quartets complements The 
Waste Land‟s horror of being overwhelmed by the world‟s disorder and fragmentation 
with an enactment of a possibility of experiencing this world as an aesthetically unified 
and – even if only for a moment – meaningful vision. 
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Two remarks need to be made before I move to my reading of Eliot, one on 
terminology I will use throughout this thesis, and the other on the way I read Eliot‟s 
poetry. I think of the event of meaningful experience – the event that Eliot defines as a 
moment in which knowledge and experience merge in identity – as a moment of 
articulation: a moment of insight in which the pre-articulate experience of the real 
accepts an expression of its meaning in a signifying structure. In this moment of 
meaningfulness, an articulated meaning is also the experienced meaning of the reality to 
which the perceiving and interpreting eye attends, and therefore I will speak of 
meaningful experience as a moment of the complementarity of a signifying structure 
and the experience that it articulates. I will also use near-synonyms – such as 
reciprocity, interrelation, interaction and interdependence – to speak of the dynamics of 
the process in which this complementarity of meaningful experience appears. The 
perfect balance that these terms denote, however, is rare, if ever experienced at all. Most 
of the time, we experience reality as meaningful to an extent rather than completely, 
some of it understood – articulable in language as meaning – and some remaining a 
residue of the non-articulate, the background in which we apprehend the meaning. In 
Eliot, it is experience that is primary, always given, and this position seems to demand 
that we regard significative structures as supplied to articulate its meaning. Yet we 
speak of experience in language, inevitably signifying it in terms that specify it as a 
particular kind of experience, and as long as the experience we speak about accepts the 
meanings of our terms, it can be referred to as the kind of experience they denote; while 
the residue of unsignifiable reality – the pre-articulate experiential surplus that a 
linguistic expression fails to assimilate into the meaning it articulates – does not, by 
definition, have a name. I therefore think of and name this residue of the real the 
experiential supplement of the pre-articulate to the signifying structure that articulates 
the meaning of that part of our reality which we understand. 
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In my readings of Eliot‟s poetry, I focus on what I see as key moments in them, 
the moments that build most intensely on the junctures between language and 
experience that Eliot identifies in his theoretical writing. While I attempt to characterise 
the kind of an aesthetic unity that I see realised by each poem, my primary purpose is to 
expose the dynamics in which Eliot‟s poetic language works to create these effects. It is 
a part of my argument that Eliot‟s poetic language actualises in its grammar and in its 
network of intra- and extra-textual references the complex of relations that define the 
Eliotic vision of how language shapes the experience of reality. I admit holding the 
assumption that the sets of distinctions and the tensions of their articulation which I 
foreground in the passages I read empower the rest of the poem in each case and even, it 
could be said, the entirety of Eliot‟s poetry and probably poetry as such – after all, this 
thesis aims to highlight Eliot‟s concern with the functioning of language per se. I see 
the force of his poetry enabled by his deployment of the fundamental relations of this 
functioning, and this kind of working with language effectively characterises all literary 
writing. As this line of generalisation comes into play, my instant response is the wish 
to emphasise the importance of difference, for these sets of distinctions that I 
foreground are actualised in different ways in every poem and even in every passage of 
the same poem, not only for every reader but, ultimately, in every reading act. This 
insistence on the singularity of poetic effect – with a very specific function attributed to 
conceptual abstraction – is inscribed in Eliot‟s own position as a poet, critic and 
philosopher, which is among the focal points of my argument in this thesis. And so in 
my reading of Eliot‟s poetry, I respond to its invitation to be read line by line and 
sometimes word by word, for the kind of poetic experience it strives to give dwells in 
the area of the immediate, instant perception of its language – as it did for Eliot while 
reading and re-reading Shakespeare, in search for ways of naming and describing that 
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paradoxical effect of aesthetic immediacy that Eliot felt was produced by the medium of 
Shakespeare‟s poetic drama. 
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PART I 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE 
AS BACKGROUND TO ELIOT’S POETICS: 
 
FROM LINGUISTIC ORDER TO AESTHETIC TRUTH 
  
2 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. 
 
THE PREMISE: THE ABSOLUTE OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE 
 
 
THE ABSOLUTE: THE MEANINGFUL ORDER OF BEING 
 
For Eliot the philosopher, the interrelation between „knowledge‟ and „experience‟ is not 
a question to be answered but a given that must be self-reflectively taken into account 
by every epistemological project. The statement that experience participates in the 
formation of the terminology of a system of knowledge is, effectively, the thesis of 
Eliot‟s reading of Bradley, a reading in which metaphysical philosophy is not exempt 
from the pragmatics of human existence. In his 1964 Preface to the published version of 
Knowledge and Experience, Eliot reflects on a change that had to be made for the 
publication of his work: 
What may at first appear more serious is the loss of one or several pages of the 
conclusion of the essay. The last page of the typescript ends with an unfinished 
sentence: For if all objectivity and all knowledge is relative.... I have omitted 
this exasperating clause: it is suitable that a dissertation on the work of Francis 
Herbert Bradley should end with the words „the Absolute‟. (KE 11) 
 
Inscribing this unfinished sentence into the reception of his philosophical work, 
Eliot relativises the Absolute, building his thought on the paradox of its relativity. This 
relativity comes through Eliot‟s attribution of the Absolute to Bradley‟s voice, so that 
the Absolute defines Bradleyan philosophy as an idealist philosophy, while the 
Absolute found in Eliot‟s dissertation is turned into a Bradleyan premise rather than 
being thought of as a philosophical premise about reality as such. And if considered in a 
relation, it is no longer the Absolute we are dealing with but its relativity, an Absolute 
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defined by Eliot as limited by the subjective point of view which accepts (as Bradley 
does) or doubts (as Eliot does) its absoluteness. 
Eliot makes this gesture of undermining the absoluteness of the Absolute in the 
Preface to his dissertation, extending its effect to play down the significance that the 
publication of his philosophical work is likely to have. He deprives his dissertation of 
the authority conventionally ascribed to philosophical discourse to enclose the entire 
oeuvre of the author in a definitive conceptual formulation of the deep premises of his 
thought, while all other writing of the author is then read as subordinate to that 
formulation, as if they re-articulated the meaning of those premises rather than 
articulating meanings of their own. Eliot destroys this hierarchy in a multiple splitting 
of the uniformity of the subjective mind that it assumes: his dissertation, Eliot 
effectively says, rewrites Bradley‟s thought rather than writes down Eliot‟s own. This 
split is reinforced by another one, that which has happened in Eliot‟s own self in the 
course of time. His philosophical work was recognised by the philosophy department in 
the voice of „Josiah Royce, the doyen of American philosophers,‟ as „the work of an 
expert‟ (KE 10) when it was completed in 1916, but at the time of introducing this work 
to the public Eliot does „not pretend to understand it‟ (KE 10). The language that he was 
qualified to use then is no longer his own, nor is its conceptual content. Eliot the poet of 
1964 is not Eliot the philosopher-and-poet of 1916, let alone the fact that they both 
differ from the philosopher Bradley. The difference that Eliot delineates is not only the 
difference between two subjective points of view but also that of the two kinds of 
sensibilities embodied in different kinds of language, philosophical and poetic, the 
former characterised by conceptual consistency and the aspiration to speak the truth 
which, by implication, are not the attributes of the latter. 
Most importantly, the poetic sensibility with which I have just identified Eliot‟s 
voice prefacing Knowledge and Experience is not defined, as it would have been in a 
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discourse governed by the law of conceptual coherence; it is enacted. Eliot says only 
that he is no longer a philosopher as he used to be but he does not say that he is a 
literary man. His reader knows him as a poet and, facing a rejection of his earlier, 
philosophical identity, assumes that this rejection is enabled by this other, literary, self-
identification. And if literary discourse distinguishes itself from the philosophical as 
that which relies on the effect of its language rather than on defining its meaning 
conceptually, here it is: not only does the unfinished sentence in the draft which Eliot 
owns end with the word that is the exact opposite of „the Absolute,‟ „relative,‟ but it 
also enacts relativity by leaving the sentence (and so the whole dissertation) open-
ended. The meaning of this unfinished sentence is left potential, realisable only in the 
specific context of its reading that may or may not demand completion. This 
completion, and so the meaning, is an interpretative (re-)construction of significative 
paths opened by the conditional „if‟ that predicates the completeness of the 
philosophical Absolute with the relativity of a specific point of view. The Absolute 
knows its world as an all-inclusive harmony, and it speaks what it knows in complete, 
meaningful sentences; but it appears as this meaningful totality only against the 
background of the indeterminacies of immediate existence in its openness to the 
unpredictabilities of the impossible-to-know. 
The unfinished sentence left out, Eliot‟s dissertation ends with the following 
statement: 
If I have insisted on the practical (pragmatic?) in the constitution and meaning of 
objects, it is because the practical is a practical metaphysic. And this emphasis 
upon practice – upon the relativity and instrumentality of knowledge – is what 
impels us towards the Absolute. (KE 169) 
 
The Absolute is the hypothetical possibility of an all-inclusive harmonious order 
to which we strive while regarding it as actually existing, even if only as a prospect. 
This prospect of the absolute order of reality gives purpose and meaning to human 
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existence; but this order remains potential, and its meaningfulness is known only as the 
other of disorganised reality: 
There is a real world, if you like, which is full of contradictions, and it is our 
attempt to organize this world which gives the belief in a completely organized 
world, an hypothesis which we proceed to treat as an actuality – whence the 
question how and how far we come into contact with this world of absolute 
order. (KE 90) 
 
We oscillate between two experiences of reality: the disordered „real world [...] 
full of contradictions‟ and „a completely organized world‟ in which we believe as real 
because we have experiences of „order‟ in practical reality. This „order‟ appears in 
moments of meaningful perception of immediate reality (which Eliot, after Bradley, 
calls „feeling‟) that are moments of all-inclusive knowledge; but this knowledge is all-
inclusive only at the moment of insight, every shift in perception calling for a shift in 
the meaningful ordering of what is perceived: 
We do not, in point of fact, simply know: we make tentative and hardly 
formulated theories of knowledge in practice, theories which go to make up our 
real knowledge. [...] Theoretically, that which we know is merely spread out 
before us for pure contemplation [...]. The real situation is rather that we have 
[...] a felt whole in which there are moments of knowledge: the objects are 
constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly 
developing. We perceive an object, we will say, and then perceive it in a special 
relation to our body. (KE 154-155) 
 
Every moment of the absolute meaningful order of reality, or of knowledge, is 
bound to the point of view that perceives it and knows what it perceives. This shift, a 
change of reality and of the truth about it, does not imply falseness but is the only way 
in which we know the world: in a movement from one point of view to another, every 
one of these viewpoints equally valid in their given contexts. On the one hand, Eliot 
says, this undermines our theories because the validity of each theory is questioned 
from another point of view, rather than seen to establish the truth about the world; but 
on the other, these theories are true only because they originate in the specific, particular 
viewpoint able to claim the true meaning for the reality it perceives: 
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So long as our descriptions and explanations can vary so greatly and yet make so 
little practical difference, how can we say that our theories have that intended 
identical reference which is the objective criterion for truth and error? And on 
the other hand our theories make all the difference in the world, because the 
truth has to be my truth before it can be true at all. This is because an „objective‟ 
truth is a relative truth: all that we care about is how it works; it makes no 
difference whether a thing really is green or blue, so long as everyone behaves 
toward it on the belief that it is green or blue. (KE 168-169) 
 
There is no other possibility of knowing the truth except comparing „my truth‟ of 
it at the present moment with the ways in which reality is seen from other viewpoints, 
my own or those of others. The water in the sea may be rather green or rather blue, and 
if it is important to determine which it is, we check our present perception of it with that 
of others or of our own in the past. We know reality in moments of its perception which 
overlap in some respects because we live in the same reality, and differ in others 
because we move in time and space and shift the focus of attention, constantly 
redefining the limits of what we perceive and know. 
„But a metaphysical doctrine pretends to be “true” simply, and none of our 
pragmatic tests will apply to it‟ (KE 169). For Eliot, this very standpoint is a fiction. The 
world „exists only as it is found in the experiences of finite centres‟ (KE 168), which 
brings us back to the dynamics of pragmatics just described. Truth is the question of 
correspondence between visions of the common world from different points of view. 
Meanwhile, a metaphysical doctrine „pretends to be “true” simply‟ but in fact assumes 
an oxymoronic absolute correspondence of all relative worlds to the world of its own 
point of view, non-existent in any actual reality: if there is one truth about one reality, 
„where can you say that there exists the world to correspond?‟ Eliot asks (KE 168). The 
oxymoron and the absence of reference make the metaphysical „truth‟ meaningless: 
„The notion of correspondence will not do [to support the truthfulness of a metaphysical 
doctrine], for it has no meaning here‟ (KE 169). And if a metaphysical theory relies only 
on the consistency of the truth that it asserts, it „fails in same way, if it is not merely 
“ideas” that we are examining, but reality‟ (KE 169): „ideas‟ are consistent in their own 
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metaphysical system, but the reality that they organise for us into a meaningful world is 
not. This ideal consistency ensures coherence and so makes the metaphysical truth 
meaningful in itself; but this meaningfulness does not self-evidently relate to the way 
things are: „A metaphysic may be accepted or rejected without our assuming that from 
the practical point of view it is either true or false‟ (KE 169). 
Without the limitation of a point of view, nor a relation to actual reality, the 
Absolute is characterised by this ideal consistency alone, impossible to localise in the 
world of our being and contemplate as an existent: „The Absolute, we find, does not fall 
within any of the classes of objects: it is neither real nor unreal nor imaginary‟ (KE 
169). That is because the Absolute does not appear in reality as an object at all. It 
appears as the idea of order itself, all-pervasive and self-sufficient, subsuming all reality 
there is, and invisible because of this omni-pervasive all-inclusiveness. There is no 
outside for this absolute order, so there is no point from which it could be viewed, while 
everything there is is its property. It can be thought only from within and only as a 
metaphysical ideal order, a meaningful harmony that may or may not be the harmony of 
actual, „practical‟ reality given to us in moments of our limited and constantly shifting 
perception. 
 
■ 
The structuralist perspective in which language is considered as a significative system 
that works according to its inner laws, a perspective historically unavailable to Eliot and 
yet foreshadowed in his philosophical work, makes it clear that Eliot is thinking about 
reality as linguistic process. The implicit definition of the Absolute that Eliot gives in 
his insistence on the impossibility to think it – the ideal, consistent, meaningful order, 
sufficient in itself and yet organising all reality there is – identifies the Absolute with 
the structure of language. Ideal meaningfulness and arbitrary relation to reality are 
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definitive characteristics of the Saussurean langue. The „world of absolute order‟ which 
is „completely organized‟ as a coherently meaningful whole (in opposition to „a real 
world [...] full of contradictions‟ [KE 90]), is the whole of linguistic structure. And we 
believe it („treat it as an actuality‟ [KE 90]) in spite of its merely hypothetical validity in 
the same way as we allow language to signify the real. The question remains „how and 
how far we come into contact with this world of absolute order‟ (KE 90). 
 
 
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE: THE ALL-INCLUSIVE FEELING OF THE REAL 
 
This contact is the matter of Eliot‟s philosophical concern in his reading of Bradley, 
immediate experience standing for the basic premise of reality. Ostensibly, the key 
premise of Eliot‟s dissertation is not the Absolute but immediate experience, its other 
terms being reality itself and „feeling:‟ „the only independent reality is immediate 
experience or feeling‟ (KE 30), Eliot says at the close of his introductory chapter laying 
out the a priori assumptions of his philosophical vision. This immediate experience, 
also reality and „feeling,‟ is in a paradoxical relation with the Absolute, the two being 
counterparts in one respect but synonyms in another. In the introductory chapter of 
Knowledge and Experience, their synonymy surfaces almost unexpectedly, as if 
discovered in a semantic correspondence of their definitions demanding from Eliot a 
gesture of self-reflection: 
Immediate experience, we have seen, is a timeless unity which is not as such 
present either anywhere or to anyone. It is only in the world of objects that we 
have time and space and selves. By the failure of any experience to be merely 
immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious 
souls in a world of objects. We are led to the conception of an all-inclusive 
experience outside of which nothing shall fall. If anyone object that mere 
experience at the beginning and complete experience at the end are hypothetical 
limits, I can say not a word in refutation for this would be just the reverse side of 
what opinions I hold. And if anyone assert that immediate experience, at either 
beginning or the end of our journey, is annihilation and utter night, I cordially 
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agree. That Mr Bradley himself would accept this interpretation of his (Truth 
and Reality, p. 188) „positive non-distinguished non-relational whole‟ is not to 
be presumed. But the ultimate nature of the Absolute does not come within the 
scope of the present paper. (KE 31) 
 
It appears that the „non-distinguished non-relational whole‟ in its all-inclusive 
„harmony and cohesion‟ defines both the Absolute and immediate experience. Without 
distinctions or relations that differentiate things from one another, both the Absolute and 
immediate experience are conditions of no-thing, and it is a matter of will alone whether 
to value this condition as perfect „harmony and cohesion‟ or to dread it as „annihilation 
and utter night.‟ „But the ultimate nature of the Absolute does not come within the 
scope of the present paper:‟ Eliot wants to keep his attention in the area between these 
conditions of nothingness, in „the world of objects‟ which we think of as constituents of 
„an all-inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall fall‟ but do not quite 
experience this all-inclusive whole. This difference between what we know as the world 
of objects and our experience in which there is more than we know is the condition for 
meaning to appear: meaning is only against the background of what it is not. 
And yet these conditions of nothingness, though in themselves essentially the 
same, mark two different limits of meaningful experience. The Absolute is the 
destination point of „our journey,‟ known as „complete experience,‟ while immediate 
experience is its origin, defined by „mere‟ immediacy. And if the Absolute is the 
principle of order that may or may not be the order of experienced reality, immediate 
experience is the condition of presence, the sense of the real that may or may not be 
ordered into a meaningful whole. Imagined in its purity – as „a felt whole‟ (KE 155) 
before even there is the perceiver and the perceived – immediate experience is the given 
of the real. Within this „felt whole‟ perception distinguishes the viewer and the viewed 
as objects of reality, while in itself this whole of immediate experience is no-thing but 
the condition of pure presence for any-thing to appear. Eliot quotes Bradley: 
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It means for me, first, the general condition before distinctions and relations 
have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor object exists. And 
it means, in the second place, anything which is present at any stage of mental 
life, in so far as that is only present and simply is. In this latter sense we may say 
that everything actual, no matter what, must be felt; but we do not call it feeling 
except so far as we take it as failing to be more. (KE 16) 
 
Immediate experience is before „distinctions and relations‟ happen, among them 
the distinction between the subject that perceives and the object that is perceived, as 
well as those of „time and space‟ in which anything exists. It is before even a possibility 
of reflection, for the moment when a reflecting mind distinguishes itself from the 
external on which to reflect is already after the segmentation of the „non-distinguished 
non-relational whole‟ has emerged. 
This condition, then, can only be imagined: experience of reality never is 
„merely immediate‟ but is always already framed in a set of distinctions of „time and 
space and selves‟ in which „we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects.‟ 
The moment we perceive ourselves perceiving things in space around us and in time is 
already after the immediacy of reality has broken into the distinguished relational whole 
of its objects, to reverse Bradley‟s negative definition of what immediate experience is 
not. Yet even in the world of objects, immediate experience remains as the aspect of 
presence of things that are in view: immediate experience is „anything which is present 
at any stage of mental life, in so far as that is only present and simply is.‟ It does not 
appear by itself but only as the assertion of the existence of things coming to us through 
„feeling:‟ „everything actual, no matter what, must be felt; but we do not call it feeling 
except so far as we take it as failing to be more.‟ 
Translated into the structuralist Saussurean terminology, the characteristic of 
„distinctions and relations‟ defines the post-immediate experience as the linguistic 
condition of human existence: relationality of distinct units of meaning defines the 
system of language. If the world is a relational whole of objects, these objects are 
distinguished from one another and simultaneously form a whole in the structure of 
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language which is a relational system of distinct elementary units of meaning. The 
Saussurean langue is analogous to the Eliotic Absolute because they are both defined as 
an ideal meaningful order arbitrarily related to practical reality which it is assumed to 
organise. At the same time, langue is analogous to the post-immediate experience of 
reality in that both are characterised by segmentation of experiential homogeneity into 
elements of meaning related to one another within an organised meaningful whole. 
Language is the bridge between two states of no-thingness, immediate experience and 
the Absolute, these states defined each by one of the two definitive aspects of the 
linguistic structure. And so „our journey‟ between them – our actual existence „in the 
world of objects‟ in which „we have time and space and selves‟ (KE 31) – is an 
existence in a reality segmented into objects, the medium of this segmentation being the 
structure of language. 
This formulation, however, not only assumes structuralist premises about 
language but also challenges them at the very core. The notion of this intrinsic 
interdependence between language and reality itself goes beyond structuralism, for it 
defines langue as a structure uncompromisingly torn away from the reality which it 
speaks. This division line is the basis of the fundamental structuralist postulate that 
linguistic sign is arbitrary, dependent on the relational system of which it is an element 
but not on the reality which it denotes. This postulate also defines the focus of the 
structuralist inquiry into language: it looks into the systematic relations of linguistic 
structure but not beyond. Yet Eliot leaves the issue of the Absolute (or the linguistic 
order) outside the scope of his concern (KE 31) and focuses his attention „on the 
practical (pragmatic?)‟ (KE 169) – or on the post-immediate and pre-absolute human 
existence of actual experience which arises in interdependence between the system of 
language and the real which language signifies. This interdependence, and not the 
absolute linguistic order per se, is the central matter of Eliot‟s concern. Knowledge and 
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Experience, as Eliot effectively explains in his introductory chapter, considers 
epistemology in the light of this interdependence, insisting on it, revealing its nature in 
every premise of epistemological projects which it appears to underlie. 
If read in these terms, Eliot‟s philosophical work elaborates a fundamental 
extension of what would later emerge as the structuralist definition of linguistic 
meaning, the philosophical basis of this extension formulated in Bradley‟s definition of 
the post-immediate condition of human existence. The Saussurean understanding of 
linguistic process builds on the implications of the arbitrary relation of linguistic 
structure to the reality it signifies, this arbitrariness of connection between language and 
reality seen as the enabling and necessary condition for language to communicate 
meaning. But the Bradleyan world of „distinctions and relations‟ never comes to be 
completely post-immediate. In Bradley‟s definition, „distinctions and relations‟ develop 
against the background of „feeling‟ in which „everything actual,‟ before it is any-thing at 
all, „is only present and simply is.‟ This „felt‟ background never loses its significance 
but remains the source of all meaningful reality there is; it is, to quote Eliot again, 
a felt whole in which there are moments of knowledge: the objects are 
constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly 
developing. We perceive an object, we will say, and then perceive it in a special 
relation to our body. (KE 155) 
 
The world, a relational whole of objects, reinstates itself in moments of insight, 
„new transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly developing.‟ This development 
is a process in which „moments of knowledge‟ arise in a constant interaction between 
the background of „feeling‟ and linguistic-objective relationality, and the relation 
between the felt and the known redraws itself anew the emergence of every „moment of 
knowledge.‟ Language signifies reality by organising that which is in immediate 
perception into a systematic relational whole of perceivable objects. This systematic 
relationality, formally a defining characteristic of langue, is not in the linguistic system 
alone but lives in immediate perception, reinstating itself in every moment of knowing 
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immediate reality. And the identification of the real as the immediately perceived means 
that every moment of knowledge ultimately assumes a system of meaningful coherence 
of its own. Linguistic system signifies reality in principle but the system itself – the 
meaning it articulates – is unique to every given „whole‟ of „feeling‟ in which 
meaningfulness comes up as the „objectivity‟ of the world. This is the area in which I 
want to begin looking for answers to „the question how and how far we come into 
contact with this world of absolute order‟ (KE 90) given to us with the gift of language. 
 
■ 
In his remark on the fact that immediate experience and the Absolute, two states of 
perfect harmony and cohesion, are synonymous with nothingness, a state of the 
nightmare of meaninglessness, Eliot is clear enough about his position as to which it is 
for him. The possibility of identifying the all-inclusive non-distinguishable being with 
„annihilation and utter night‟ is there in the language of Eliot‟s definition of his premise, 
a possibility of a meaning to which he „can say not a word of refutation.‟ But this 
meaning is not his choice, he proceeds to say: „this would be just the reverse side of 
what opinions I hold‟ (KE 31). Next to this assertion of the meaningfulness of 
immediate and complete experience, lies Eliot‟s choice of immediacy as the primary 
value over that of the absolute order, as he takes immediate experience rather than the 
Absolute for the fundamental premise of his philosophy. Experience is not made 
meaningful by ordering reality into the known cohesion of the Absolute. The meaning 
of experience begins in the given as it is, moving from this given point towards the 
complete order that is unknown until it is found. 
Eliot repeated this journey towards a discovery of a principle ordering reality 
several times. The premise of immediate experience – the real found meaningful in an 
all-inclusive harmony of its organised perception – reappears in Eliot‟s writing under 
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many terms. It is „immediate experience‟ in philosophy. In literary criticism, it is 
assertively stated by the term „objective correlative‟ (SE 145) in which a work of art 
arrests the flow of „feeling‟ to create „that particular‟ (SE 145), „significant emotion, 
emotion which has life in the poem‟ (SE 22), „such that when the external facts, which 
must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked‟ 
(SE 145). It is also the unity of sensibility Eliot finds in Dante and Donne: „a system of 
thought and feeling; every part of the system felt and thought in its place, and the whole 
system felt and thought‟ in Dante (The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry 182-183), and 
„a kind of unity in the strange ability of Donne to unite disparate thought in a continuity 
of feeling‟ (The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry 222). It is the „fusion‟ of feeling and 
thought into the unique and unanalysable unity in meaning of a work of art, the 
distinctive characteristic of Shakespearean drama (SE 19-20), also realised in its effect 
of the „ultra-dramatic,‟ an aspect impossible to conceptualise and yet undeniably 
formative of the ultimate experience of transcendence from one‟s own „plane of reality‟ 
into Shakespeare‟s, as Eliot explains in his Edinburgh lectures (EL I 7-9, 12-13; EL II 9, 
16-20). And it is in „a kind of mirage of the perfection of verse drama, which would be a 
design of human action and words, such as to present at once the two aspects of 
dramatic and musical order,‟ the right balance of the two enabling art to fulfil its 
ultimate function „in imposing a credible order upon ordinary reality, and thereby 
eliciting some perception of an order in reality, to bring us to a condition of serenity, 
stillness, and reconciliation‟ (OPP 87). In every case, Eliot keeps his eye fixed on the 
same complementarity: he distinguishes a structure, a system of interrelated elements 
analysable in ostensibly formal terms, and the necessary supplement of the direct 
experience of immediately present reality which enables the structure to actually mean. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
 
INSCRIBING EXPERIENCE INTO LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE: 
ELIOT AS A NON-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER 
 
 
My insight into the consistency of Eliot‟s assumptions – a consistency unobstructed by 
the fact that Eliot, by turning away from philosophy, seems to push his concern with the 
nature of reality into the margins of his direct attention – is enabled by the structuralist 
experience of considering language as a system of signification. Eliot extends this 
notion of language by insisting on the given, intrinsic interdependence between 
linguistic meaning and experienced reality. I see Eliot assuming the structuring 
significative force of language to organise reality, this organisation inevitably imposing 
relations of the linguistic system on unstructured experience that hypothetically might 
be signified in other ways. However, in contrast to the post-structuralist caution about 
this power of language to instate reality and an emphasis on the insurmountable divide 
between linguistic universe and the pre-linguistic unmediated real, Eliot builds on the 
sites of linguistically organised experience in which this divide does not exist. 
The relation between structuralist premises about language and Eliot‟s on which 
I want to build is, clearly, not a historical one. A shared intellectual climate, and so the 
sameness of concerns, might be claimed between Eliot‟s and Saussure‟s thinking, but to 
establish a historical link between their premises is not my present purpose. Instead, I 
want to read Eliot in a dialogue with the structuralist view of language, this dialogue 
offering possibilities of mutual interpretation which I want to explore. Drawing a 
parallel between structuralist assumptions and Eliot‟s understanding of language gives 
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an analytic perspective in which Eliot‟s career appears as a coherent development of a 
defined notion of the nature of language, while this implicit notion itself extends 
structuralist premises that have been recognised as underlying the limitations of 
structuralist thinking. 
The fundamental limitation of the structuralist definition of language that Eliot‟s 
writing uncompromisingly challenges is the premise that language is an immanent 
structure of signification. For structuralism, meaning is enabled by the fact that 
language is a self-sufficient differential relational system in which every unit of 
signification means by way of being defined by the differential relations of that system. 
In Eliot‟s premises, as I have outlined above, the significative importance of this 
linguistic relationality is recognised in its both aspects: the meaningfulness of 
systematic relationality appears as the principle of the absolute order manifest in 
„moments of knowledge‟ (KE 155), while the differential, elementary nature of meaning 
is acknowledged in Eliot‟s insistence that the world is known only as a relational whole 
of distinct objects that, in their turn, are inseparable from „terms‟ that denote them (KE 
155, 165-168). However, Eliot attributes these aspects of systematic coherence and 
segmentation not to the system of language per se but to experience which language 
shapes for it to be meaningful, and so his definitions call for a reinterpretation of 
structuralist premises to include extra-linguistic conditions that enable the significative 
system of language to mean. 
In Eliot, the extra-linguistic appears as immediate experience that, in its turn, is 
a synonym for reality itself. The problem with this identification of the extra-linguistic 
with experience and then with the real is that these are in themselves terms, and their 
semantics is loaded with the history of their use in the Western philosophical tradition 
which Eliot‟s dissertation explicitly questions. In addition to the polysemy of these 
terms derived from their multiple redefinitions, their meaning in Eliot‟s use is further 
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complicated by his idiosyncratic deviation from the basic principles of the kind of 
thinking that operates in them. The structuralist logic offers a way of avoiding this 
overdetermined semantic net: I will focus on the opposition between the linguistic (or 
the systematic) and the extra-linguistic (or the non-systematic) itself. Reading Eliot with 
this focus makes it possible to foreground his original, idiosyncratic vision of the 
relationship between language, experience and reality. And in the perspective of this 
relationship, his oeuvre appears as a consistent elaboration of a coherent philosophical-
aesthetic vision of the world, original in that it is inassimilable into any of the schools of 
thought in terms of whose vocabularies Eliot has been read. Further, the way in which 
Eliot thinks this relationship seems to grasp the very core of the turn in the Western 
philosophy that had already been taking place at the time of Eliot‟s direct engagement 
with philosophy
1
 and produced, in the course of the twentieth century, a range of 
philosophical languages that question the fundamental assumptions of Western 
philosophy and construct their discourses accordingly. 
The ground for the overlapping between Eliot‟s thought and the linguistic turn in 
the Western thinking is their common rethinking of the nature of systematicity itself. In 
philosophy, this rethinking is directed towards questioning and modifying the basic 
                                                 
1
 Richard Wollheim, in a review of Knowledge and Experience to the New Statesman, gives a concise 
description of this turn to explain the obscurity of Eliot‟s style. In Eliot‟s defence, Wollheim says that „he 
wrote at a time when it was very difficult for a philosopher not to be obscure‟ because philosophy itself 
had already been losing its foundations of systematic thought, facing its „inability to understand the 
relation between a thought and that of which it is a thought in any [...] terms open to it.‟ Bradley in 
Wollheim‟s account effectively appears as a thinker who realised the differential nature of language and 
its arbitrary relation to the reality it denotes, as well as the crucial implication that linguistic distinctions 
are imposed on reality and falsify it: even most contemporary philosophers, according to Bradley, 
„committed the cardinal sin of analysis, which is to treat what can be distinguished as though it were 
different. [... In Bradley‟s view,] the ideas, categories, classifications that we impose upon the world 
falsify it, by suggesting real divisions where really there are none: although, as Bradley was quick to see, 
even to state the doctrine like this is already an error, for what are “we” and “it” but themselves 
unjustified abstractions?‟ („Eliot, Bradley and Immediate Experience‟ 401). In a more extensive account 
of Bradley‟s influence on Eliot, Wollheim shows Eliot‟s linguistic awareness to be more radical than 
Bradley‟s, for Eliot rejects the only unity that Bradley still holds to, that of a subjective mind. For Eliot, 
„mental contents are at best a transient phenomenon;‟ immediate experience, or feeling, „breaks up and 
develops into “an articulate whole of relations” within which the broadest division is that into Subject on 
one side and Object on the other,‟ and because feeling is unstable, the subject-object distinction 
constantly reinstates itself as do all other distinctions of the articulate whole of feeling („Eliot and F. H. 
Bradley: An Account‟ 176, 175). Long before the historical linguistic turn, Eliot had its premises 
available to him in Bradley‟s thought and radicalised their implications. 
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premises of analytic terms and procedures, namely two: the premise of the subject-
object distinction, underlying the assumption that reality is objective and the demand 
that the analytic inquiry into the nature of reality must not allow intrusion of 
subjectivity; and the assumption that this objective reality is coherent, understandable in 
a system of interrelated concepts. These two assumptions are interdependent because 
analytic thinking associates coherence with truth, while incoherence is the marker of 
error, error itself attributed to an intervention of subjectivity. 
Eliot‟s thought reinterprets these assumptions, turning the terms in which they 
operate into a complementary network instead of regarding them exclusive of one 
another. The underlying premise here is that all these oppositions derive from the 
experience of reality as given and that they mark different kinds of relations in which 
this experience takes place. Reality is objective when it is analytically understood, but it 
is also subjective because it is experienced. Objective reality is coherent because 
coherence is the property of objectivity: Eliot defines the world of objects as the 
relational structure analogous to the system of langue. The conceptual coherence of the 
philosophical discourse („a metaphysical doctrine,‟ or „a metaphysics‟ as Eliot says in 
Knowledge and Experience [169]) is a radical case of this structure, an instance of 
linguistic systematicity in the highest degree. Truth, meanwhile, indeed must be 
coherent because it is articulated in language, in itself the medium of establishing links 
of coherence necessary in the communication of meaning; but this system of coherent 
links, in order to have the value of truth, must be embedded in experience. To enable 
this link – to articulate truth in terms that are the terms of experience – Eliot redefines 
the notion of systematicity itself: he replaces the conceptual analytic coherence of 
philosophy with the experiential kind of coherence, which in Eliot is recognised as 
poetic. 
A number of Eliot‟s critics explicitly claim that Eliot defies the linguistic order 
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by constructing his writing in resistance of conceptual coherence and in search of 
alternative terms, reading his poetry as resulting from this search (Lamos; Riquelme; 
Schwartz; Skaff; Spurr). But more importantly, Eliot‟s thinking has been shown to 
substantially correspond in premises with the thinking of the late nineteenth and the 
twentieth century that developed in reaction against the analytic premises in philosophy. 
This reactionary thinking validates subjectivity as the experiential locus of reality, and 
quests the claim of analytic coherence to the universal truth. Eliot has been read in the 
vocabularies of the phenomenology of Husserl (Kumar; Spanos), the hermeneutics of 
Heidegger and Gadamer (Davidson; Shusterman; Spanos), and the pragmatics of 
William James (Michaels). References to Jacques Derrida punctuate many studies, 
while some consistently read Eliot in deconstructive terms (Austin; Ellmann). And it is 
in the non-analytic dimensions of interpreting the world that Eliot‟s thought and his 
poetry have been seen to rely on Indic traditions (Kearns; Perl & Tuck; Perl „The 
Language of Theory,‟ Skepticism and Modern Enmity). These readings foreground the 
premises underlying Eliot‟s shift from philosophy to poetry in the aspiration to speak in 
a discourse of truth. In effect, they identify the pillars that support the other kind of 
systematicity, the Eliotic non-analytic alternative, that of poetic discourse. In the light of 
these premises, poetry appears the only kind of language that – paradoxically, for it is in 
itself a structure of mediation – enables access to the immediate experience of reality. 
Reading Eliot as a philosopher who turned to poetry in search of a more 
adequate discourse of truth begins with a description of Eliot‟s redefinition of the 
subject-object relation. In contrast to the analytic premise of the divide between the 
inquiring subject and the object of inquiry, Eliot insists that no system of knowledge is 
independent from the point of view building it (Michaels 175; Perl, „The Language of 
Theory‟ 1013). From here on, Eliot‟s readers elaborate the implications of this 
insistence, as formulated in both Eliot‟s own writing and the vocabularies that they use 
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to interpret Eliot, and demonstrate how the inscription of the inquiring subject into the 
system of knowledge being build redefines the notion of the epistemological system 
itself. The relations that define this non-analytic kind of systematicity constitute the 
thematic and structural network that is the ground of Eliot‟s notion of the aesthetic 
effect conceptualised in his criticism and realised in his poems, as I will show in the 
coming chapters. 
The subject, meanwhile, remains a somewhat grey area. Critics tend to avoid 
directly defining Eliot‟s notion of the subject, this avoidance justified by his repeatedly 
stated rejection of the subject in both his philosophical work and literary criticism 
(Davidson 41, 66). And when aspects of Eliot‟s implicit understanding of the subject are 
discussed, its notion is seen circling in contradictions (Ellmann; Michaels 180). It is the 
subject, however, that is the core issue of the originality of Eliot‟s thought. His stance 
on the subject does not lend itself to any of the terminologies that have been used for 
explicating Eliot‟s thinking, while his original understanding of what the subject is so 
far has been overlooked. Eliot explicitly formulates his stance on the subject in 
Knowledge and Experience, this formulation being the matter of my concern further 
below. Eliot‟s understanding of subjectivity is at the core of his aesthetics developed in 
his criticism and realised in his poetry, as I will demonstrate in the remaining part of my 
thesis. 
 
 
POETRY AS PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: ELIOT AND INDIC TRADITIONS 
 
A discussion of the Eliotic notion of the distinction between the subjective and the 
objective must begin with a qualifying statement that this distinction operates in Eliot‟s 
language in the adjectival form rather than in the nominal. The subject-object distinction 
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marks the difference in the mode of apprehending reality rather than a divide between 
two separate entities, the subject and the object. For Eliot, the objective reality is the 
known, or linguistic, reality which is segmented and signified in a language of 
knowledge, while subjectivity stands for its complementary opposite, the pre-objective 
experience of that same reality before the perceiving consciousness has organised the 
perceived into a world of objects by means of a system of terms. 
This position is most concisely put in a 1913 Harvard paper of Eliot‟s, „Degrees 
of Reality,‟ which begins with a claim that there is no strict opposition between the 
objective and the subjective. Eliot explains: „What we have is only an attitude toward 
objects which is defined in retrospection to be the recognition of an identity, – and of 
course is only on retrospection known as an attitude at all‟ (2). Objects of reality are out 
there independently of our relation to them, but we know they are there through „an 
attitude‟ only. Objects are present to us in experience, or through „feeling,‟ as Eliot will 
refer to it consistently in his dissertation; yet at the moment of perceiving objects we are 
aware neither of the fact of our perception nor of its mode, for this awareness arises 
only on retrospection. 
The identity that Eliot is talking about in this sentence is an identity of the object 
to itself in its linguistic meaning, and we recognise this identity in a moment of 
linguistic denotation. Eliot distinguishes denotation from immediate perception in 
which the object is real though it may not be immediately denoted, recognised as „an 
identity:‟ „The object then is always real but we do not know what the object is‟ (8). The 
act of identifying the perceived object is the act of denoting it as a meaning; and the 
difference between the pre-denoted and denoted object is in the mode of our 
apprehension of it, in one case as „a point of attention‟ at which we happen to look, and 
in the other as a linguistically articulated meaning that refers to this piece of reality that 
we are looking at: „In the assertion “the sky is blue” a process takes place during which 
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a hypothetical point of attention is rejected and “the blue sky” substituted for it‟ (9). 
This process, Eliot says, „is really continuous and unanalysable‟ (9): for unknowable 
reasons and in unknowable ways, we perceive and understand reality by attending to it 
and substituting linguistic meanings for points of our attention. 
Philosophising is a case of this process: 
Hence in the logical process of a philosophical system you have a succession, or 
rather a continuous substitution. You start, or pretend to start from experience – 
an experience which is already saturated with theory and definition – and 
organise it. (12) 
 
Eliot‟s parenthetical remark here is crucial. On the one hand, pre-linguistic 
experience is distinct from linguistic knowledge: „as soon as we have defined 
experience, we have moved from experience into theory‟ (11). But on the other hand, 
linguistic knowledge does not eliminate the experience of that which is known, for in 
this move into theory, the pre-linguistic experience of the reality denoted does not 
disappear: 
Now when we define an experience we tend to substitute the definition for the 
experience, and then experience the definition. The original experience may of 
course have been a definition, but the act of experiencing is quite another thing 
from the act of defining. The distinction between reality and ideality then 
amounts to the distinction between the point of attention and the act of attention. 
(12) 
 
The reality to which we attend, „the point of attention,‟ may be already 
linguistic, its experience „saturated with theory and definition.‟ But our attending to it, 
„the act of attention,‟ is immediate: in this act of attention, we have „only an attitude 
towards objects,‟ and we understand what kind of objects these were and how we 
perceived them, and even the fact that we did, only „on retrospection,‟ as Eliot says in 
the opening of his paper (2). Significative mediation of one kind or other is 
omnipresent: we understand reality, experience it as the reality of objects, because it is 
mediated by interpretative frames. But in experience we are not always aware of the fact 
of this mediation. Immediate experience does not refer to the absence of significative 
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mediation but to our unawareness that our experience is being shaped by its structures 
into a network of meanings. 
It is this unawareness of mediatory structures in the process of their direct 
perception that validates a theory as true. In this unawareness, a theory is immediately 
experienced, turning the pre-linguistic experiential field of perception into an all-
inclusive meaningful structure. This experience of immediate reality as meaningful is 
what Eliot calls the Absolute: it is the meaningful unity and „an all-inclusive experience 
outside of which nothing shall fall‟ at the end of our journey through „the world of 
objects [where] we have time and space and selves‟ (KE 31): 
The crudest experience and the abstrusest theory end in identity, and this identity 
I call the absolute. If you choose to call it nothing, I will not dispute the point. 
But whichever it is, it is both beginning and end. Thus the double process is 
accounted for. („Degrees of Reality‟ 14-15) 
 
 
■ 
Thus the Eliotic redefinition of the philosophical linguistic systematicity into the 
linguistic structure of poetry builds on the identification of mediatory structures in 
which „the crudest experience‟ and „the abstrusest theory‟ rely on a common ground 
and, consequently, are brought together to result in the moment of identity that Eliot 
defines as the Absolute. On the largest scale, this common ground is culture, its values 
held and communicated in language, as well as in accepted practices through which this 
culture is lived. In the West, Eliot‟s native cultural background, the linguistic and the 
practical are divided, the conceptual order associated with the philosophical knowledge 
of truth seen as hidden from the eye of an everyman subsumed in the preoccupations of 
the daily life. But this is not so in the Indic philosophical tradition – this difference is 
the bottom line of Eliot‟s attraction to it. 
The relationship between the fundamental premises and procedures of Western 
thinking and Indic traditions of thought has been highlighted concisely in Perl‟s reading 
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of Eliot. In India, philosophy is understood as the practice of philosophising rather than 
a linguistic occupation as is the case in the West. In the Mādhyamika school, for 
example, „philosophy is not, as in the West, a set of logically demonstrated theoretical 
propositions; it is a psychological process that results in the apprehension that 
appearance and reality are the same‟ (Perl & Tuck 82). The two states of no-thingness, 
immediate experience as the originally given „felt whole‟ (KE 155) and absolute 
harmony as the destination point, translate in Nāgārjuna‟s philosophy into two 
perspectives on the world: the viewpoints of „samsāra, or the conventional (the 
perspectives of the pre- and unenlightened)‟ and „the standpoint of nirvāna, or the 
absolute (this is the perspective of the enlightened)‟ (Skepticism and Modern Enmity 
57). Through Indic philosophy, Perl associates immediate experience with the self-
evident, unquestioned existence in the everyday routine structured by the cultural 
conventions of the community in which we live. He also notes the identity of the 
enlightened state of absolute completion of experience with the initial, pre-enlightened 
being in the conventional in Indic philosophy: „The viewpoint of the absolute, when it is 
achieved, is not absolutistic – it is an apotheosis of conventional reality. The absolute 
point of view is true by definition, but it validates the manifold and the conventional‟ 
(Skepticism and Modern Enmity 57). 
In the same paper of 1913, Eliot himself contrasts the way in which we make 
sense of the world in our everyday life as opposed to our aims in the philosophical 
inquiry into reality: 
As social human beings, our interest is to hold various criteria of reality in 
various contexts and not try to be consistent; [...] But as philosophers, our aim is 
consistency at any price. [...] 
What we ordinarily refer to as experience of reality, what provides the criterion 
of truth is simply the sphere of balance of collective meaning. („Degrees of 
Reality‟ 13-14) 
 
In the face of the absence of the absolute point of view from which to claim 
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absolute truth, truth dwells in the area of agreement of multiple points of view about 
what their shared reality is. A discourse of truth must aim for this inclusiveness. 
Philosophy, then, can only aspire to an approximation, an „increasingly adequate‟ 
explanation of reality as it immediately appears to us but not the one that is absolutely 
right, while adequacy increases as the explanation „takes into account more points of 
view on the subject and includes more of its context and web relations‟ (Perl, „The 
Language of Theory‟ 1013). As Eliot says in a paper on Kant, „a complete explanation 
would be entirely in terms of appearance‟ (quoted in „The Language of Theory‟ 1013). 
That means, however, that this explanation loses in philosophical consistency and so in 
its explanatory force, its language aiming „to hold various criteria of reality in various 
contexts and not try to be consistent,‟ operating as we do in our daily life rather than 
attempting to establish conceptual coherence. Aspiring to communicate truth rather than 
aiming for „consistency at any price,‟ philosophy ends up explaining the reality that we 
consider to be lived, immediate reality. While associating the real with the immediately 
experienced, Eliot does not let it go unnoticed that reality – as we think and speak about 
it rather than immediately live it – is in itself defined by a network of linguistic terms in 
which we understand what it is: 
[Eliot‟s belief is] that „existence‟ or „reality‟ is a quality attributed to certain 
terms within a shared context of discourse, and that, in relation to its context, 
„knowledge‟ is also only a term. [...] Our „real world‟ is a fabric of implicit 
theories that we have tacitly agreed to call „facts‟ (Perl, „The Language of 
Theory‟ 1015) 
 
Reality is linguistic. Its existents are common meanings, „facts,‟ „tacitly agreed‟ 
on in a „shared context of discourse‟ by way of an overlapping of the terms of our 
„implicit theories‟ in which we understand and articulate our immediate environment, 
without even questioning – but believing in – the truthfulness of these theories in 
relation to the real order of things. The structure of the language in which we articulate 
reality is the structure of that reality itself; linguistic grammar is the grammar of the 
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real. In a 1912-1913 paper on Greek philosophy, Eliot draws attention to this link in 
Aristotelian logic and remarks on the possibility of its development that Aristotle did 
not pursue, that of a „search for reality by the analysis of grammar:‟ 
It is only in the persistent faith in a difference between thought and reality which 
prevents Aristotle from explicitly handling metaphysics as the investigation into 
the ultimate meaning of thought as expressed in the forms of language. He 
conducts himself as if he were analysing things and not ideas. (quoted in Perl, 
„The Language of Theory‟ 1016) 
 
In effect, Eliot translates the demand of the Indic tradition for philosophical 
insight to be experienced in everyday reality into the demand that the language of truth 
is modelled on the structure of everyday life. The language of truth must „hold various 
criteria of reality in various contexts‟ aiming for the most adequate expression of „the 
sphere of balance of collective meaning‟ which Eliot understands truth to be („Degrees 
of Reality‟ 13-14). The structure of this language of truth is defined by characteristics 
that are commonly observed in Eliot‟s poetry, summarised by Perl as „multivocality, 
syntactic complexity and richness of association,‟ their combination making language 
„untranslatable into theoretical terms – or rather, endlessly translatable, from an 
infinitude of perspectives‟ („The Language of Theory‟ 1021). 
This redefinition of the language of truth asserts the value of experience. The 
Indic tradition insists on this value by defining philosophy as a practice in which truth is 
understood as immediate participation in everyday reality rather than a linguistic 
meaning. Eliot effectively translates this into a statement that the system of knowledge 
contains the knower within its structure; and then this structure is the structure of the 
knower‟s lived reality. In his paper on Kant, Eliot says: 
Knowledge is only knowledge when „taken internally‟. If you contemplate 
knower and known from the outside, what you find is not simply knower and 
known, but a peculiar complex of existents, and knowledge fades into ontology. 
Hence in order to know we must begin in faith. (quoted in Perl, „The Language 
of Theory‟ 1014) 
 
Things, for Eliot, exist in ideas in which they are known; and ideas, when they 
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are known, are known as things. Knowledge in this connection „fades into ontology‟ 
because its language articulates what is known to exist. How this knowledge arises is 
unknowable: the process in which we substitute the expression „the blue sky‟ for the 
point of attention that is the blue sky is not analysable. But it is this inexplicable 
connection between the grammar of language and the grammar of reality that makes 
knowledge real, experienced as well as conceptualised. 
When we speak of ... so and so‟s theory we are not thinking of it as true ... when 
or so far as we believe in a system we are inside it: there is no „theory‟, for the 
theory is the reality.‟ („The Validity of Artificial Distinctions,‟ quoted in Perl, 
„The Language of Theory‟ 1015) 
 
In these early papers – and more elaborately in his work on anthropology which 
the matter of my later concern – Eliot refers to this inexplicable link as „faith.‟ And 
faith, in the West as well as in India, is the form of experiencing truth through 
conventionalised religious practices among which is the practice of reading the text of 
the Book: 
If one wants the truth about the Pentateuch, for example, one turns to the 
experience of Talmud and of Midrash, one learns the history and practices the 
conventions. One participates in, thus knows the truth – despite the fact that 
what is learned is an anthology of Rabbinic disagreements. (Perl, Skepticism and 
Modern Enmity 60-61) 
 
Eliot will keep the distinction between the linguistic structure that communicates 
experience and the experience itself throughout his life. In a 1956 letter, he writes: 
It seems to me that it would be more wrong to say that poetry has no meaning, 
than it is to over-emphasize the importance of meaning. The fact that a poem can 
mean different things to different persons – something which I think has been 
stressed by Paul Valéry as well as myself – must, however paradoxically, be 
reconciled with the assertion that it has an absolute and unalterable meaning... 
One can only deal with problems like this in contradictions. (quoted in Perl, 
Skepticism and Modern Enmity 60) 
 
The meaning of a poem that is specific to every reader is the meaning 
experienced in an act of reading, with the contexts of that act inscribed into what it is; 
while the „absolute and unalterable meaning‟ of a poem is its linguistic tissue, the 
formal significative structure which directs the act of reading and the inscription of its 
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referential contexts in an absolutely determined, „unalterable‟ way. The meaning of a 
poem is a double process: the poem on the page is the point of our attention, while our 
reading of it the act of attending to it, an act in which we experience the definition of 
reality that the poem gives in its language, its meaning arising for us in a succession of 
inexplicable substitutions that our reading eye performs directed by the poem‟s words. 
 
 
THE AESTHETIC FORCE OF ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS: ELIOT AND HEIDEGGER 
 
At the turn of the century, Eliot may have needed to look outside the context of his 
native cultural background in search of forms of thinking reality as experienced in a 
complex of both linguistic analytic understanding and direct, unreflected participation in 
it. But this search itself characterises the intellectual climate of Eliot‟s time, and in the 
course of the twentieth century the West developed its own tradition of thinking reality 
in more ostensibly experiential terms. The compatibility of Eliot‟s thinking with Martin 
Heidegger‟s ontological hermeneutics has been demonstrated extensively by Harriet 
Davidson, in her study T. S. Eliot and Hermeneutics. Such a reading of Eliot in 
Heideggerian terms is enabled by the overlapping between Heidegger‟s fundamental 
premise and Eliot‟s, that existents of reality appear in a continuous tension between our 
pre-structured, immediate existence among them and structured, articulate 
understanding of their objective identities. Guided by the network of parallels between 
Eliot‟s and Heidegger‟s thinking drawn by Davidson, I go beyond her reading in 
directly highlighting the analogy between Heidegger‟s premise of Dasein and the 
Eliotic immediate experience, which allows me to identify the tension between their 
visions of reality, the Eliotic version of ontological hermeneutics emerging as more 
ostensibly aesthetic than Heidegger‟s. 
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Looked at from Eliot‟s perspective, Heidegger‟s hermeneutics foregrounds the 
ontological implications of the Eliotic link between the structure of language in which 
cultural tradition articulates its understanding of reality and the direct experience of that 
reality, this experience emerging as an ongoing interpretative activity which is identified 
with existence itself. While Eliot searches for forms of linking immediate reality with 
the philosophical thought by turning from Western philosophy towards Indic traditions, 
Heidegger insists on contemplating this link thinking within the frame of Western 
thought. It is in this focus that I see the interpretative value of Heidegger to Eliot: in his 
insistence on the value of the lived reality, challenging the Western tradition on the 
same issue as Eliot does, Heidegger – far more explicitly than Eliot – keeps his focus on 
the function of language as articulating the meaning of this immediately lived reality. In 
this emphasis, Heidegger encapsulates a set of premises about language that empower 
Eliot‟s creative thought, while in Eliot‟s own theoretical thinking these premises appear 
as scattered over different areas of his attention, rather implicitly underlying his 
concerns other than the concern with language. Thus while Eliot, in his interest in Indic 
traditions and anthropology (a matter of my direct concern in Chapter 3), seems to be 
losing faith in the power of language to articulate the meaning of reality, Heidegger 
directly addresses the question of how Western thinking of the relationship between 
language and reality must change in order to enable language to speak the truth. The 
answers given by Heidegger‟s ontological hermeneutics to this question are behind what 
can be thought of as Eliot‟s reacceptance of the authority of language to speak the truth, 
albeit not in the form of philosophy but in that of poetry. 
 
■ 
Heidegger articulates the link between immediate reality and language as a structure of 
meaning in the premise of Dasein, the pre-epistemological understanding of the world: 
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it is the mode of our being in a reality which we somehow already understand. On this 
plane of immediate understanding, there is no the object separate from the subject who 
knows the object by means of the systematic language of knowledge. Reality is before 
distinctions between them have emerged, though understanding itself appears as 
articulation in their terms. Thus reality is experienced as a continuous interpretative 
process, this process regarded as reality itself. For such ongoing interpretation that 
constantly redraws distinctions which signify reality, 
Dasein is foundational: that anything is grounds the possibility of Dasein‟s 
existence as comprehension that things are; but this ontological characteristic of 
Dasein allows the possibility that anything is. (Davidson 43) 
 
For Heidegger as for Eliot, reality appears to us in our comprehension of it. 
Reality exists out there by itself, which makes it possible for us to comprehend it; but it 
is through comprehension only that reality shows itself for what it is. We let be that 
which is by apprehending it as meanings, in both our behaviour as we live in the given 
reality and in language as we recognise its objects in their objective identities. 
The difference between the immediate and structural apprehension of the same 
reality appears clearly in Heidegger‟s explanation of the double nature of equipment: 
Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of [aus] 
its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, 
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These „Things‟ never show themselves 
proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill 
up the room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken 
as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something „between four 
walls‟ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment of residing. Out of this 
the „arrangement‟ emerges, and it is in this that any „individual‟ item of 
equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already 
been discovered. (Being and Time 97-98, H 68-69) 
 
This room is a metaphor for the world: we reside in it, doing things without 
thinking what is in the room and what we are doing or how, and we also know it as „a 
totality of equipment‟ in which every „“individual” item [...] shows itself.‟ As I will 
demonstrate in the subsequent chapter, Eliot thinks of this doubleness of immediately 
lived reality and its understanding as a meaningful structure in the context of 
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anthropology. Following Durkheim, Eliot speaks of the living space as a space of 
human activity regulated by ritual practices, in their turn rooted in a religious cult 
through which a culture interprets reality but also permeating the everyday routine of 
the members of that cultural community. Thus Eliot sees ritual as the paramount 
significative practice because ritual is a form that fuses the immediate experience of 
reality and an interpretative form in which lived reality appears as meaningful. This 
identification of meaningful experience with a rite also makes this experience ostensibly 
aesthetic, which underlies Eliot‟s attention to Shakespearean drama and, through it, his 
descriptions of poetic drama as an aesthetic medium. By combining elements of poetic 
and dramatic appeal, poetic drama articulates its meanings in the same kind of fusion of 
immediately lived reality with a structured form that Eliot observes in a rite. In Eliot, 
poetic language appears as an extension of this line of thought, its structural 
characteristics defined by the aesthetic imperative for it to build on the junctures 
between linguistic structure and immediate perception that Eliot identifies while looking 
at extra-linguistic forms of aesthetic communication. 
Heidegger, in contrast to Eliot, never turns his eye away from language. He 
formulates the link between lived reality and a structure of meaning directly, in 
ostensibly phenomenological terms, through the difference in the way of attending to 
lived reality. This difference will appear in my discussion of Eliot in the next chapter as 
a demand for an artist to keep a double vision of reality and of the work of art as a form 
that articulates the meaning of that reality. To define it from the Heideggerian 
perspective, we reside in the world (as in a room filled up with equipment for us to use 
as we do things) without thinking about its arrangement, while our knowledge of the 
meaningful structure of the world in which we live (of the equipment that fills in the 
room) is a matter of reflection, of distancing ourselves from the immediate environment 
as the environment of our being. This reflection – even though it removes us from 
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reality as immediately lived – is an enabling force, for it foregrounds the existents of 
our environment in their individual identities as the constituents of the „arrangement‟ 
that the place of our dwelling, the world, is. This process is the core of human existence, 
and Heidegger describes it as fundamentally linguistic: 
All working and carrying out tasks, all transaction and calculation, sustains itself 
in the open, an overt region within which what-is can expressly take up its stand 
as and how it is what it is, and thus become capable of expression. This can only 
occur when what-is represents itself (selbst vorstellig wird) with the 
representative statement. (Heidegger, Existence and Being 328-329) 
 
This representative statement through which reality exposes itself for what it is 
is not the property of the philosophical conceptuality in which reality is explained but is 
born in the immediate context within which reality speaks for itself. This statement 
arises in submission „to a directive enjoining it to express what-is “such as” or as it is‟ 
so that „the statement “rights itself” [...] by what-is‟ (329). On this condition, this is a 
statement of truth: 
„Truth‟ is not the mark of some correct proposition made by a human „subject‟ 
in respect of an „object‟ and which then – in precisely what sphere we do not 
know – counts as „true‟; truth is rather the revelation of what-is, a revelation 
through which something „overt‟ comes into force. All human behaviour is an 
exposition of that overtness. (Heidegger, Existence and Being 336) 
 
This dynamic is the structure of Dasein and the bottom line of its 
communicability. As Davidson puts it, „the always already meaningfulness of the world 
is grounded in its possibility for coming to language‟ (47). This coming to language, the 
„uncovering‟ of reality as it appears in direct experience, enables the interpretative circle 
of understanding that „is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself‟ 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 195, H 153). Dasein is a state of both linguistic and direct 
apprehension of immediate reality, truth arising in their agreement: 
To say that an assertion „is true‟ signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in 
itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, „lets‟ the entity „be seen‟ in its 
uncoverdness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as 
Being-uncovering. (Heidegger, Being and Time 261, H 218) 
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This interdependence between linguistic meaning and the direct apprehension of 
reality opens up „a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing‟ that is 
hidden in the Heideggerian hermeneutic circle (Being and Time 195, H 153). This 
possibility is realised in the existence of language in discourse which, in its turn, „is 
existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding:‟ discourse is „the 
Articulation of intelligibility,‟ or the effort of understanding and interpretation itself, 
and this discursive process is identified with the very nature of existence (Being and 
Time 203, H 161). 
For Heidegger, the form of „the expression of the existential fore-structure of 
Dasein itself‟ is not philosophical discourse, but poetic. The advantage of poetic 
language over philosophical is that poetry incorporates in its linguistic structure traces 
of discourse in which Dasein „expresses itself,‟ makes itself known „by intonation, 
modulation, the tempo of talk, “the way of speaking”‟ (Being and Time 205, H 162). In 
interpreting poetic language we experience the equiprimordial „state-of-mind‟ that is the 
condition for „a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.‟ Poetry, by 
way of inscribing traces of the interpretative process of discourse into the structure of its 
language, gives us a kind of experience that is the experience of existence itself, 
whereby it also articulates the essence of existence: 
In „poetical‟ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of 
one‟s state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing 
of existence. (Being and Time 205, H 162) 
 
In my reading of Eliot, this definition of the function of poetry as a discourse of 
truth splits into two areas of attention, in correspondence with the dichotomy between 
experiential immediacy and linguistic structure, which I see underlying Eliot‟s thinking. 
Language as discourse, poetic or otherwise, defined in Heideggerian terms as the locus 
of the interpretative process of consciousness, operates on two planes: it signifies the 
immediate, sensuous perception of extra-linguistic reality; and it brings into the field of 
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the interpretative activity of consciousness a world of cultural artifacts, extending the 
existential horizon of the interpreting consciousness far beyond the limits of its physical 
experience. 
The relationship between language and sensuous perception as it appears in Eliot 
is the direct concern of my reading of Knowledge and Experience further below in this 
chapter. In the context of Heidegger‟s thought, the important parallel in their premises is 
their common understanding of subjectivity: experience, for both Eliot and Heidegger, 
is not an attribute of the subject, but rather a term for the experiential background in 
which all existents of the world, including the subject, emerge in interpretative process. 
In Heidegger, the „state-of-mind‟ does not refer to a psychological entity associated 
with the subject but, rather, to the locus of interpretative activity, the process of being in 
the world that is also understood. Dasein is not „encapsulated as something “internal” 
over against something outside‟ but „as Being-in-the-world it is already “outside” when 
it understands.‟ „In talking, Dasein expresses itself‟ but „[w]hat is being expressed is 
precisely this Being-outside – that is to say, the way in which one currently has a state-
of-mind (mood) which [...] pertain[s] to the full disclosedness of Being-in‟ (Being and 
Time 205, H 162). The Eliotic immediate experience, „a felt whole‟ which is „the 
general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed‟ (KE 155, 16), 
is the same state of immediate being before it has been defined in terms of a relational 
system of a world of objects. And once this „felt whole‟ has turned into a world of 
objects, it coincides with consciousness: Eliot‟s definition of consciousness, as I will 
show, articulates the same overlapping of its allegedly internal content with what is 
conventionally thought of as the outside world as does Heidegger in his description of 
Dasein in terms of the distinction between subject and object. 
As Eliot more emphatically relies on the aesthetic dimension of the meaningful 
experience of reality, the other aspect of the Heideggerian hermeneutic existence in the 
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world, that of its cultural richness, gains even more force of immediate presence to the 
interpreting consciousness than it seems to have in hermeneutic philosophy. The 
implication of hermeneutic thinking that language makes available to us the entire 
cultural heritage, of our own culture as well as that of other cultures, and that it 
reawakens our interpretation of them, was elaborated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
Gadamer refers to this background of cultural awareness as „historically affected 
consciousness,‟ and describes its interpretative activity as determined by its „horizon of 
understanding.‟ This consciousness is of a subject collectively understood, a cultural 
community rather than an individual. And it is situated in the given moment of its own 
historical existence, this given point of view calling for reinterpretation of the past, 
reawakening it in the present in the effort of understanding the cultural reality which is 
now lived, by that reshaping cultural tradition itself: 
Just as the individual is never simply an individual, because he is always in 
understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose 
a culture is an abstraction. The historical movement of human life consists in the 
fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never 
have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we 
move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. 
Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists 
in the form of tradition, is always in motion. The surrounding horizon is not set 
in motion by historical consciousness. But in it this motion becomes aware of 
itself. (Gadamer 303) 
 
In Eliot, this hermeneutic logic appears as a relevant parallel in two contexts, of 
anthropology and of literary aesthetics, and it is in their comparison that Eliot‟s 
emphasis on the perceptual immediacy of experienced reality emerges in full force. In 
the context of anthropology, the focus of my attention in the next chapter, Eliot relies on 
the Durkheimian definition of cultural change as fundamentally contingent, demanding 
that „[a] people wh[ich] replaces another‟ is regarded as „a distinct individuality,‟ 
without assuming any kind of continuity between them (IPR, Gray 114). In this context 
Eliot speaks of the inaccessibility of another cultural reality to the interpreter through 
language, looks for alternative, extra-linguistic forms of communication, and formulates 
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his aesthetic views. But in the context of literary tradition, a tradition that itself is 
embodied in language, Eliot speaks of the continuity of historical change in terms 
strikingly parallel to those of Gadamer‟s cultural hermeneutics. Here, he demands for 
„the historical sense [that] involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but 
of its presence,‟ to enable the poet to write „with a feeling that the whole literature of 
Europe [...] has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order‟ that the 
poet‟s own work is about to recompose (SE 14, 15). 
I see this disparity deriving from the difference in point of view and in the focus 
of Eliot‟s definitions. Thinking of ways in which a culture – and the experiencing 
subject – interprets its lived reality, Eliot is trying to answer the question of how pre-
articulate experience is articulated in language and other signifying structures (such as 
rites) and how, if at all, this pre-articulate experience can be communicated if not by 
means of language. Meanwhile, as Eliot speaks of literary tradition, his focus is 
restricted to the linguistic medium alone, and he describes the relationship between 
extra-linguistic experience and poetic language from the reversed perspective, first of all 
tackling the question of how literary tradition is internalised by the poet through „great 
labour‟ till it permeates the poet‟s sensibility to „his bones‟ (SE 14) and how this 
internalisation eventually enables the originality of the poet‟s own work. While Eliot 
sees no way of determining how lived experience is articulated in language, the fact that 
a meaningful articulation of reality – such as a poem – can be re-experienced, re-lived 
as the meaning of immediate reality, raises no doubt. On the contrary, this assumption is 
behind the closing statement of „Tradition and the Individual Talent‟ that a poet himself 
does not understand his creative practice „unless he lives in what is not merely the 
present, but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, 
but of what is already living‟ (SE 22). 
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This asymmetrical relation reinforces the ontological implications of the parallel 
between Eliot‟s premises and those of hermeneutic thinking. Reality appears as 
fundamentally linguistic experience for both Eliot and Heidegger. Heidegger locates the 
interpretative process in lived reality per se – in the world which is a room filled up 
with equipment using which we do things without thinking about the equipment itself 
unless we step back and reflect. Meanwhile, Eliot describes the same interpretative 
activity as ostensibly aesthetic experience, or the experience of perception, stressing the 
fact that the way in which immediate experience is transformed into a linguistic 
expression is unknowable. At the same time, Eliot‟s premises fully accept the reverse 
implication of hermeneutic ontology, that linguistic reality is also lived reality, for it is 
through language that the Gadamerian „historically effected consciousness‟ lives in the 
awareness of the world reaching far beyond the limits of the consciousness‟s physical 
existence. In Eliot, this Gadamerian consciousness is explicitly effective in the field of 
the history of aesthetic form only, ostensibly in literary tradition. As if enacting the 
Heideggerian definition of poetry as a discourse of truth per se, Eliot accepts all that 
comes into the field of conscious perception through poetic language as the articulation 
of reality, this articulated reality re-lived pre-reflectively, through aesthetic 
apprehension of poetic discourse. The context – the horizon – of „the existential 
possibilities‟ in which a work of art articulates the Heideggerian „state-of-mind‟ (Being 
and Time 205, H 162) is, for Eliot as well as for Gadamer, the entire culture of which a 
literary work is an artifact. And for Eliot, in addition, this entirety of cultural reality is 
immediately present, always „already living‟ (SE 22) in the process of the pre-reflective, 
aesthetic apprehension of literary language. All aesthetically communicated reality is 
real for Eliot, and so every poem is a statement of truth that the reader presumably re-
experiences in the process of reading; but the Heideggerian premise that lived reality is 
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articulated in language through a move of reflection remains for Eliot an open, 
fundamentally unanswerable question, as I hope to make evident further below. 
This asymmetrical acceptance of hermeneutic tenets makes Eliot‟s poetic world-
vision of reality appear as defined by excess, for everything that comes to consciousness 
through aesthetically organised language is experienced as immediately present. The 
Waste Land is a poetic expression of the Eliotic experience of this excessive linguistic 
reality. This poem realises the function that hermeneutic thinking claims for every 
artifact, a poem in particular: its linguistic tissue concentrates in itself interpretative 
structures in which culture understands its own lived reality, the variety and density of 
those structures comprising the intensity of the poem‟s aesthetic effect. The experience 
of interpreting this poem is analogous to the experience of existence itself, in the full 
density and intensity of interpretative effort by which human existence is defined in the 
hermeneutic world-vision. This parallel grounds Davidson‟s claim that The Waste Land, 
a poem closely read in her study, is „A Ceaseless Hermeneutic‟ in itself (97): it is an 
embodiment of the hermeneutic ontological claims as an instance on discourse that, as 
Heidegger puts it, communicates „the existential possibilities of one‟s state-of-mind,‟ 
this communication regarded „an aim in itself‟ turning the poem into „a disclosing of 
existence‟ (Being and Time 205, H 162). My reading of this poem, however, will also 
show that this hermeneutic process is assumed rather than realised in this poem. The 
Waste Land forces the reader into constructing meaningful unities by overwhelming 
readerly perception with the excess of linguistic reality, assuming that the reader will do 
so by the natural inclination of human consciousness to understand what it perceives as 
a meaningful whole, but the poem does not direct the process of aesthetic interpretative 
perception into a moment of experiencing aesthetic unity. 
It is Four Quartets that will do exactly what The Waste Land refuses to do. The 
later poem exploits Eliot‟s assumptions about the aesthetic perception of linguistic 
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meaning, controlling the excess of linguistic reality by locating readerly experience in 
perception itself. This poem holds to The Waste Land‟s hermeneutic-aesthetic premise 
that all reality communicated through aesthetically organised language is perceived by 
consciousness as immediately present, but it takes another step: it controls the excess of 
linguistic reality by the laws of perception that delimit and direct linguistic excess, 
creating an aesthetic unity synonymous with meaningful experience. Exposing the 
emergence this unity arises is the purpose of my reading of Four Quartets, while in the 
remaining part of this chapter I want to look into Eliot‟s formulations of the 
philosophical ground on which this unity builds. 
The shift of attention to the perceptual ground of existential experience, which I 
want to undertake here, calls for a phenomenological vocabulary, a vocabulary that 
indeed has been productively used for interpreting Eliot (Kumar, Spanos). Davidson‟s 
reading of Eliot in consistently hermeneutic terms, however, uncompromisingly rejects 
the language of phenomenology, on the grounds that Eliot‟s premises do not accept the 
Husserlian „transcendental ego‟ (66). Instead, in Eliot‟s effectively hermeneutic 
philosophical vision, „the self becomes a locus of culture with no transcendental 
dominion over the cultural matrix‟ (5). In Eliot, the subject is an absence, absence itself 
defined as „the absence of transcendent foundation, center, origin – whether subjective 
or objective – for our being‟ (3). To describe the inexplicable, inarticulable ground of 
the linguistic process which is hermeneutic existence, Davidson refers to Derrida: this 
linguistic process, as linguistic play, is „permitted by the lack, the absence of a center or 
origin;‟ this centre of absence is „a reality, a function‟ (Derrida 260, 271) but it has no 
centring force. It is, as Davidson puts it, „a center which is non-center,‟ and this 
paradoxical centre of absence is the locus of the emergence of meaning (Davidson 38-
39). 
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Without assuming to speak for Derrida or Heidegger, I want to suggest that in 
Eliot this absent centre that does not define but centres around itself the whole world 
signified and communicated in language is the body – not „a transcendent foundation‟ 
but a radically physical one, without ascribing any metaphysical aspect to its centrality. 
Its absence is the absence to language, the incommunicability of its pre-linguistic 
experience of reality which, however, determines the map of meaningful distinctions, or 
the linguistic system, in which it understands and speaks the world. Its centrality is the 
centrality of signifying activity of which nothing can be said except that it is such a 
centre of signifying activity, determined by a myriad of identifiable factors none of 
which is given a decisive authority to claim the definitive significance to itself. This 
centre is, to quote Derrida again, „a function, not a being – a reality, but a function. And 
this function is absolutely indispensable.‟ Derrida goes on to say: 
The subject is absolutely indispensible. I don‟t destroy the subject; I situate it. 
That is to say, I believe that at a certain level both of experience and of 
philosophical and scientific discourse one cannot get along without the notion of 
subject. It is a question of knowing where it comes from and how it functions. 
(Derrida 271) 
 
Eliot offers a version of the subject in this Derridean sense, as an indispensible 
centre that cannot be defined by any metaphysical term but is a function and a reality 
making its factors interact in unpredictable constellations which make the living world. 
As it follows from Eliot, these interacting factors are language which is the system of 
culture, consciousness which is the locus of cultural perception of the world and of 
oneself in it, and the self that lives in the culture. This Eliotic version of the subject is 
the matter of my concern further below, after I consider Eliot‟s conception of objective 
reality of which the subject is a part. 
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LINGUISTIC REALITY IN PERCEPTION: OBJECTS AS MEANINGS AND MEANINGS AS 
OBJECTS 
 
In the context of Eliot criticism, it is not phenomenological readings that point to the 
most significant contexts in developing of the Eliotic notion of the subject but a reading 
in the terms of pragmatics, as given by Walter Benn Michaels in a concise but important 
paper „Philosophy in Kinkanja: Eliot‟s Pragmatism.‟ Reading Eliot on his own terms, as 
I am about to do, calls for significant modifications of Michaels‟s interpretation of 
Eliot‟s thought, most importantly on the issues of the coherence of his notion of the 
subject and on the issue of linguistic meaning on which Eliot, in Michaels‟s view, does 
not have consistent views (172, 174, 180, 182, 184-185, 189). In my reading below, I 
want to claim the contrary, the consistency of Eliot‟s position on both the subject and 
linguistic meaning, defining them in close interrelation. Michaels relies on two tenets of 
pragmatic philosophy found in Eliot: the uncompromising emphasis of pragmatics on 
the given primacy of context (190), and the dependence of this pragmatic context on the 
notion of the pre-linguistic understanding of the immediate environment as formulated 
by William James (170-173). Without directly engaging in a deconstruction of 
Michaels‟s argument, I build my vision of the Eliotic subject on these two assumptions 
even though Michaels takes them in other directions than I am about to do. 
A concise formulation of contextual primacy comes towards the end of 
Michaels‟s reading, by way of a summarising encapsulation of his argument: 
Prior to context there is no world; prior to context there is no self; context 
describes the intermingling of world and self; context describes the 
intermingling of world and self from the beginning, genetically and structurally 
both. (190) 
 
This „intermingling of world and self‟ takes place on the grounds of the 
linguistic reference. In reference linguistic expression performs two functions, often 
simultaneously: language articulates the meaning of reality as an individual understands 
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it and communicates this meaning to other individuals of the linguistic community. The 
meaning of a word in reference is rooted in the direct, extra-linguistic perception of 
reality, while the meaning it articulates is collective because both language and the 
reality of which it speaks are shared. From the viewpoint of the subject, a meaning 
expressed in language is a property of both the individual perception of reality and the 
collective, social convention of referring to it in a certain way, by this word in this 
meaning rather than in any other combination. 
Eliot refers to linguistic community as a „community of meaning‟ (KE 161. And 
it is this double functioning of linguistic reference is the ground for, as Michaels puts it, 
„the already public character of the individual self‟ (190). Eliot more explicitly speaks 
about it as an anthropological phenomenon rather than linguistic, associating this 
„already public character of the individual self‟ with the social instinct that Eliot sees as 
religious („Durkheim‟ 314), which I will discuss in more detail further below. The 
relationship on which I want to elaborate here is between the pre-linguistic, direct 
perception of immediate reality and the linguistic meaning that signifies this reality, 
transforming it into the reality of objects. This transformation relies on the perceptual 
and linguistic memory of the subject, and our experience of reality is an ongoing 
process of this transformation. Context, defined from this perspective, is a space of 
consciousness that perceives immediate reality through the senses and makes sense of 
the perceived by signifying it in language. This perceiving and signifying 
consciousness, if it must be thought of as the subject, splits into two subjective planes, 
the experiencing and the linguistic subject, the perceiving eye and the speaking „I‟ that 
signifies what is being perceived, defining its own identity as the subject living among 
other existents of the world. The relationship between these two subjective planes of 
experiencing reality is the core of the Eliotic linguistic phenomenology and the ground 
of the poetic effects realised in his poems, most manifestly in Four Quartets, a poem 
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that I will show exploiting Eliot‟s assumptions about the relationship between language 
and perception. 
 
■ 
The dynamic of the process in which pre-linguistic perception turns into linguistic 
meaning intertwines psychological and linguistic development in the process of 
memory which is both perceptual and linguistic. Eliot does not elaborately describe the 
psychological aspect of this process, in a gesture of rejection of the psychological 
subject on the grounds of his philosophical premise that pre-linguistic reality is 
unknowable. He states the fact of the intrinsic interrelation between pre-objective 
perception and the reality of objects (KE 106-107), but the only way in which he 
approaches the non-linguistic perceptual constituent of this interrelation is by regarding 
this perceptual constituent as an inexplicable experiential supplement, the marker of 
subjectivity in the subject-object relation. Yet this description appears in William James, 
a philosopher whose work Eliot knew (KE 19, 29, 115, 116) and who relies on a 
premise similar to the Eliotic immediate experience. James provides Eliot with „a model 
of epistemological innocence‟ (Michaels 172) in his description of how objective reality 
emerges out of the pre-objective extra-linguistic background, this process seen as 
dominating the mindset of a small child or a savage: 
The primitive savage‟s mind is a jungle in which hallucinations, dreams, 
superstitions, conceptions, and sensible objects all flourish alongside each other, 
unregulated except by the attention turning in this way or that. The child‟s mind 
is the same. It is only as objects become permanent and their relations fixed that 
discrepancies and contradictions are felt and must be settled in some stable way. 
(James 299-300) 
 
In parallel with the Bradleyan insistence that the background of „feeling‟ is never 
fully subsumed into the objectivity of the world (KE 16, 155), this Jamesian childish 
pre-objective perception does not disappear in the course of the development of 
consciousness but remains as the perceptual foundation of our contact with the real. In 
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James‟s definition, sensations „are first things in the way of consciousness‟ (James 6), 
which makes their reality „paramount.‟ We do not question the reality of objects that 
assert their presence to our consciousness through the senses (299-306). Between 
sensations and „adult consciousness,‟ there are „perceptions‟ that develop on the ground 
of sensations by subsuming their indeterminate mass, „a jungle‟ of the „sensible‟ ground 
into objects of perceptions. The background of indefinite „sensations‟ transforms into 
more clearly objectified entities, the properties of objects perceived („perceptions‟), 
while sensations as sensations are no longer the content of perception: 
[W]hen qualities of an object impress our sense and we thereupon perceive the 
object, the sensation as such of those qualities does not still exist inside the 
perception and form a constituent thereof. The sensation is one thing and the 
perception another, and neither can take place at the same time with the other. 
(James 81-82) 
 
„Sensations‟ in James refer to pre-objective sensuous perception, while 
„perceptions‟ are James‟s term for objects in perception after „qualities of an object 
impress our sense and we thereupon perceive the object.‟ So „the sensating child‟ 
becomes „the perceiving adult‟ by way of accumulating experience of perceiving the 
same object until consciousness recognises the identity of the object to itself in a contact 
with it immediately, as if skipping the actuality of the sensory data through which the 
object appears to consciousness. An adult mind performs the same process in every 
instance of perception, inclined to establish a network of meaningful associations by 
transforming pre-objective sensations into objective perceptions, in order to see its 
environment as a complex of real objects: 
[P]erception is rarely abortive; some perception takes place. The two discrepant 
sets of associates do not neutralize each other or mix and make a blur. What we 
more commonly get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other 
object in its completeness. In other words, all brain-processes are such as give 
rise to what we call FIGURED consciousness. If paths are irradiated at all, they are 
irradiated in consistent systems, and occasion thoughts of definite objects, not 
mere hodge-podges of elements. (James 82) 
 
The process of perceiving reality as constituted of objects is interrelated with the 
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linguistic development for James. In Eliot, this developmental logic underlies the 
process of the formation of the objects of reality as meanings, while consciousness that 
perceives these objects is always already linguistic. An Eliotic description of this logic 
must begin with the statement that the link between perception and linguistic meaning is 
inextricable, with no possibility of having one without the other. This bond is 
encapsulated in perhaps the most frequently quoted sentence from Knowledge and 
Experience: „Without words, no objects‟ (KE 132). Eliot explains: 
The object, purely experienced and not denominated, is not yet an object 
because it is only a bundle of particular perceptions; in order to be an object it 
must present identity in difference throughout a span of time. (KE 132) 
The object qua object would not exist without this bundle of experiences, but the 
bundle would not be a bundle unless it were held together by the moment of 
objectivity which is realized in the name. I am very far from meaning that it is 
the act of naming which makes the object, for the activity does not proceed from 
one side more than from another. Objects cannot arise without names, and 
names never spring up without objects, ready to be applied to the first objects to 
which they seem appropriate. Nor do I mean that the object did not exist until it 
was known, but only that it has not the character of objectivity until it is known 
as an object. (KE 133-134) 
 
Language is not a means of communicating reality that is already organised into 
a reality of objects but the medium of such organisation itself. Reality is out there 
independently of whether it is known (articulated in language) or not; but the objective 
structure of the real (knowledge of reality as the reality of objects in the identity of those 
objects to themselves) emerges only in the process of linguistic articulation which takes 
place in experience through the linguistic function of reference. 
For Eliot, objective reality is the meeting point of the sensory contact with the 
environment and language, both aspects of our sense of the real seen as equally 
important „systems:‟ „The world thus appears as an ideal construction of descriptions 
linked to the physiological and to the logical system‟ (KE 106), while every object of 
this world, also „the thing,‟ „is a logical construction, composed of two sorts of material, 
sense-data and universals‟ (KE 107). This link of objective reality to „the physiological‟ 
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system – the system of the sensing body – is inexplicable. The fact that we know 
objective reality through what James termed „sensations‟ that transform into more 
objective „perceptions‟ that, in their turn, grow into the knowledge of the world of 
objects is evident; but it is indescribable how the process takes place. For Eliot, the 
hierarchy of linguistic organisation – from the most immediate and least objective 
„sensations‟ to the most logically coherent and most abstracted „knowledge‟ – is 
analytic, while in experience constellations of these levels of perceiving and 
understanding reality are contingent, with no possibility of determining the ultimate 
dynamic of their interaction. 
And yet, even though full analytic description of this interaction is not possible, 
it can be observed, for the background of the non-objective experience of immediate 
reality transforms meaning in the process of linguistic conceptualisation. This non-
objective background is an aspect and a source of the indeterminacy of objective 
meaning and its shifts in every instance of its appearance in reality. Eliot shows that this 
aspect serves its formative function even if the meaning in question (an object referred 
to) is at a far remove from sensory perception. Even when this object a symbolic 
abstraction, its identity depends on the context of its appearance, of which pre-objective 
experiential background is a formative part: 
Now in any use of a word which symbolizes an abstraction the actual object of 
attention, I submit, is exceedingly variable: there is not simply one determinate 
object in various contexts, but the object varies with the context. Thus, in any 
use of an abstract term, we may distinguish between the logical meaning, which 
is an intended object, and the real meaning, which is a part of the experience and 
not an object real or intended. (KE 103) 
 
There is a difference between an object symbolised by a word as „an abstraction‟ 
and an object that appears as „a bundle of particular perceptions‟ (KE 132). The former 
belongs to linguistic logic, much closer to the pole of „universals,‟ while the latter is a 
cluster of „sense-data‟ marked by a name as an object but not as much dependent on the 
inner logic of the linguistic system as „an abstraction‟ is. The significance of this 
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difference emerges in Eliot‟s description of the process of memory, a description that 
also explains the difference between an object present to direct perception and its 
presence to consciousness in language. This difference – more precisely, the relationship 
between the perceptual and linguistic objectivities – underlies the possibility of the 
aesthetic affectivity of linguistic representation. Eliot‟s description of memory 
effectively explains how linguistically mediated meaning is experienced as immediate. 
It is this relationship and this process that I will show performed in Four Quartets. 
In Knowledge and Experience, memory appears as a paradigmatic case of being 
conscious of reality in a way that foregrounds „[t]he contrast between meaning and 
reality‟ because in memory (as in anticipation) „the reality intended is [not] a present 
sense perception‟ (KE 49) but a perception of the past (or future). Memory, in other 
words, is an instance of „the consciousness of an intended reality and of a present 
meaning which are not co-existent in time‟ (KE 49). In every case of distinguishing an 
object, consciousness connects two aspects of its appearance, „an intended reality‟ in 
which the object appears and „a meaning‟ that enables the object‟s integrity and identity 
with itself. But in the case of memory, in contrast to direct perception, these two stages 
of linguistically supported objectification are separated by a temporal gap: the reality in 
„sense perception‟ is in the remembered past, while „a meaning‟ is what is remembered 
in the present. In this split, immediate experience is no longer located in the sensuous 
contact of the conscious body with its immediate environment but in the consciousness 
in which the event of remembering of that past experience takes place in the present: 
„The reality is there, and the “mental state” here‟ (KE 49). This relocation is enabled by 
the capacity of consciousness to signify its immediate reality and preserve it in memory 
as meaning that can be recalled as real in a moment of remembering. 
The significative process, however, necessarily transforms the immediate 
experience of the reality being signified, in two ways: signification reduces experience 
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to „a meaning‟ leaving out the whole background of pre-objective perception; and 
consciousness re-signifies that meaning in the context of other objects present to it at 
the moment of remembering experience: 
In memory, for example, or anticipation, there may be the consciousness of an 
intended reality and of a present meaning that are not co-existent in time. The 
reality is there, and the „mental state‟ is here. And inasmuch as this present state 
may omit the greater part of what was present to the reality which is 
remembered, and may likewise add or distort, we are accustomed to form the 
notion of a perfect idea of the past experience identical in content with the 
experience itself, and differing only in that it is present as a memory instead of 
past as an experience. (KE 49) 
 
„A memory‟ in the last sentence of this passage is a linguistic entity, a unity of 
the signifier and the signified which is „a perfect idea of the past experience identical in 
content with the experience itself.‟ By stating that past experience „is present as a 
memory,‟ Eliot asserts that the experience expressed in language is present to 
consciousness as meaning: language, that is, does not speak of things absent but instates 
in consciousness the presence of the objects it articulates. The reality of linguistic 
meaning for Eliot is self-evident enough to warn his reader against a misconception of 
memory as an effort of consciousness „to identify itself with the past experience‟ with 
the envisaged „completion of the process [in] hallucination‟ (KE 49). 
Eliot‟s counter-definition of memory refuting this „natural view‟ (KE 49) builds 
on identifying the difference between objectivity emerging from immediate sensory 
perception and objectivity asserted in language. This is a difference in meaning but, 
more importantly, in kind. Memory depends on distinguishing an articulus of an object 
(its „image‟) from the appearance of that object in direct perception, each of the two 
objects (one directly perceived and the other remembered) emerging in a set of relations 
peculiar to the respective mode of their apprehension: 
What we attend to in perception is one group of objects; what we attend to in 
memory is a different group: not, as in perception, the object as in itself it really 
is, but its image. Not that there are two distinct entities, the object and its image 
– the difference is not one of physical objects, but of intended objects. (KE 49) 
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In other words, consciousness knows the difference between the direct presence 
of an object to the senses and its articulated presence. Consciousness knows – or rather 
„feels‟ – in which mode it apprehends the object and this mode of apprehension is the 
aspect of the object‟s presence to consciousness and so of the object itself. The way in 
which the object appears in consciousness qualifies it as either present „in perception, 
the object as in itself it really is‟ or „its image,‟ each of these appearing in „a different 
group‟ of objects. Conscious awareness of this difference is the condition of 
apprehending a memory as memory and not as a (re)production of the past reality which 
– if indeed (re)produced fully, with all levels of the formation of an object in perception 
involved as actively as they are in a direct sensory contact with objective reality – 
would be hallucination. 
This „image‟ is a stable unit of object-meaning only up to a point. The signifying 
process does not end with the transmission of objective reality directly perceived into an 
articulus of an object that is recalled by consciousness (re-)instating its presence. 
Presence is manifest as immediacy; and so the „image‟ – if it is an object present to 
consciousness in „the “mental state” [that] is here‟ – does not stand by itself but is 
complemented by „feeling,‟ an analogue of the residue of the pre-objective „sensations‟ 
experienced in response to the objective reality of „perceptions‟ and of the objects of 
knowledge. „Feeling,‟ as it appears in Eliot‟s description here and throughout his 
dissertation, marks the link between the object and the perceiving consciousness, the 
fact of the presence of the object to the perceiving point of view. „Feeling‟ is towards 
and of the object „felt,‟ but it is an attribute of the consciousness that „feels‟ the presence 
of that object, or experiences it as meaning. Eliot describes it as follows: 
In perception we intend an object; in recollection we intend a complex which is 
composed of image and feeling. We do not intend to remember simply the 
object, but the object as we remember it. And this new object is much more the 
experience than the past object, for we try to remember how we felt towards the 
past object. (KE 49) 
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The example with which Eliot chooses to explicate the dynamic of this process 
is remembering „a public address‟ (KE 50). The choice itself is remarkably consistent 
with the conception of memory that Eliot describes. A speech is an object that is already 
an articulation when directly perceived, so Eliot does not have to account for the 
complexity of the formation of an objective articulus out of „sense-data‟ but can focus 
purely on the transformation of an object as meaning in the process of remembering it. 
But there is more to this choice than a pragmatic philosophical reduction aiming to 
purify the phenomenon being described, for this is an instance of Eliot‟s submission to 
his own premise that the logic of the pre-objective sensory perception is unspeakable 
because linguistic articulation is only of objective reality, and for the non-objective 
there are no words. The pre-objective background of experience can be referred to, as I 
am referring to it now and as Eliot does by naming it „immediate experience‟ or 
„feeling,‟ and its formative significance to our understanding of reality identified, as 
Eliot does by claiming that the world is „an ideal construction of descriptions linked to 
the physiological and to the logical system‟ (KE 106). But this kind of reference is the 
limit of its denotation: in language, the pre-objective sensory perception of the real 
appears only as an aspect of the immediate presence to consciousness of the objects 
named, unsignifiable otherwise than in the prefix to the word denoting the object being 
perceived, as in the term „pre-objectivity‟ itself. 
Effectively, the object of Eliot‟s attention in his description of memory is the 
interaction between the intention of consciousness to organise this pre-objective 
perception into an objective whole and the linear-temporal structure of linguistic 
expression. Consciousness objectifies by way of being inclined to identify as the object 
of its attention the most totalising meaning of what it perceives to be its appearance in 
an instance of reference, while intermediary objectivities through the perception of 
which consciousness has constructed that ultimate object are dismissed as no longer 
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significant. To recall James, „all brain processes are such as give rise to what we call 
FIGURED consciousness‟ that understands reality as consisting of „definite objects, not 
mere hodge-podges of elements‟ (82), while all pre-figured stages of its perception – 
„sensations‟ and then „perceptions‟ – are dismissed once reality has appeared to 
consciousness as the reality of objects. Though Eliot sees the mechanism of purely 
sensory perception as inaccessible to the analytic eye, he understands the process of 
communicating linguistic meaning to be susceptible to the Jamesian principle of the 
conscious perception, according to which consciousness aims at the identification of the 
object of the highest conceptual order. There is nothing to see before the process of 
objectification is complete enough for objects to be recognised as meanings, and its 
formative elements – the „sensations‟ through which the object asserted its presence to 
consciousness – are dropped, forgotten once the object has been perceived as the object. 
But this transformation does not stop once the stage of linguistic articulation of the 
perceived is reached: the inclination of consciousness to understand the perceived 
reality on the highest conceptual plane remains. In Eliot, this inclination of conscious 
perception manifests itself as intertwined with the structure of language. 
Unlike objects immediately perceived through the senses, linguistic meaning – 
which is the object a linguistic expression articulates – is structurally organised, and the 
hierarchy of its organisation is perceived temporally by hearing (or reading) a sequence 
of linguistic expression. Structurally, language articulates meaning by combining units 
that in themselves are not parts of the meaning being articulated. Sounds of the word are 
not constituents of its meaning, just as words are not quite the meaning of a sentence 
comprising them (this disparity is best seen in idiomatic expressions: the meaning of the 
phrase „under the weather,‟ for example, is not the sum of the meanings of the words it 
comprises). These units can be analytically identified as different kinds of objective 
entities (sounds, words and sentences, also „a public address‟) that are hierarchically (a 
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word is of sounds, and a sentence is of words that are of sounds). And a linguistic 
utterance articulates this hierarchy in a linear sequence, in its turn temporally perceived. 
In the direct perception of a linguistic articulation, the chrono-logic of the conscious 
construction of an object through a sequence of objective transformations coincides 
with the chrono-logic of its expression in linguistic structure. But this overlap, the 
ground in which meaning is perceived in continuity of its expression, is broken when 
the linguistic expression is re-collected after it has been understood in entirety: 
consciousness preserves the final, most totalising meaning of the expression, while the 
sequence itself and the dynamic of the process in which it was perceived are dropped. 
Eliot‟s description of this disparity in the formation of meaning in the direct 
perception of a linguistic sequence compared to the meaning remembered shows a 
remarkable awareness of the structural planes of language, from phonetic to lexical to 
syntactic and discursive. This structure arises in the process of the perception of 
language: meaning is not the property of the linguistic sequence itself but results from 
the conscious activity of constructing it in perceiving the sequence, the activity itself 
and the sequence pushed out of the horizon of consciousness once the significative 
process is complete: 
We are attempting to recall, let us say, a public address which we have heard. If 
memory were simply a restoration of the past, we might expect to recall first the 
words or fragment of the sentences which the speaker uttered, rather than the 
sense which we extracted therefrom. For these sounds which he uttered take 
precedence in time of the meaning; the meaning, to use Meinong‟s phrase, is a 
zeitverteilter Gegenstand [object distributed in time], and the fact that we recall 
the meaning, in most cases before we recall the actual words, would imply that 
the past presents itself in a different time-order than that of the objective time in 
which the events are held to have taken place. Now in most cases the meaning is 
what we want; if we had to live through the whole speech again to re-extract the 
meaning, we should find it very inconvenient. And the meaning can hardly be 
said to exist in time as the spoken words exist. (KE 50) 
 
Consciousness, that is, already in the process of direct perception aims for the 
meaningful unit of a conceptually highest structural level, before the process of the 
utterance and perception of a linguistic expression is completed. And once this unit is 
53 
 
established, there is no way back: it is preserved in memory as the meaning of the past 
experience, forgetting the intermediary stages of its formation. Further, even if 
consciousness tried to recollect those intermediary stages through which the meaning 
emerged, it would re-experience them only in the light of the most totalising meaning to 
which they have led. 
James, ostensibly focusing his attention on what Eliot considers to be the 
unanalysable „feeling,‟ explicitly states that the perceptual and the significative planes 
of a linguistic sign are interdependent. He cites the French phrase „Pas de lieu Rhône 
que nous,‟ and comments: 
[O]ne may read this over and over again without recognizing the sounds to be 
identical with those of the words paddle your own canoe. As we seize the 
English meaning the sound itself appears to change. [...] at that moment one may 
often surprise a change in the very feel of the word. (80) 
 
Not only does consciousness aim at the most inclusive meaning of a linguistic 
articulation but this most inclusive meaning, once identified, contaminates the matter of 
the perceived through which the meaning reaches consciousness. Once consciousness 
realises the possibility that the acoustic form can hold a parallel content, the form is 
perceived as at least double, working in both systems of relations in which it is a 
significative structure, in this example English and French. The whole of the langue, in 
itself understood as the structure of relations between objects that are significative 
elements within a systematic whole, determines the character of the direct perception of 
the sound, „the very feel of the word.‟ In the Eliotic vocabulary, the pre-objective 
„feeling‟ is not only the background and the source of the objective reality which 
emerges from it but is also determined in nature by the (linguistic) meaning to which 
consciousness attributes it as the perceptual aspect of the object. A transformation from 
one plane of signification to another – from, say, pre-objective „sensations‟ to more 
clearly objectified „perceptions‟ – is irreversible for an analytic eye to see and explain. 
This means, among other things, that once an objective transformation has taken place, 
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the analytic eye cannot disregard it nor can it see the pre-objective for what it was 
before it was subordinated to the objective meaning consciousness has perceived most 
recently. Sensory perception is not only pre-linguistic but also post-linguistic: the 
„sensation‟ itself, also the „feeling,‟ is determined by the distinctions of which „feeling‟ 
is an aspect. 
This capacity of linguistic articulation to shape experience from the most 
abstract to the most immediate, sensory levels of the significative mechanism of 
consciousness-in-the-body is the bottom line of the aesthetic affectivity of poetic 
language. For Eliot, this effect is not exclusively poetic: all language conveys meaning 
that is articulated by linguistic structure but located in experience eventually rooted in 
the non-articulable sensory perception, or the perceiving body. Meaning is by definition 
someone‟s, the communicative situation either the speaker‟s and/or the addressee‟s, and 
the situation of remembering adds yet another experiencing instance, the remembering 
point of view – all these meanings, for Eliot, are different meanings, though the 
linguistic expression that directs their construction is the same „public speech:‟ 
[T]he meaning intended in attention to the speaker is not the same as the 
meaning intended in recollection. In hearing, we aim at the meaning of the 
speaker – in memory we aim at the meaning which we drew from his words. 
And the same distinction holds good, though it is less apparent, even with the 
speaker‟s words: for we intend in the one case the words as spoken, in relation 
to the speaker, and we intend in the other the words as we heard them. And the 
words in this aspect, were never an actual object of perception; they have their 
existence only in memory. (KE 50) 
 
The supplement of the experiencing body, that is, never disappears from the 
structure of meaning as Eliot sees it. As long as the object-meaning is in formation, the 
subjective-experiential constituent shows itself as conscious perception which builds 
this object-meaning out of the network of perceptual and linguistic associations. And 
when the object of conscious attention has reached the completion of its objective 
identity in the highest degree, it brings the subject with it, as the consciousness-in-the-
body that has intended and experienced this object-meaning. The subject is born at the 
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moment of the transformation of the perceived reality into the reality of objects. 
Throughout the process of objectification, it has been the perceiving-and-signifying 
consciousness; at the moment of the completion of this objectifying process, this 
articulating consciousness-in-the-body turns into a speaking voice that expresses the 
meaning it has perceived. 
Correspondingly to the difference between objects of direct perception and those 
linguistically instated, Eliot distinguishes two kinds of articulating bodies, one involved 
in the process of direct experience of reality that is being objectified into meaning and 
the other reflecting (in remembering, for example) on that experience as a meaning 
already known: 
The past which we aim at is the experience of an ideal individual, who should 
have been both internal and external to ourselves, who should have both known 
and experienced the past to which in a very loose sense our memory may be said 
to refer. (KE 50) 
 
For Eliot, the relation between subject and object is strictly a matter of the 
degree of objectification. The subject is the other of the object, instated by the object 
appearing to consciousness but never an entity existing before the object to which 
consciousness attends. The distinction between the „internal and external‟ individual in 
the fragment I have just quoted refers to two modes of apprehending objective reality, 
internality associated with direct sensory experience and externality with articulation. In 
direct perception, the object-meaning forms and transforms as a series of pre-articulate 
„sensations,‟ and hence remains fundamentally „internal‟ experience, enclosed in the 
perceiving body. Meanwhile, objective reality is „external‟ to this body because it has 
been defined as the reality of objects distinct from the perceiving viewpoint itself. 
But language is not the only means of expressing the meaning of the directly 
perceived reality: this meaning is also expressed through the body in its immediate 
response, as behaviour to the objects being perceived. Eliot articulates the significance 
of behaviour as part of his explanation of the interdependence between language and 
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objective reality encapsulated in the sentence „Without words, no objects‟ (KE 132). The 
recognition of an object present to the senses, according to this description, begins with 
the bodily response: „[I]n any knowledge prior to speech the object is not so much an 
identity recognized as it is in a similar way of acting; the identity is rather lived out than 
known‟ (KE133). While „the explicit recognition of an object as such‟ is impossible 
„without the beginnings of speech,‟ the recognition of the object‟s identity may just as 
well be expressed by „a form of behavior‟ which, if sufficiently regular, is understood in 
a similar way as a linguistic expression. To know the object as an object is not possible 
without language because, in addition to the fact that a part of the object‟s identity to 
itself is its linguistic meaning, language is at the basis of the subject-object distinction 
itself: „Our only way of showing that we are attending to an object is to show that it and 
ourself are independent entities, and to do this we must have names‟ (KE 133). But there 
is also a regularity of non-linguistic response, before this regularity turns into the 
linguistic understanding of what the perceived object is. 
We may say if we like that the dog sees the cat and knows it is a cat, though it 
does not know its name, and I have no objection to this way of speaking loosely. 
But when we ask in what this knowledge consists, we can only point to a form 
of behaviour. [...] the point at which behaviour changes into mental life is 
essentially indefinite; it is a question of interpretation whether in expression 
which is repeated at the approach of the same object (as a cat may have a 
peculiar way of acting at the approach of a dog) [there] is behaviour or language. 
(KE 133) 
 
Ostensibly, the argument of this description is against thinking of objects 
independently of linguistic structure. In the encounter of a cat and a dog, „we have no 
object (except from the point of view of the observer, which must not be confused with 
that of the patient under examination),‟ for it is only „language which gives us objects 
rather than mere “passions”‟ (KE 133). But nevertheless, from the point of view of the 
observer, Eliot reads the behaviour of a cat and a dog in a similar way as reading a 
linguistic expression. Even though „passions‟ that arise in response to one‟s immediate 
reality are unknowable until they are identified as responses to objects meanings, their 
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pre-linguistic bodily expressions can be understood, (re-)constructed by an observer in 
his language by interpreting the behaviour of „the patient under examination.‟ 
By the time Eliot submitted his dissertation, he had used an opportunity to think 
of the structure of this (re-)construction as the core methodological problem of the 
anthropological investigation. And soon after submitting his dissertation he will define 
this immediate behavioural response as aesthetic, both contexts being examined in my 
next chapter. In Knowledge and Experience, Eliot states the ultimate inaccessibility and 
yet the authority of sensory perception in a description of hallucination. Eliot‟s purpose 
here is to insist on „the unity and continuity of feeling and objectivity,‟ these two being 
„only discriminated aspects in the whole of experience‟ (KE 115). The emphasis on „the 
whole of experience‟ implies that an object appears in the full complexity of objective 
relations, and so its identity to (and difference from) itself is perceived only by the point 
of view that makes the judgement what it is. Eliot looks at „a child frightened by a 
bogey:‟ 
The child „thinks it sees‟ a bear. The meaning of this phrase is by no means self-
evident, for we have, I believe, no criterion for saying that the child does or does 
not see a bear. Such an illusion may be much more, or much less, than a 
cinematograph bear; Pierre Janet gives examples, from among his hysterical, of 
the sensation of touch and weight as well. [...] I do not see any priority of image 
over emotion, or vice versa. There is, if you like, a tendency for emotion to 
objectify itself, but the implication is surely mutual, for feeling and image react 
upon one another inextricably, and the two aspects are so closely related, that 
you cannot say that the relation is casual. (KE 115-116) 
 
The pre-objective sensory perception, also „passion‟ and, as here, „emotion,‟ is 
aroused by an objective reality that consciousness aims to identify and respond to 
accordingly, to which Eliot refers to as „a tendency for emotion to objectify itself.‟ This 
objectification intertwines all levels of perception and signification so intimately that 
they supplement one another without any discernible laws of dominance (there is „no 
priority of image over emotion, or vice versa‟) or a possibility of discriminating what 
aspects of the object perceived have been supplemented. The bear appears to the child 
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real on the level of sensory perception, with the potential of „touch and weight as well‟ 
as that of vision, these sensory responses shaping for the child a complex of perceptual-
significative associations (mis)identified as a bear, this identity marked out by the word 
denoting the object dominating the child‟s immediate reality. We know that there is no 
bear in the environment we share with the child, and conclude that the child is 
„frightened by a bogey.‟ But the fact that we know there is no bear and so the child must 
be experiencing an illusion does not annul the child‟s experience of a bear‟s presence as 
real. 
It is therefore not altogether true or altogether false to say that the child sees a 
bear. For to take one group of relations of the word „bear‟, and say that this 
group and no other shall constitute the meaning, is not only unwarranted but 
impossible. The child does not know just what it means when it says „bear‟, nor 
do we know what it means; it does not know what it has perceived when it has 
been frightened by a „bear‟, nor do we know what it has perceived. For as the 
difference between real bear and illusory bear is a difference of fullness of 
relations, and is not the sort of difference which subsists between two classes of 
objects, so the one word must cover both reality and error. (KE 116) 
 
We are able to discriminate between „reality and error,‟ Eliot says, by comparing 
our perceptions of what we infer to be the same object and recognising, in this 
comparison, a distinctive enough difference in similarity of those perceptions: „The 
error is thus error because we are able in practice to assume that it was the true object 
that we perceived the whole time‟ (KE 116). Objective reality is an outcome of the 
perceiving and signifying activity of the articulating consciousness, or an interpretation. 
And the judgement about its truthfulness is a product of the interpretation from another 
point view, the one that observes both the objective reality in question and the 
consciousness that identifies that object and decides whether the interpretation of reality 
of that consciousness is acceptable as true or not. Eliot presents this argument in 
defence of his insistence on the relativity of reality, or the non-existence of the absolute, 
metaphysical truth: 
The real object was „there‟, and in a practical sense it was that to which the 
perception referred, but the solution, in which we account for a true and a false 
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perception by summing them up under an identical reference, is essentially a 
practical solution, inasmuch as it involves an interpretation of a point of view 
which we do not accept, that of the error, and an interpretation is essentially 
unverifiable. (KE 117) 
 
This „practical solution‟ of identifying an object perceived with a meaning, 
which is the event of signification, relies on two characteristics of the perceiving-and-
interpreting consciousness: the will of the perceiving point of view to claim that 
meaning for that object and its resource of memory in which the object in question 
appears to it and is identified with other appearances of that object. Objective identity, 
Eliot says, is „an ideal identity‟ which is „supported, if you like the phrase, by the will‟ 
(KE 52) in an act of recognising the sameness of relation between the „image‟ of the 
object in memory and reality directly perceived, while this relation itself „exists only in 
relation with other (in fact, with all the other) identities in the series‟ (KE 52). This 
„series‟ is the resource of the memory of the perceiving-and-signifying point of view: 
You have a past experience and a present memory and, if these were all that 
existed, even they would not exist for they would only constitute two utterly 
disparate worlds. But you have also and experience b and a memory B, and so 
on, and when you have the two alphabets given and only then you have some 
standard for comparison. The reference of each memory is not given separately, 
but you are, in a sense, given the whole series first. You cannot say simply „A is 
identical with a‟, but you say „A is identical with a, with regard to the identity of 
B with b‟ and vice versa. (KE 52) 
 
The message of this algebraic description is that the „series‟ of the related pairs 
which the signifying consciousness sees as analogous appears on the basis of two types 
of memory: experiential, here marked by small letters and elsewhere described as rooted 
in the senses, and significative-linguistic, here marked by the capital letters and 
elsewhere associated with the object-„image‟ held in memory as „a perfect idea of the 
past experience‟ (KE 49). This imagined „series‟ of analogical relations between 
significative units and pre-signified experience implicitly assumes that consciousness, 
in the course of its life, accumulates the experience of not only objects as units of 
meaning identical to themselves, as „images,‟ but also the experience of their 
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appearance in process, as they emerge to consciousness out of the pre-objective reality it 
perceives. And since the significative-objectifying mechanism is enabled by the 
relational „series‟ accumulated by consciousness, it is individual to every point of view 
because it ultimately depends on the history of perception of that point of view. Our 
realities, though all emerging in the common world, are individually unique because we 
have individual, essentially singular biographies. 
Eliot understands this singularity radically. If the laws in which direct perception 
and signification intertwine in the course of the biography of a point of view are 
indeterminable, psychology is impossible because the object of its inquiry, the subject, 
does not exist. Eliot devotes to this issue a full chapter of Knowledge and Experience 
(KE 57-83). But in the light of his premises about the structure of objective reality, the 
reasons for the impossibility of the psychological subject are stated in one sentence: 
Apparently, another person may be an intended object, but can be a real object 
only to the person himself – and a person is not an object to himself, because he 
is directly acquainted with himself, and acquaintance is not a subject-object 
relation. (KE 106) 
 
The subject is real only to the subject himself because direct sensory experience 
is the property of one‟s own body only; and since all objective reality is grounded in 
immediate perception, a self „can be a real object only to the person himself.‟ But the 
rootedness of consciousness in the body also means that it cannot fully objectify itself 
from the immediate experience of itself into a significative unit as it does in completing 
the process of objectification of other objects. The supplement of direct, pre-objective 
experience to the object that consciousness is trying to define, itself, is impossible to 
eliminate because consciousness cannot eliminate direct experience of itself. And direct 
„acquaintance is not a subject-object relation‟ because the distinction between 
consciousness as the perceiving subject and consciousness as the object perceived is 
incomplete. The subject is either not real, a logically constructed but fictional object 
observed as „another person,‟ or not an object accessible to knowledge at all but a 
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perceiving-and-signifying point of view, unanalysable by definition. 
 
 
A DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT AS THE PERCEIVING-AND-SIGNIFYING POINT OF VIEW 
 
The issue of the subject in Eliot has left many of his readers rather perplexed. His notion 
of subjectivity builds on the crossroad of two conceptual perspectives that do not 
contradict each other but are hard to keep simultaneously in mind. On the one hand, 
subjectivity is the locale – the perceiving and signifying centre – of objective reality; 
and yet, on the other hand, it is an essentially open medium, a functional network that 
organises all reality into a universe of the meaningful relations that the subject learns in 
the course of its life. 
Eliot‟s own description of this relationality appears in the introductory part of 
his dissertation as a gesture of rejection of „Mr Russell‟s supposition of a 
“consciousness” which might merely exist for a moment and experience the sensation 
of red.‟ Eliot‟s alternative is to insist on the Jamesian notion of „context‟ which is also 
„that of which Bradley speaks when he says that the finite content is “determined from 
the outside”‟ (KE 29). Eliot proceeds: 
This determination from the outside is unending. In the first place, there is my 
present physical constitution, which determines the experience without being an 
element in it, and there is my whole past, conceived as either the history of my 
body or as the sequence of conscious experiences, so far as I can detach them 
from the objects in the experience, and consider them only as adjectives to 
myself. And secondly, there are the nature and the connection of the object, 
which fall outside of the present moment of experience, and are discovered on 
closer scrutiny. As we develop subject and object side, they seem to 
approximate independence, for the object is certainly independent of this 
knower, and the knower independent of any particular object: on the one side we 
get souls and selves, on the other the physical universe. (KE 29) 
 
We need the distinction between the subject and the object to understand the 
reality in which we live. However, this distinction does not mark a dividing line 
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between them but is a condition for their interaction, a distinction that is drawn only in 
order to be continuously broken. There is consciousness and there is reality outside it, 
yet consciousness is not an entity in itself but is subject to the „unending‟ „determination 
from the outside‟ which Eliot understands as physical non-objectified matter. A dividing 
line between the subject and the object cannot be drawn in experience. But the 
hypothetical – purely theoretical – distinction between them enables us to see 
experience as the site of their reciprocal interrelation, without either being the origin of 
the other: „That objects are dependent upon consciousness, or consciousness upon 
objects, we most resolutely deny‟ (KE 29-30). Their purity is only intended and never 
really experienced. Even in thinking of subjectivity and objectivity per se, they only 
„seem to approximate independence‟ without ever reaching it because thinking itself is 
the outcome of their mutual contamination, a product of their interrelatedness in which 
subjectivity and objectivity appear in their respective approximations, consciousness 
and object. Reality is their interaction, their reciprocity, without either pre-dominating 
the other: 
Consciousness, we shall find, is reducible to relations between objects, and 
objects we shall find to be reducible between different states of consciousness; 
and neither point of view is more nearly ultimate than the other. (KE 30) 
 
Hence, there is no mental reality as opposed to the outside world, no definable 
inwardness for psychology to study: „[T]he external world and the mental world are 
exactly the same stuff‟ (KE 74). 
Just as the Heideggerian „state-of-mind,‟ the locus of Dasein that is not 
„encapsulated as something “internal” over against something outside‟ but „as Being-in-
the-world [...] is already “outside” when it understands‟ (Being and Time 205, H 162), 
the Eliotic consciousness does not contain anything inside it but is the medium that 
constantly articulates the meaning of the reality (in) which it lives. A part of this 
ongoing process of articulation is a repeated split in the point of view in every moment 
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of understanding, for in such moment consciousness situates itself as an existent, an 
object, of the world it understands, and that object is no longer the experiencing point of 
view looking at it. This objectified consciousness is a self, or a soul; and it redefines 
itself in every moment of understanding the world in which it lives. The ongoing 
interpretation of the world also is the interpretation of the self that interprets it, and then 
it is this self – the point of view that immediately experiences the world which it speaks 
– that is the ultimate instance of truth. In „Degrees of Reality,‟ Eliot gives two 
definitions of the absolute: it is the identity between „the crudest experience and the 
abstrusest theory,‟ but it is also the unique self: „Degree of truth is degree of 
individuality, and the ultimate individuality is the absolute‟ (14, 15). In Knowledge and 
Experience, Eliot more elaborately articulates the relationship between the world and 
the self: 
The point of view (or finite centre) has for its object one consistent world, and 
accordingly no finite centre can be self-sufficient, for the life of a soul does not 
consist in the contemplation of one consistent world but in the painful task of 
unifying (to a greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and passing, 
when possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall 
somehow include and transmute them. The soul is so far from being a monad 
that we have not only interpret other souls to ourself but to interpret ourself to 
ourself. (KE 147-148) 
 
A consciousness is inconceivable – there is only the world it sees. And because it 
is the same world, consciousness wants to see it as coherent in spite of the truth that this 
world does not appear identical to itself in different „moments of knowledge‟ (KE 155). 
The soul itself appears to itself as a constituent of that world: it (re-)instates its own 
objectivity, an identity to itself within the world it sees in every „moment[] of 
knowledge‟ of the world anew. Hence the task of interpreting „ourself to ourself‟ is 
analogous to that of interpreting „other souls to ourself.‟ Our other selves are removed in 
time, and so in the space they see, from our immediate reality being experienced here-
and-now, so our continuity with ourselves is a part of the continuity of the world and we 
(re-)establish this continuity in constantly changing reality through interpretation. This 
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interpretation is the activity of „a higher‟ point of view that „shall somehow include and 
transmute‟ the „two or more discordant viewpoints.‟ This „higher‟ point of view is closer 
to the absolute truth but only that it perceives and interprets the „discordant‟ ones that 
are in its view in the present moment. Every self-reflecting move of consciousness is a 
shift in point of view, the reflecting consciousness always being the „higher‟ viewpoint 
in relation to those observed: 
Wherever a point of view may be distinguished, I say, there a point of view is. 
And whereas we may change our point of view, it is better not to say that the 
point of view has changed. For if there is noticeable change, you have no 
identity of which to predicate the change. (KE 148) 
 
The subject, hence, is no more than a relative stability of a point of view, a 
stability found in the sameness of the body which, however, does not coincide with the 
sameness of the conscious point of view that lives in it. For consciousness never stands 
still in its tireless pursuit of defining the ultimate object, the totality of the world, itself 
being an element of it among others; and hence this movement towards a more inclusive 
perception is a movement of the point of view repeatedly aiming to include itself into its 
own vision of the entire world. And this inclusion, if realised as such, means another 
split in the viewpoint: „Strictly speaking, a point of view taking note of another is no 
longer the same, but a third, centre of feeling‟ (KE 149). 
 
■ 
This third centre of feeling is the bottom line of the implications of these philosophical 
premises for the aesthetics of poetry. In „Degrees of Reality,‟ Eliot defines this third 
viewpoint as the „irreducible‟ „act of attention‟ to all reality, this reality both sensually 
perceived and articulated in terms of the „systems‟ by means of which we explain the 
real in discourse (17). All discourse assumes the presence of this irreducible point of 
view, a perceiving-and-signifying consciousness which interprets the meaning of the 
language being spoken in that discourse. This point of view is the locus of the meaning 
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that the discourse articulates in its language, meaning itself understood as experience 
directed by the signifying structure but not the structure itself. The event of meaning is 
the moment of understanding when the (mediatory) linguistic structure merges with the 
(immediate) experience of the meaning it brings alive to the perceiving-and-signifying 
consciousness. 
The presence of this perceiving-and-signifying consciousness – or, rather, its 
involvement in the interpretative process – turns a poem as a linguistic structure into an 
instance of discourse which is a statement of truth, the validity of that statement 
confirmed by the fact of the experience of the poem‟s meaning. A poem, that is, 
assumes the presence of the experiential supplement to its linguistic structure, the 
reading consciousness-in-the-body responsive to linguistically communicated meaning 
both conceptually and perceptually. Poetic language relies on the imaginative capacities 
of the perceiving consciousness through which the experience of the reality this 
language speaks is bodily as well as linguistic. The poem‟s reader is like the child 
frightened of a bogey that the poem has constructed in its language. The reading 
consciousness-in-the-body supplies the missing elements for the „fullness of relations‟ it 
cannot help but see as „a bear‟ in the process of experience. At the same time, the reader 
is the observer of this experience, for she knows that this „bear‟ is a bogey, a „fullness of 
relations‟ that is a presence instated in the process of interpreting the poem‟s language, 
with no objective entity to point to as the source of the perception that has been 
experienced as „a bear‟ (KE 116). 
It is only in Four Quartets that a structure bringing these two points of view, the 
experiential and the linguistic, into one will be realised. This poem defines its reality as 
the field of conscious perception and plays on the inclination of consciousness to 
establish the most totalising meaningful structure in this field. The dynamic of this play 
I will explore in my reading of Four Quartets. The Waste Land, meanwhile, does not 
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yet dare to assume sufficient knowledge of signifying perception but only insists on the 
fact of its irreducible presence, a presence that it obsessively and somewhat 
paradoxically restates as a gap, a lack, an absence of meaningfulness in a reality 
overcrowded with unrealised, dead possibilities of meaning. 
Before moving to the poems, I want to look into two fields of Eliot‟s theoretical 
concern – his writing on anthropology and his criticism of Hamlet – where the two 
points of view, the analytic and the experiential, are evident in Eliot‟s own thinking. In 
his analysis of the methods of anthropological investigation, Eliot identifies the limits of 
linguistic communication and considers the alternative channel through which 
experience may be communicated, by way of extra-linguistic sympathetic identification 
with the other, which then appears as the ground for Eliot‟s formulation of the nature of 
aesthetic experience. His response to Hamlet shows this alternative channel of 
communication at work, for Eliot identifies with Hamlet‟s point of view in this way in 
1919, and reflects on this experience in 1937. These critical assessments of Hamlet 
expose the structure of Eliot‟s thinking as the extra-analytic, experiential viewpoint 
susceptible to the aesthetic affect evoked by Shakespeare. Both contexts, Eliot‟s 
knowledge of anthropology and his response to Shakespeare, appear in Eliot‟s poetry as 
sources of thematic motifs and formal structures, which I will consider in Part II. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
 
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL MODEL OF AESTHETIC IMMEDIACY AND 
HAMLET’S EMOTIONAL EXCESS 
 
 
In the perspective from which I read Eliot, his interest in anthropology appears as an 
extension of his life-long, though often implicit, concern with the functioning of 
language. Anthropology presents for Eliot an epistemological project facing the core 
question with which Eliot himself is preoccupied as a philosopher and poet: given the 
fact of the intrinsic dependence of all knowledge and understanding on language, what 
are the possibilities of communicating experience that is not the property of the 
linguistic structure? How – if at all – does one access experience beyond that which is 
already known, already conceptualised in the language that is the structure of one‟s 
thinking and through which all experience is interpreted and understood? Anthropology 
suggests for Eliot an alternative form of articulation and communication that in itself is 
extra-linguistic, the rite, which Eliot then regards as the prototype of the aesthetic form. 
Both the rite and the work of art demand extra-linguistic involvement in their perception 
and, through this extra-linguistic dimension, communicate unknown experience as 
meaning. The focus of my attention in reading manifestations of Eliot‟s interest in 
anthropology is on ways in which anthropological contexts offer him models of linking 
linguistic structure and immediate experience. 
As such a source of alternative ways of interpreting reality, anthropology has 
been seen as present in Eliot‟s field of vision from early childhood to the final period of 
his career: its significance has been highlighted in his creative writing beyond The 
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Waste Land (most extensively by Robert Crawford), and its assumptions has been seen 
as underlying his cultural criticism (explored by Marc Manganaro). Anthropological 
narratives provide Eliot with an abundance of poetic motifs and structures, 
foregrounded by some critics more consistently than others. Examples include Anne 
Bolgan, who builds coherence in The Waste Land on the narrative of the Fisher King, 
and Martha Carpentier, who singles out Jane Harrison as an underestimated source of 
mythological motifs in Eliot among other modernists. These correspondences, however, 
are manifestations of the deeper presence of anthropology in the frame of Eliot‟s 
thought. Anthropological discourse appears in Eliot‟s thinking as a source of structural 
models by means of which language can be taken beyond its systematic determinacies, 
used in ways that point to inarticulable, unmediated experience. This kind of 
significance of anthropology in Eliot is the focus of a number of theoretically oriented 
critics. Jewel Spears Brooker presents Frazer as providing Eliot with a method of a 
conceptually non-unified discourse for The Waste Land („The Case of the Missing 
Abstraction‟), while anthropological discourse beyond Eliot‟s immediate contexts – 
with reference to Lévi-Strauss – helps us to see the continuity of Eliot‟s anthropological 
method from his early masterpiece to Four Quartets („From The Waste Land to Four 
Quartets: Evolution of a Method,‟ Lobb 84-106). William Harmon sees Eliot‟s poetry 
as expressing the peculiarities of the „primitive mentality,‟ the anthropological analogue 
of the Eliotic unified sensibility (800-801), and presents Eliot as „a philosophical 
anthropologist and, in poetry, a quasi-primitive as well‟ (797). Manganaro continues 
this line of thought, further exploring Harmon‟s thesis within the corpus of Eliot‟s 
creative and theoretical writing, but also situating it in the context of the linguistic turn 
in contemporary anthropology. Eliot‟s view of the problems of anthropological 
investigation appears as an early instance of James Clifford‟s and Clifford Geertz‟s 
insistence on the participatory involvement of the anthropologist in the culture he 
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describes. The anthropologist is thus seen as a writer of First Text, an inquirer who 
disregards extant accounts of the culture in question but instead discovers it through 
first-hand experience, articulating its values by way of „a logocentric transformation of 
native “experience” into‟ the text that the anthropologist writes (Myth, Rhetoric and the 
Voice of Authority 2-9). Manganaro shows that Eliot‟s criticism and poetry, with special 
attention given to The Waste Land and Four Quartets, is consistently searching for 
ways to grasp the „extrasemantic (or presemantic)‟ (92), „prelogical‟ (94) – aesthetic – 
dimensions of experience. And Eric Gould focuses on Four Quartets alone out of all 
Eliot‟s oeuvre: it is this poem – in its discursive structure rather than The Waste Land in 
its narrative allusions to the Grail – that realises most fully the dimension of „mythicity.‟ 
Through the multifaceted prism of hermeneutics and anthropological and linguistic 
theories of the twentieth century, Gould defines mythicity as a condition of „writing 
itself as it evokes the simultaneously open and closed nature of experience‟ (43) by 
virtue of the exceptional capacity of an aesthetically organised text to lead the 
interpretative process of reading into understanding meanings that are not directly 
expressed. 
My contribution to this field of Eliot criticism is in the attempt to trace Eliot‟s 
theoretical formulations of the extra-linguistic, aesthetic aspect of the kind of 
articulation and communication of meaning that anthropology defines for him. In his 
analysis of the premises and methods of anthropological inquiry, Eliot articulates the 
fact of the intrinsic connection between linguistic structure and the immediate 
experience of meaning. To articulate this connection, the analytic stance must in Eliot‟s 
thinking give way to the phenomenological position from which an analytically 
discerned meaning is true, actually present in immediate experience. In his 
philosophical work Eliot refers to this connection as a moment of identity between 
theory and experience, and it is the experienced meaning of a rite or of a work of art. 
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This moment can be approached in two ways: described analytically from the 
theoretical viewpoint, reflecting on both the formal structure that articulates the 
meaning and the experience of that structure; or experienced as immediate reality only, 
in which case its analytically discernable structure is invisible to the experiencing eye. 
This distinction will underlie my use of the terms „effect‟ and „affect.‟ Aesthetic effects 
of a work of art are defined from the position of an observer, in appreciation of both the 
effect produced and the formal structure that produces it. Meanwhile, aesthetic affect 
refers to the experience of being affected by the aesthetic force of a work of art to the 
degree of preventing the perceiving viewpoint from appreciating the formal structure 
that directs aesthetic perception. Eliot reflects on the subtlety of this distinction – the 
impossibility, in fact, of drawing a clear dividing line between analytic and immediate 
perception of an aesthetic object – in his definitions of aesthetic experience in 
anthropological contexts, the subject matter of the middle section of this chapter. This 
ambivalence of Eliot‟s notion of the nature of aesthetic experience I will observe in his 
response to Hamlet, the matter of my concern in the closing section of this chapter. It is 
in the state of the affect produced by the Shakespearean effect of aesthetic immediacy 
that Eliot characterises the play in terms of Shakespeare‟s failure to create an aesthetic 
unity in 1919. And he reflects on this experience in 1937, appreciating the fact of the 
play‟s affectivity and identifying formal structures that produce this overwhelming 
effect. The same line of development I will observe in his poetry, seeing The Waste 
Land and Four Quartets as aiming for the two kinds of Shakespearean effects 
respectively. These two poems rely on the doubleness of poetic language, analysable as 
a formal structure of mediation on the one hand, and yet open to the immediate 
experience of interpretative process a poem demands on the other. 
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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMIT OF ANTHROPOLOGY: LANGUAGE IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF PRIMITIVE RITUAL 
 
My discussion of the significance of anthropology to Eliot‟s thought focuses on the 
paper that Eliot gave in December 1913 to a Harvard interdisciplinary seminar led by 
Josiah Royce. The paper is known under the title which Eliot gave it in 1926 in his 
Introduction to Charlotte Eliot‟s dramatic poem Savonarola, „The Interpretation of 
Primitive Ritual.‟ Eliot‟s own summary of his argument in this Introduction had been 
the only evidence of the paper‟s existence till the publication of Harry Costello‟s record 
of Royce‟s seminar, edited by Grover Smith. In 1963, the year of the publication, Smith 
noted that Eliot‟s paper did not survive in any form (Josiah Royce’s Seminar 14). But in 
1968 its manuscript appeared among the papers of the Hayward Bequest to King‟s 
College, Cambridge, and is extensively quoted by Piers Gray in his book on Eliot 
published in 1981, the source of my citations of Eliot‟s paper below (Gray 108-142). 
Bearing these historical circumstances in mind, Eliot‟s given title perhaps has 
done a little disservice to the significance of this paper, so far read primarily as a 
document of his anthropological sources. Indeed, the paper gives a sense of how close 
Eliot‟s familiarity with anthropology was at the time: not only does he know the work 
done in the field across the globe but he knows it well enough to derive and criticise the 
premises on which it relies, whether they are explicitly stated or implicitly assumed. 
Eliot gives a strong reading of Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl of the French 
school of anthropology, as well as of Andrew Lang, Edward Burnett Tylor and Jane 
Ellen Harrison, along with Frazer, of the Anglo-Saxon school, drawing comparative 
conclusions between them from a very insistent analytic perspective of his own. As 
such a critique, the paper shows Eliot concerned with the problem of intercultural 
communication, and so language, rather than with anthropological narratives per se. 
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Eliot defines the analytic focus of his discussion as „causality and interpretation 
of meaning‟ (IPR, Gray 109) and promises to expand on this in the face of the 
problematic status of anthropology within the scientific paradigm. The problem of 
anthropology is that it deals with an object that does not lend itself to properly 
objective, or scientific, treatment: „no “scientific” definition of religion is possible‟ 
(IPR, Gray 109). As a starting point to begin demonstrating this, Eliot quotes Durkheim 
to define the object of anthropology. The so-called „facts‟ of anthropological 
investigation are cultural communities which „are born, develop, die, independently 
from each other...:‟ 
A people wh[ich] replaces another is not simply a prolongation of this other with 
some new characters, it is something other, it has some added properties, some 
less, it constitutes a new individuality, and all these distinct individualities, 
being heterogeneous, can not fuse (se fonder) into one continuous series, nor, 
above all, into a single series (une série unique). (IPR, Gray 114) 
 
In effect, the rest of Eliot‟s paper expands on how absolute this rupture between 
different cultures is. He insists on the cultural dependence of a human mind (in 
opposition to its uniformity as assumed by Tylor and Lang), and takes it further to say 
that anthropological description builds on meaningful links that underlie the 
anthropologist‟s own culture but not necessarily the culture at which he looks. 
Lévy-Bruhl‟s notion of the „pre-logical‟ is a good example of how language 
constructs a reality instead of identifying a „fact‟ outside linguistic structure. Basically, 
„pre-logical‟ terms the mentality of totemic cultures: instead of conceptual reasoning 
underlying Western thinking, these cultures rely on the „law of participation‟ in which 
everything is in part everything else. This law is the core of the self-conception of a 
totemic community that defines itself through identification of its members with a cult, 
which determines specific rites and other social practices of that community. In Eliot‟s 
view, Lévy-Bruhl‟s notion of pre-logical mentality might be useful in describing 
totemism, but the distinction itself is defective and ultimately misleading, because it 
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makes totemic understanding of the world a reduced version of the Western mind 
without doing justice to its otherness. In Eliot‟s words, „it is not certain that the savage 
except so far as he had mental processes similar to our own, had any mental process at 
all‟ (Savonarola viii). At the same time, Lévy-Bruhl implicitly deprives the Western 
mentality of non-logical ways of apprehending reality, a reduction which Eliot refuses 
to accept. It may be the case that „the mystical mentality [...] plays a much greater part 
in the daily life of a savage than in that of the civilised man‟ (Review of C. C. J. Webb 
116) but Lévy-Bruhl seems „to draw the distinction between primitive and civilized 
mental processes altogether too clearly‟ (IPR, Gray 122), exaggerating the difference 
between them (Review of C. C. J. Webb 116). 
Reading Durkheim, Eliot observes an attempt to do away with linguistic 
conceptualising altogether in order to avoid the formative power of the terminology 
being used. Durkheim tries to do it by postulating two rules: „consider social facts like 
things‟ and „systematically set aside all preconceptions‟ (IPR, Gray 124). These rules 
for Durkheim effectively tackle one problem: as a science, anthropology must resist the 
temptation of a coherent explanation if it fails to correspond with the world. In Eliot‟s 
phrasing, this disparity is due to a „contrast between logical necessity of the 
enchainment of our ideas in explanation and the real laws of nature‟ (IPR, Gray 124). 
To avoid an imposition of linguistic logic on the reality being described, Durkheim 
says, anthropological description must group social phenomena by shared exterior 
characteristics but not, as it has been the case, proceed from an ideology as a starting 
point. 
Eliot has a problem with every term of this conception. Firstly, a „fact,‟ a piece 
of empirical given for Durkheim, for Eliot is a conceptual construction: „A fact is a 
point of attention which has only one aspect or [exists] under a certain definite aspect 
which places it in a system;‟ (IPR, Gray 116-7); „A fact, then, is an ideal construction, 
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and has its existence within a more or less variable sphere of practical or scientific 
interest‟ (KE 60). Not only is a fact a linguistic structure before it has a clear relation to 
reality (as „an ideal construction‟ defined by one aspect „in a system‟) but its definition 
fully depends on the point of view that defines it within its own „more or less variable 
sphere of practical or scientific interest.‟ For Eliot, there is no way of escaping either 
language or the formative input from the investigating subject, as Durkheim tries to do 
by establishing his rules. 
Secondly, Eliot finds the notion of a „social fact‟ highly problematic. Durkheim 
defines it, in Eliot‟s translation, as „[a]ny mode of action (maniére de faire), fixed or 
not, which is susceptible of exercising on the individual an exterior (sic) constraint‟ 
(Gray 123). For Eliot, Durkheim, in asking the anthropologist to identify „an exterior 
constraint,‟ demands the impossible, that one answer the question of the motives of 
behaviour which, in Eliot‟s terms, is fundamentally unanswerable. As he generalises in 
this paper, „All questions of intention are [...] too subjective to be treated scientifically‟ 
(IPR, Gray 130). 
The fundamental subjectivity of intentions – the impossibility of knowing 
internal experience until it is externally expressed in language or behaviour – Eliot 
considers in Knowledge and Experience, as I have discussed in detail above. Here, in 
his reading of Durkheim, Eliot formulates this by transforming Durkheim‟s twofold 
distinction, the social exterior versus the individual interior, into a twofold opposition of 
his own, the formal exterior versus the meaningful interior. All behaviour is exterior, 
Eliot says, but its meaning is enclosed in the interiority of intentions which is 
inaccessible to language at all, even if the agent that attempts conceptualising it is the 
same agent who experiences the meaning: 
I say that we must treat the subject in terms of social behaviour, because in the 
scientific explanation the purposes of the people examined can never be taken on 
faith. (IPR, Gray 126) 
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No report, that is, of a native can be trusted, for the native does not know the 
meaning of his behaviour and must put the same kind of effort into explaining it as the 
anthropologist studying his culture (Smith, Josiah Royce’s Seminar 82-3; 119). For 
Eliot, this is a linguistic problem before it is a problem of communication proper: any 
articulation in language involves an unanalysable leap from the immediate experience 
of reality into the conceptual structure of language. And for language to be conceptual, 
it does not have to be scientific, because all language is conceptual: myth, commonly 
seen as an alternative, non-analytic discourse of signifying reality, for Eliot is already 
governed by the logic of linguistic rationality and hence removed from the immediate 
reality grasped in ritual practice. As Eliot says in a review of 1916, 
Mythology does not explain reality but rationalises the savage‟s own religious 
practices, while the true origin of these practices are unknown to the savage just 
as they are to the scientist. („Durkheim‟ 313) 
 
Having made this distinction between the meaningless, exterior form, behaviour, 
and the inaccessible interior meaning, Eliot bends the positivist terms he has read in 
Durkheim to articulate a phenomenological position: 
[I]f you take a purely external point of view, then it is not behaviour but 
mechanism, and social phenomena (and ultimately, I believe, any phenomena) 
simply cease to exist when regarded steadfastly in this light. You must take into 
account the internal meaning: what is a religious phenomenon for example 
which has not a religious meaning for the participants? (IPR, Gray 127) 
 
Having performed the substitution of a „phenomenon‟ for a „fact‟ in order to 
preserve the identity of the object of concern, Eliot jumps back into positivist shoes and 
tries to determine „the point which is as far in the direction of description (and away 
from interpretation) as we can go and still have religious facts to describe‟ (IPR, Gray 
128). This point, in his view, is the practice of worship, the actual ritual; while any 
explanation going beyond that, Eliot says, „will be an increasingly dubious 
interpretation‟ (IPR, Gray 128). This suggests a methodology: 
So far as there is an external order in ritual and creed and in artistic and literary 
expression, this order can be reconstructed and cannot be impugned. But the 
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„facts‟ which can be thus arranged are decidedly limited, and consist historically 
in a certain order – we never know any too exactly of what the order is. (IPR, 
Gray 129) 
 
„Miss Harrison is one of the most proficient exponents‟ of this historical 
comparative method; but her proficiency is not at all devoid of interpretative input: 
„[O]ne has only to open the contents table of one of her extraordinarily documented 
books to perceive how her “fact” melts into interpretation, and in interpretation into 
metaphysics‟ (IPR, Gray 141). The same applies to Frazer. Though Eliot acknowledges 
that Frazer „is unquestionably the greatest master,‟ who indeed managed to prove that, 
across cultures, „certain fixed relations can be found which are not relative to the 
observer,‟ (IPR, Gray 129) he has not avoided falling into the trap of over-interpretative 
activity; Eliot „cannot subscribe for instance to the interpretation with which he ends his 
volume on the Dying God‟ (IPR, Gray 130). 
Eliot‟s remarks may easily be read as critical assessments of the work of 
Harrison and Frazer, as if he said: these are great achievements by these scholars, but 
there are some issues on which it is possible to improve. Yet the core issue is that an 
interpretative input from the subject who describes reality is inescapable and even 
necessary if this reality is being described in the phenomenological terms of human 
experience rather than in the positivist terms of empirical facts, a switch which Eliot 
performs as he reaches a critical point in his reading of Durkheim. The identity of a 
phenomenon to itself is in the meaning in which it presents itself in experience. And as 
we have seen, the identity of meaning, Eliot says in Knowledge and Experience, is „an 
identity supported, if you like the phrase, by the will‟ (KE 52). Eliot‟s definition of the 
anthropological „fact‟ as the fact of ritual, and of religion as the phenomenon of 
experiencing meaning is an act of such will expressed in an emphatic insistence on the 
imperative I have quoted: to „take into account the internal meaning‟ in the 
consideration of religious phenomena (IPR, Gray 127). 
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The major implication that follows from this act of will is that it blends belief, 
meaning, religion, language, culture and consciousness into an unknowable net of 
mutual determinations. Language and religion, in Eliot‟s phenomenological definition 
of religion in terms of „the internal meaning‟ (IPR, Gray 127), appear as determinants of 
experience before it is articulate enough to be accessible to analytic reflection, so the 
meanings they shape in this non-reflective mode of perception are the reality of and for 
consciousness. But language and religion are also social structures shaping the value 
system of a cultural community, which means that consciousness and its reality are 
socially shaped, though neither the precise constellation of the cultural values 
structuring that consciousness nor the ways in which it comes to be can be analytically 
defined. 
At the close of his paper, Eliot says that anthropology is in the hardest possible 
position of all humanities because no one else deals with 
the differences of mind in so significant a sense. [... S]ociology and comparative 
religions [...] have a task so far as I know unique among sciences: that of 
interpreting into one language an indefinite variety of languages. (IPR, Gray 
133). 
 
In studying societies and religions, anthropology deals with „the differences of 
mind‟ which gives it for the object of study „an indefinite variety of languages‟ to be 
interpreted into one. Eliot does not find that task accomplished in the work of the 
anthropologists he knows; nor does he feel he has offered a substitute methodology 
worth serious consideration. The question of the validity of anthropology as a science 
he leaves open. 
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ANTHROPOLOGY TO AESTHETICS: AESTHETIC IMMEDIACY IN THE LAW OF 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Yet Eliot transforms the failures of the anthropological enterprise to signify the direct 
experience of reality in language into a positive phenomenological programme of 
literary aesthetics. Eliot recognises a channel of immediate, non-linguistic 
communication in the Lévy-Bruhlean „law of participation‟ in which everything is 
everything else, a law that for Eliot articulates the principle of pre-objective immediate 
comprehension of reality and, hence, the affective ground of aesthetic effect. Strictly 
speaking, the law of participation does not distinguish between kinds of objects that 
contaminate each other in their participatory communication. But in the Eliotic 
transformation of it into the principle of aesthetic effect, it predominantly applies to 
intersubjective pre-conscious identification with other viewpoints in which their 
experience of reality is our own on extra-linguistic planes of perception. 
This structure of intersubjective communication appears in Eliot‟s dissertation as 
a double (or multiple) point of view underlying every process of understanding. This is 
an aspect of Eliot‟s philosophical vision of reality we considered earlier. In his paper on 
ritual, Eliot notes this communicative channel when he says that we understand other 
beings on an interpersonal level, „by intuitive sympathy with‟ them (Smith 76). And the 
source of this intersubjectivity Eliot finds, again, in anthropology proper, reading The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life by Durkheim (the review was published in the 
year of submission of his dissertation, 1916): intersubjectivity derives from the natural 
human need in „group consciousness‟ which, above all, is „a religious instinct.‟ Eliot 
summarises as follows: 
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On one side the consciousness of man is limited by the individual‟s needs and 
activities. The individual marries and begets; hunts and fishes, builds and 
labours, and these are interests of purely individual consciousness. The instinct 
of association and community with other men is not merely defensive or 
economic, nor is the community an accident of common descent. It is a religious 
instinct. For the savage or the civilised man, a solely individual existence would 
be intolerable; he feels the need of recreating and sustaining his strength by 
periodic refuge in another consciousness which is supra-individual. Totemism is 
the organisation of the group, and the religious festival its expression. 
(„Durkheim‟ 314) 
 
This „instinct of association and community with other men‟ is not exclusive to 
primitive society: „the civilised man‟ finds „a solely individual existence‟ just as 
„intolerable‟ as „the savage.‟ The everyday practical activity of both „the savage [and] 
the civilised man‟ is characterised as „consciousness,‟ which is both individual and 
social („supra-individual‟). And „the religious festival‟ is the „expression‟ of „group 
consciousness‟ in the practical activity (or behaviour) of the same kind as matter-of-fact 
activities pursued on the everyday basis without questioning their meaning or purpose. 
The „religious instinct‟ which supports the sense of „group consciousness‟ makes 
cultural practices, one of which is a rite, as natural as individual unreflected habits of 
living in the immediate environment. 
Instead of thinking of the development of culture in historically progressive 
terms which oppose the pre-rational mind of „the savage‟ to the rationality of „the 
civilised man,‟ as does Lévy-Bruhl‟s notion of pre-logical mentality, Eliot distinguishes 
the rational and the pre-rational as aspects of the human comprehension of reality 
regardless of the culture‟s stage of historical development. These aspects come across as 
the linguistic, conceptual understanding of objective reality, the bread and butter of 
philosophy and science, and immediate, pre-objective, bodily – aesthetic – 
comprehension of and response to the environment through participation. In 1924, Eliot 
reviews W. J. Perry‟s work on anthropology. He does not value the work itself very 
highly, but uses the opportunity to point out the real issue that anthropological inquiry 
should consider, the nature of the distinction – or rather, the indeterminability of the 
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distinction – between the aesthetic and the religious or magic functioning of cultural 
artifacts. Eliot draws attention to the origins of the arts in the magical function of 
totemic objects, and asks whether this magical bond is not the core of the aesthetic 
effect as such: 
The Indian who hung a necklace of bear‟s-teeth about his neck [was] not aiming 
primarily at decoration, but invoking the assistance of life-giving amulets. At 
what point, we may ask, does the attempt to design and create an object for the 
sake of beauty become conscious? At what point in civilisation does any 
conscious distinction between practical or magical utility and æsthetic beauty 
arise? [...] Is it possible and justifiable for art, the creation of beautiful objects 
and of literature, to persist indefinitely without its primitive purposes: is it 
possible for the æsthetic object to be a direct object of attention? (Review of W. 
J. Perry 490-491) 
 
In other words, is the aesthetic object – given that in its aesthetic function it 
produces an affective state in the perceiver, exploiting the Lévy-Bruhlean participation 
law eliminating distinctions including the subject-object one – is such an object an 
object at all? Can a point of view attend to it without being immediately involved into 
the process of apprehending just what this object is? If the aesthetic effect of a work of 
art exploits the immediate responses of human consciousness, responses that pre-
reflectively involve one‟s body and mind, how can a work of art be regarded as itself an 
object, „a direct object of attention‟ which assumes a clear-cut dividing line between the 
comprehending viewpoint and the object to which it attends? Can an aesthetic structure, 
fundamentally relying for its aesthetic effect on the participatory instincts of 
consciousness-in-the-body, at the same time assert its objectivity, which demands a 
complete division between the perceiving viewpoint and the object it perceives? 
This paradox of the aesthetic artifact is irresolvable; in fact, the aesthetic effect 
results from the contamination of the two ways of comprehending reality. In Knowledge 
and Experience, aesthetic apprehension appears as a prototypical example of immediate 
experience per se, or rather the kind of experience that brings it as close to pure 
„feeling‟ as possible: 
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Mere feeling is something which could find no place in a world of objects. It is, 
in a sense, an abstraction from any actual situation. We have, or seem to have at 
the start a „confusion‟ of feeling, out of which subject and object emerge. We 
stand before a beautiful painting, and if we are sufficiently carried away, our 
feeling is a whole which is not, in a sense, our feeling, since the painting, which 
is an object independent of us, is quite as truly a constituent as our soul. (KE 20) 
 
To create an aesthetic form that would produce this effect, an artist must 
apprehend it from a double point of view, experiencing the affect but also reflecting on 
the relation between the formal structure of the work and that experience. And Eliot‟s 
descriptions of artistic sensibility emphasise as the distinctive characteristic of the 
artist‟s mind its exceptional capacity for self-reflection while its immediate experience 
of reality is the same as that of everyman. Artistic sensibility responds to its 
environment more acutely and registers its own responses, which enables it to come up 
with structures – works of art – that affect every human sensibility in a similar way. The 
artist, in this process of the aesthetic comprehension of the world and its communication 
in creative expression, identifies and relies on the most immediate, pre-reflective 
responses of the human body-and-mind. These responses, however, have a history of 
cultural interpretation which the artist must manipulate in the work of art in order to 
evoke the immediate, participatory involvement of the consciousness-in-the-body of its 
audience and, at the same time, infuse it with meaning. In the 1918 review of Wyndham 
Lewis‟s Tarr, Eliot puts it as follows: 
The artist, I believe, is more primitive, as well as more civilized, than his 
contemporaries, his experience is deeper than civilization, and he only uses the 
phenomena of civilization in expressing it. Primitive instincts and the acquired 
habits of ages are confounded in the ordinary man. („Tarr‟ 106) 
 
In a slightly later review, in 1919, Eliot rephrases the same in ostensibly more 
literary terms: 
And as it is certain that some study of primitive man furthers our understanding 
of civilized man, so it is certain that primitive art and poetry help our 
understanding of civilized art and poetry. [...] More intelligibly put, it is that the 
poet should know everything that has been accomplished in poetry 
(accomplished, not merely produced) since its beginnings – in order to know 
what he is doing himself. He should be aware of all the metamorphoses of 
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poetry that illustrate the stratifications of history that cover savagery. For the 
artist is, in an impersonal sense, the most conscious of men; he is therefore the 
most and the least civilized and civilizable; he is the most competent to 
understand both civilized and primitive. („War-Paint and Feathers‟) 
 
And in 1923, Eliot finds the perfect combination of the primitive-immediate and 
the conceptual-analytic comprehension in the Aristotelian theory of the aesthetic form 
of drama. To begin with, the Aristotelian definition of drama includes the essential 
element of direct bodily participation called for by various kinds of rhythm; Eliot quotes 
Butcher: 
[P]oetry, music, and dancing constitute in Aristotle a group by themselves, their 
common element being imitation by means of rhythm – rhythm which admits of 
being applied to words, sounds, and the movements of the body. („The Beating 
of a Drum‟ 12) 
 
This rhythmic patterning – repetition of elements that appeal to the full variety 
of perceptual involvement, from the body in dancing to the ear in hearing the sound to 
the understanding of linguistic meaning in words – is the fundamental condition for the 
catharsis. It is not, Eliot insists, primarily intellectual or moral but aesthetic experience, 
necessarily involving the senses: 
As for the catharsis, we must remember that Aristotle was accustomed to 
dramatic performances only in rhythmic form; and that therefore he was not 
called upon to determine how far the catharsis could be affected by the moral or 
intellectual significance of the play without its verse form and proper 
declamation. („The Beating of a Drum‟ 12) 
 
This perfect balance involving all perceptual capacities of human sensibility 
drama inherits from ritual: „The drama was originally ritual; and ritual, consisting of a 
set of repeated movements is essentially a dance‟ („The Beating of a Drum‟ 12). This 
ritual „dance,‟ in Eliot‟s understanding, is a repetition of otherwise instinctive 
movements, of behaviour that is immediate bodily response to the surrounding 
environment before it is understood and can be denoted in language, just like in a cat‟s 
„peculiar way of acting at the approach of a dog‟ (KE 133). And so it is a mistake to 
ascribe to this behaviour a pre-conceived pragmatic function or intended purpose, even 
83 
 
though ritual turns it into a repeatable, aesthetically structured form which then 
historically develops into drama: 
It is equally possible to assert that primitive man acted in a certain way and then 
found a reason for it. An unoccupied person, finding a drum, may be seized with 
a desire to beat it; but unless he is an imbecile he will be unable to continue 
beating it, and thereby satisfying a need (rather than a „desire‟), without finding 
a reason for so doing. The reason may be the long continued drought. The next 
generation or the next civilization will find a more plausible reason for beating a 
drum. Shakespeare and Racine – or rather the developments that led to them – 
each found his own reason. The reasons may be divided into tragedy and 
comedy. We still have similar reasons, but we have lost the drum. („The Beating 
of a Drum‟ 12) 
 
Though immediate response, and so behaviour, is pre-rational, the human mind 
instinctively rationalises, and so – „unless he is an imbecile‟ – the savage or the civilised 
man rationalise why they beat a drum though actually the drum inexplicably evoked that 
response. Reasons for ritual behaviour, in Eliot‟s narrative, historically turn into 
„reasons‟ of dramatic convention, eventually leading to the great Aristotelian generic 
distinction between tragedy and comedy. Our cultural memory has preserved these 
„reasons‟ well enough for them to hold true („We still have similar reasons‟); but 
aesthetic experience, in fact, is before them: the real reason why the savage beats the 
drum is that he is seized „with a desire to beat it‟ and not „the long continued drought,‟ 
let alone the tragic or comic plot structure of a play. 
Eliot repeats his demand for a participatory, ritual aspect in the dramatic genre 
on several occasions. In April 1923 he writes in The Criterion that „the stage – not only 
in its remote origins, but always – is a ritual, and the failure of the contemporary stage 
to satisfy the craving for ritual is one of the reasons why it is not a living art‟ („Dramatis 
Personæ‟ 305-306). In the same review, Eliot wishes actors had „had the training in 
movement and gesture – the only training in movement and gesture – the training of 
ballet‟ that would have made their performance less „inchoate‟ („Dramatis Personæ‟ 
305) but a more clearly shaped, aesthetic form. In a paragraph-long parenthesis Eliot 
adds that the only way cinema – though deeming itself the generic heir of drama, the 
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contemporary realistic form „merely because it is a series of photographs‟ – actually 
affects its audience is by being a rhythmic form: „The egregious merit of Chaplin is that 
he escaped in his own way from the realism of the cinema and invented a rhythm‟ 
(„Dramatis Personæ‟ 306). By such dance-like, rhythmically patterned behaviour the 
stage calls for actual, immediate participation, a kind of participation found in ritual 
where everybody present is included in its action: 
The working-man who went to the music-hall and saw Marie Lloyd and joined 
in the chorus was himself performing part of the work of acting; he was engaged 
in that collaboration of the audience with the artist which is necessary in all art 
and most obviously in dramatic art. („London Letter‟ Nov. 1922, 662) 
 
An ideal stage performance, that is, absorbs the spectator‟s perceptual attention 
in such intensity that the stage itself – its function of drawing a demarcation line 
between the spectator‟s space and the space of representation – disappears. An ideal 
stage performance entangles the spectator‟s perceptual attention into the rhythmic 
patterns of its form so that the spectator – imaginatively or actually, by joining in the 
chorus, for example – participates in the action on the stage, making the same bodily 
movements as the actors and as everybody would do in a rite. The meaning of this 
aesthetic ritual-like experience comes after, in an interpretation of the spectator‟s own 
experience he has gone through by repeating the actor‟s movements. 
This means, strictly speaking, a dead end for the critic. Anthropology has taught 
Eliot that immediate aesthetic experience, just like that of ritual practice, is inaccessible 
to conceptualisation even if the experiencing and the interpreting subject are the same. 
There is no possibility of conceptual generalisation, and hence no field for a critical 
inquiry. Eliot takes this uncompromising position, effectively a projection in the literary 
criticism of the Durkheimian demand for a non-interpretative approach to ritual, in his 
1919 essay on Hamlet: 
Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be interpreted; we can only criticize it 
according to standards, in comparison to other works of art; and for 
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„interpretation‟ the chief task is the presentation of relevant historical facts 
which the reader is not assumed to know. (SE 142) 
 
Facts must be provided, as fully documented as a critic can achieve. Just as an 
anthropologist must register the exterior behaviour, the actual ritual and no more, the 
critic must keep attention focused on the definitive characteristic of the phenomenon 
being described: aesthetic „standards‟ that define a work of art as a work of art. 
 
 
IMMEDIATE REALITY IN THE LANGUAGE OF HAMLET 
 
Eliot formulates this uncompromising stance on interpretation in relation to Hamlet. 
And yet for Eliot himself there seem to be too many aesthetic „standards‟ effectively in 
place in this play. His assessment of Hamlet is trapped in the paradox of the aesthetic 
artifact, the paradox which he formulates in his 1924 review of the anthropological 
work by Perry, when Eliot asks whether it is possible for an aesthetic object „to persist 
indefinitely without its primitive purposes‟ or, to say the same from the opposite 
perspective, „for the æsthetic object to be a direct object of attention‟ (Review of W. J. 
Perry 490-491). Eliot‟s response to Shakespeare oscillates between these two points of 
view: his 1919 essay on Hamlet is grounded in a direct involvement in the play‟s action 
comparable to the participatory role in ritual which is, for its participants, the structure 
of their immediate reality and not „a direct object of attention.‟ But Eliot‟s lectures on 
Shakespeare given in 1937 show him approaching Shakespeare from a critical distance, 
looking at the plays as „the aesthetic object‟ for a description of their structures from an 
analytic distance. Shakespeare, that is, provides Eliot with a kind of aesthetic unity 
which, in 1919, he experiences as fully analogous to the immediate experience of reality 
and then, reflecting on his experience in 1937, discerns the formal structures that 
determine this analogy. 
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In 1919, in the wake of his philosophical and anthropological investigations, 
Eliot assumes that a play is the contemporary form of primitive ritual. Consequently, it 
must be analysed formally in the same way, by describing the „set of repeated 
movements‟ („The Beating of a Drum‟ 12) which a play is by being a script for 
repeatable performance. Eliot terms this ritual „dance‟ („The Beating of a Drum‟ 12) an 
„objective correlative‟ (SE 145), the term deriving from his philosophical engagement 
with the nature of meaningful reality which is the world of objects in perception: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
„objective correlative‟; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the 
external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the 
emotion is immediately evoked. (SE 145) 
 
This definition infuses the positivist requirement of strictly formal description of 
ritual behaviour as a dance merely observed with the phenomenological pathos of 
Eliot‟s philosophy. Eliot identifies the meaning of the ritual-dramatic „dance‟ by 
associating every move in it with an object that instinctively evokes the response 
observed. This response Eliot assumes to be immediate, pre-reflective, of the same kind 
as that involved in being seized by a desire to beat the drum the moment it appears in 
view („The Beating of a Drum‟ 12) – except that the drums here are „a set of objects, a 
situation, a chain of events‟ patterned to evoke a combination of responses that „shall be 
the formula‟ of a singular „particular emotion‟ evoked by the work of art as a whole. In 
its unique structure a work of art mimics the actual perception of the real, or of the 
world of objects as Eliot describes it in his dissertation, involving all levels of 
perceptual response in full intensity and resulting in a complex experience of a work of 
art that is recognisable as identical to itself. 
In the explanatory examples that follow this definition, Eliot keeps faith with his 
premise that a point of view, consciousness-in-the-body, is a sheer functional centre of 
immediate response to objective reality; and he is consistent in assuming the instinctive 
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intention of consciousness to accommodate multiple viewpoints that perceive reality in 
one, the irreducible observing and unifying viewpoint. This multiplicity Eliot also 
identifies as the religious instinct underlying, in Durkheim, the „group consciousness‟ of 
the totemic primitive society („Durkheim‟ 314). And Eliot‟s examples of the successive 
realisation of an „objective correlative‟ effectively describe the Lévy-Bruhlean law of 
participation in action: 
If you examine any of Shakespeare‟s more successful tragedies, [...] you will 
find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been 
communicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory 
impressions; the words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife‟s death strike us as if, 
given the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by the 
last event in the series. The artistic „inevitability‟ lies in this complete adequacy 
of the external to the emotion. (SE 145) 
 
To „find the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep [...] 
communicated,‟ or to actually experience it, the spectator must identify with her by 
imaginatively being Lady Macbeth: living in her world and moving in her body while 
the play lasts. Anybody can assume Macbeth‟s point of view and appreciate the ability 
of Shakespeare to create an objective reality for this point of view with such precision 
that the responses shown to be Macbeth‟s are felt as automatic, inevitable because they 
are immediate responses to the objects that evoke them. 
This automatic immediacy of response to reality, observed in the play and yet 
intensely felt, experienced together with the characters, is the height of the artistic 
capacity to manipulate the immediate responsiveness of the perceiving viewpoint. „The 
artistic inevitability lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion‟ (SE 
145), and because „this is precisely what is deficient in Hamlet,‟ Eliot judges the play as 
„an artistic failure‟ (SE 145). But in fact Eliot‟s interpretative analysis of the play shows 
exactly this kind of „complete adequacy.‟ Just as in his examples of the Macbeths, 
reading Hamlet, he does not speak about Hamlet the play but about „Hamlet (the man)‟ 
(SE 145). This is a perfectly justifiable methodological move: to appreciate the fact of 
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the adequacy „of the external to the emotion,‟ the observing point of view must identify 
with the character. And yet Eliot slips. Observing the Macbeths‟ immediately 
responsive behaviour, he keeps his double vision by both taking their viewpoint in their 
reality and appreciating the adequacy of their response as he compares it to his own 
imagined reaction. But when Eliot comes to Hamlet, his viewpoint completely merges 
with Hamlet‟s, with no observing eye to appreciate the „adequacy‟ of the emotional 
response of both Hamlet and Eliot himself to the reality they face. 
Without a hint of doubt, Eliot expands on his main point that Hamlet „is 
dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as 
they appear‟ and proceeds with a description of those „facts‟ that trigger the sense of 
excess and Hamlet‟s „bafflement‟ resulting from it (SE 145). At no point does this 
description reflect that Hamlet‟s reality is the referential reality of the play, and not the 
reality of the interpreter. Eliot fully conflates his point of view with Hamlet‟s, and the 
world in which Hamlet experiences his „bafflement‟ (SE 145) for Eliot is perfectly real. 
By implication, Hamlet‟s reactions are adequate to the disordered world in which he 
finds himself: in defence of Shakespeare, Eliot says, „it must be noticed that the very 
nature of the données of the problem precludes objective equivalence‟ (SE 145-146). 
This reality which is „in excess of the facts‟ – represented, constructed in the 
language of Hamlet – Eliot sees as given, that which on another occasion he calls „the 
material which [the artist] must simply accept‟ („Ulysses, Order, and Myth‟ 166). But if 
James Joyce deserves Eliot‟s praise for having found, in „using a myth,‟ „a method [...] 
of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape as a significance to the immense panorama 
of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history‟ („Ulysses, Order, and Myth‟ 
167), Hamlet is denied an acknowledgement of the same intentional structure. Eliot 
does not recognise the meaninglessness of Hamlet‟s world as the intended meaning of 
Hamlet. Instead, he charges Shakespeare with a failure to „drag to light, contemplate, or 
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manipulate [his material] into art‟ (SE 144), for Shakespeare does not build for „Hamlet 
(the man)‟ an understandable reality, a world of objects, which Eliot sees him build for 
the Macbeths. Speaking in his own philosophical terms, Eliot‟s „feeling‟ that develops 
in the course of experiencing the play is in perfect continuity with the object-meaning 
that it articulates: Hamlet represents Hamlet‟s sense of the meaninglessness of the world 
in which he lives and makes Eliot experience the same, in a full conflation of the 
experience in and of the play. Hamlet provides Eliot with a perfect „objective 
correlative‟ of his experience of the immediately real. Hamlet‟s reality triggers in Eliot 
responses so automatic, so immediate, so dense and intense that his sensibility has no 
energy left to observe those responses and to appreciate the exactness of the 
„equivalence‟ between the formal structure of the play and the „emotion‟ it conveys for 
him. 
In 1919, Eliot does not realise that his „objective correlative‟ defines the 
structure of experience rather than the form of a work of art, nor does he see that his 
analysis of Hamlet does not consider Hamlet (the play) as the object of his attention but 
indulges in the experience of „Hamlet (the man)‟ instead. This indulgence is a 
„collaboration‟ which is direct participation in the reality presented, necessary in the 
appreciation of all art, on which Eliot remarks in remembering the „working man who 
went into the music-hall and saw Marie Lloyd and joined in the chorus‟ („London 
Letter‟ Nov. 1922, 662). There is just one difference: the artistic medium that disappears 
from Eliot‟s sight in his self-forgetful participation in the play‟s action and, in this 
disappearance, turns the space constructed in it into unmediated reality is not the stage 
of Hamlet‟s dramatic action but the language in which it is presented. Shakespeare‟s 
words evoke in Eliot‟s perception the objective structure of the reality he knows without 
distortion, with too little difference for Eliot to be aware that this objective structure is 
articulated from another point of view. Shakespeare‟s poetic language is intertwined 
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with the dramatic structure of Hamlet in ways that for Eliot fully reproduce the dynamic 
of the fluctuation between articulated „objectivity‟ and pre-objective „feeling‟ in which 
reality is perceived, its objects „constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity 
and feeling constantly developing‟ (KE 155). For Eliot, Hamlet is the linguistic 
structure entangling the immediate perception of reality in what Heidegger calls the 
„fore-structure‟ of being itself, a structure in which the interpretation of reality circles 
endlessly between the concealedness and disclosure of its meaning. Hamlet gives Eliot a 
discourse which he experiences as truth. 
 
■ 
It takes Eliot another eighteen years of reading Shakespeare and writing his own poetry 
and criticism to recognise this effect and articulate it from an ostensibly analytic 
perspective, defining it as the distinctive structural characteristic of Shakespeare‟s 
poetic drama. In his Edinburgh Lectures of 1937, Eliot speaks of the exceptional ability 
of Shakespeare to manipulate a variety of „planes of reality‟ (EL I 7, 9; II 9, 10, 12); to 
appeal, in Granville-Barker‟s words, „past reason, past consciousness often, to our entire 
sentient being‟ (EL 11); to create the „ultra-dramatic‟ dimension in which Shakespeare‟s 
„dramatic verse [...] introduces other interests and values, which exceed the demands of 
the “dramatic”, if we keep “dramatic” to its meaning of what is effective on the stage 
for an audience‟ (EL I 7). Shakespeare‟s language, that is, penetrates his audience‟s 
understanding of their actual surroundings. The dramatic structure, the formal pattern – 
what Eliot has earlier compared to the ritual dance – of Shakespeare‟s plays extends 
beyond the formal boundaries of the stage or the page into the real world. This capacity 
Eliot sees as the token of Shakespeare‟s success (EL I 7). 
In these lectures on Shakespeare, Eliot singles out one play, the one which 
shows „the maximum of the ultra-dramatic effect [which] is maintained in solution in 
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what the audience can take;‟ which is the apogee of Shakespeare‟s „dramatic skill‟ 
because in it „the dramatist and the poet are perfectly one;‟ which is „the farthest point 
to which the audience can go with Shakespeare,‟ for he presents „a role in which every 
man can, in fantasy, cast himself‟ – for all these reasons, „the most successful‟ play is 
Hamlet (EL I 12-13; II 4-9). In an ostensibly personal tone, Eliot describes how 
Shakespeare lures him into identifying with his characters and hence into experiencing 
the unknown: 
What Shakespeare seems to ask me to do, and when I am in sensitive enough 
mood makes me do, is to see through the ordinary classified emotions of our 
active life into a world of emotion and feeling beyond, of which I am not 
ordinarily aware. What he makes me feel is not so much that his characters are 
creatures like myself but that I am a creature like his characters, taking part, like 
them, in no common action, of which I am for the most part quite unaware. (EL 
II 11) 
 
In these lectures on Shakespeare, Eliot also distinguishes the purely formal 
patterning of the Shakespearean play. The analogue of the ritual dance here is not the 
„objective correlative,‟ the structure in which the form of articulation is infused with 
sense, but a properly formal „musical element‟ (EL I 1) in the dramatic effect of the 
Shakespearean play, the „musical pattern‟ which Eliot describes in these lectures as the 
unifying aesthetic structure of Shakespeare‟s drama (EL I 10, 20; II 3, 5 10, 14, 17). 
And the recognition scene in Pericles – the arche-text to Eliot‟s most Shakespearean 
and, for many, most aesthetically effective poem, „Marina‟ – for Eliot is both a „perfect 
example of the “ultra-dramatic”‟ and that of the dramatic culmination in becoming „a 
ritual‟ (EL II 18). 
This map of distinctions is drawn in 1937. Eliot observes himself from a critical, 
analytic point of view which distinguishes between immediate responses and then 
identifies structures that bring these responses about. In 1919, this analytic vision was 
overwhelmed by his immediate response to Hamlet, Eliot‟s sensibility manipulated by 
Shakespeare‟s language in ways which Eliot was not yet able to identify. His rather 
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ironic statement in that early essay that „there can be no doubt‟ about „the intractability‟ 
of the material in Hamlet on which Shakespeare „was unable to impose‟ a „dominant 
motive‟ (SE 143) sounds, in this light, as the highest praise. Explicitly criticising 
Shakespeare for not presenting a structural pattern that is articulate enough, Eliot gives 
this criticism in a recognition that Shakespeare reaches the most immediate, least 
conventionalised, properly pre-objective, pre-articulated responses which Eliot does not 
yet know in himself. Shakespeare opens for Eliot the precipice which for Heidegger is 
the concealed realm for „a possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing‟ (Being 
and Time 195, H 153). In 1937 Eliot explicitly recognises this, giving the decisive 
emphasis to the aesthetic affectivity of Hamlet, the obvious, historically witnessed 
power of the play go beyond directly comprehensible, conventional structures. This 
capacity to reach what is not yet known he sees as the definitive aspect of all poetry: 
I re-read my earlier paper [...]. What I regret in this instance is my use of the 
word „success‟ and „failure‟. I called Hamlet and „artistic failure‟ and 
Coriolanus and Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare‟s „most assured artistic 
success‟. I still think the two later plays much better pieces of construction; I 
still think the workmanship more masterly throughout [...]. Coriolanus is 
certainly more agreeable to taste formed on the French classic theatre. But as for 
„success‟! I now take rather more the view of people of the theatre, that anything 
is successful that succeeds. „Success‟ was the wrong word. And as for the 
intractability of the material, I am not sure now, that for the poetic dramatist, all 
material is more or less intractable – at any rate, when one is Shakespeare. (EL 
II 10) 
 
In 1937, even having highlighted the major affective structures of Shakespeare‟s 
poetic drama, Eliot is cautious not to make too rigidly analytic conclusions about the 
Shakespearean effect. Since 1919, he has learned the lesson of the indeterminability of 
knowledge when knowledge directly deals with structures of immediate experience. 
Even though indefinable, nor properly visible in itself, experience asserts its 
significance by the sheer force of presence which, though it is the presence of things, 
has the power to redraw their definitions, transform them into another map of the world 
and hence present another existential reality. 
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In Eliot, poetry is the site of this transformative presence of reality, and 
Shakespearean traces here are persistent. Poetry does not demand the analytic 
assuredness of criticism, the discourse of knowledge, in an explicit recognition of 
affective structures. As the discourse of immediate experience, poetry wants just the 
opposite, an immediate response to and mimicry of those structures before they have 
become analytically identifiable „conventions,‟ however indispensible these 
conventions are in successful communication. In Eliot‟s poetry, Shakespeare appears 
exactly on this level of textual patterning, some of his appearances acknowledged by 
Eliot while others never are explicitly noticed. Eliot‟s poetic mimicry of Shakespeare – 
of Hamlet in particular – is the last of the three continuities that I will observe in my 
reading of his poetry further below. It is in different combinations of the overlapping of 
the three perspectives I have discussed – his philosophical premises about the 
immediate experience of reality, the aesthetic theory derived from his engagement with 
anthropology, and his poetic experience of Shakespeare – that The Waste Land and 
Four Quartets present such strikingly different experiences of existence in the same 
world. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
THE WASTE LAND: A POEM OF LACK AND EXCESS 
 
 
My vision of the dynamics of The Waste Land is that this poem aims to evoke the 
Eliotic experience of immediate reality by overwhelming readerly perception with half-
formed meanings, throwing these half-meanings into the field of vision with such 
intensity that no thread of coherence can reach completion. It is as if the speaking eye of 
the poem perceived reality over-susceptibly, too much and too fast for it to make sense 
and say what it sees in full, grammatically constructed sentences coherently linked to 
one another to form a meaningful statement about the world. Whatever „moments of 
knowledge‟ (KE 155) are promised by the language that the poem speaks, whatever 
meaning begins germinating in the words the poem utters – inevitably put one after 
another, in an „enchainment of our ideas‟ (IPR, Gray 124) and so of the reality they 
speak, – its „little life‟ is not allowed to „bloom‟ into a tree (CPP 61-62). April is the 
month of „breeding / Lilacs‟ and „stirring / Dull roots with spring rain‟ but the „corpse 
planted last year in [this] garden‟ is not seen „to sprout‟ (CPP 61-62) into a living being. 
The Waste Land gives enough to raise an expectation, to ask the question. But it makes 
sure that the question is not answered, that the „heap of broken images‟ it is resists a 
soothing flow of thought, making it stumble instead in „this stony rubbish‟ in which 
there are „the roots that clutch‟ and „branches grow‟ but the tree they might be parts of 
is „dead‟ (CPP 61). All elements are there in the poem‟s language, but in the reality it 
speaks there is always one missing and another in excess, so that nothing comes into 
being out of them. The poem indulges in its ingenious capacity to „connect / Nothing 
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with nothing‟ (CPP 70), stubbornly getting the balance wrong, as if it knows what is 
needed for the miracle of fulfilment to happen but deliberately gives something else 
instead. 
„[T]he dead tree gives no shelter‟ for there is no water in „the dry stone‟ in which 
the tree has grown (CPP 61); and „no water but only rock‟ maps out „the agony of stony 
places‟ in which „one cannot stop or think,‟ subsumed by a thirsty fantasy of „[a] pool 
among the rock,‟ of at least a „sound of water over a rock‟ – a fantasy of „spring‟ (CPP 
72). But „Phlebas the Phoenician,‟ whose „bones [are picked] in whispers‟ by a „current 
under the sea,‟ is not enjoying this fantasy come true. No longer does he have any 
fantasies, nor even memories: he, „a fortnight dead / Forgot the cry of gulls‟ (CPP 71); 
he is in far too much water, and it has brought him death instead of a capacity „to think‟ 
(CPP 72). Philomel can think, and she is alive; but her life is human no more, and her 
thoughts cannot be spoken. She cannot not think, in fact, except her thinking is fixed on 
one memory which is of violence past, but this is a past that is painfully present. She has 
been raped, „rudely forced,‟ „by the barbarous king,‟ mutilated to cover the crime and, 
eventually, transformed. She is a nightingale, and she can „[fill] all the desert with 
inviolable voice,‟ but this is a voice with no words, her cry speaking only what the 
„dirty ears‟ of „the world‟ cannot help hearing in it, the primal reason of her loss of 
language, the rape (CPP 64). The woman (if this is a woman speaking) whose „nerves 
are bad to-night‟ does not intend to invent meanings for herself but wants to hear her 
interlocutor speak, imploring: „Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak‟ (CPP 
65). But the interlocutor – unlike Philomel perfectly capable of words, with a line from 
Shakespeare on the surface of his (?) mind – does not voice his responses to her 
questions: „Are you alive, or not?‟ his silence makes her ask. Nor do these unvoiced 
responses really answer the questions but, as if deliberately, they misunderstand them, 
use them to articulate the same kind of image: an association of a living body with the 
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dead. „[W]e are in rats‟ alley / Where the dead men lost their bones‟ says the first reply, 
placing us, living beings, in the space of the dead. And the second response presents, in 
its Shakespearean source, a living man as if he were dead: the speaker remembers a line 
– „Those are pearls that were his eyes‟ – from The Tempest, from Ariel‟s song 
describing Antonio‟s corpse in the sea to his son Ferdinand, though Ariel knows 
Antonio is in fact alive (CPP 65). 
Such is the cruelty of The Waste Land‟s spring, the fantasy brought by the „dry 
sterile thunder without rain‟ (CPP 72): everybody, every thing here is awakened to the 
life of a living corpse, not that of a living being. „Gentile or Jew,‟ however „handsome‟ 
(CPP 71), „He who was living is now dead‟ and „We who were living are now dying‟ 
(CPP 72). We are dying, the poem says, „With a little patience.‟ We are not dead yet, 
there still is a life to go through before we finally come to it. But the moment we 
become aware of death, we are among those who „were living,‟ life itself transformed 
into an adjunct, an unavoidable supplement to its end squeezed into the space of „a little 
patience‟ with which we await death whatever we are doing while waiting. And yet this 
is a supplement that is the only tangible reality we have. Which, life or death, do we 
regard as blessing and which a curse? Even the epiphany – the only unambiguously 
positive moment in the poem, the memory of the hyacinth girl – is a state of being 
„neither / Living nor dead.‟ The speaker remembers himself unable to speak not for the 
lack of words but because there is nothing to be said: his „eyes failed‟ and he „knew 
nothing / Looking into the heart of light, the silence‟ (CPP 62). Such is the „shantih‟ of 
The Waste Land‟s meditation: the best it can bring is „The Peace which passeth 
understanding‟ (CPP 80), a meaningless harmony. It may be experienced as a moment 
of bliss, that of „[l]ooking into the heart of light,‟ but this is a light that blinds, with 
nothing to see, know, and say, hence „the silence‟ (CPP 62). 
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In these structures of deficient wholes, The Waste Land speaks between the 
meaninglessness of the hypothetical „timeless unity‟ of immediate experience and „the 
world of objects‟ lacking „harmony and cohesion.‟ This world, incoherent and 
fragmented as it is, however, is a lived world, imbued with meanings, for things can be 
spoken, while a „non-distinguished non-relational whole‟ is not accessible to linguistic 
expression, even if it is a „positive‟ whole, the Absolute (KE 31). The Waste Land 
speaks the only reality that can be known and spoken, the incoherence of the world of 
things, their disharmonious multiplicity. The poem constructs immediate reality as the 
other of meaningful coherence: complete coherence is assumed – as the fullness of 
being, or „the conception of an all-inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall 
fall‟ (KE 31) – but it is not actually constructed. For if it were, this would not have been 
the coherence of immediate experience but that of language, and then the poem would 
have stepped out of touch with immediate reality completely, fully into an order which 
is, though meaningful, not real. The Waste Land‟s obsession with the immediate turns it 
into a field of the war against the cohesion of language which, as a linguistic artifact, the 
poem inevitably speaks. 
For Ruth Nevo, this war of The Waste Land against all known frames of 
coherence is extensive enough to claim, in 1982, that the poem is „a deconstructionist 
Ur-text, even [...] a Deconstructionist Manifesto‟ and that „disunification, or 
desedimentation, or dissemination [...] is the raison d’être of the poem‟ (454). Nevo 
summarises the sites of this „disunification‟ in a paradigmatic list of „the fundamental 
categories of literary criticism,‟ every one of those categories „dismantled‟ in this poem. 
It has no narrative, time, or place; no protagonist; „no drama, no epic, no lyric;‟ „no one 
point of view, no single style, idiom, register;‟ no identifiable „overall subject matter, or 
argument, or myth, or theme;‟ no „obvious conventional poetic features such as meter, 
rhyme, stanza, or any regularity or recurrence or set of symmetries which would 
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constitute formal pattern in any classical sense at all‟ (455). Its symbols „refuse to 
symbolize:‟ they „explode and proliferate,‟ „turn themselves inside out, diffuse their 
meanings, and collapse back again into disarticulated images‟ (456). It „has no 
beginning or end:‟ „no inception and no center and no closure‟ (456). Even the material 
body of the poem is indeterminate, its textual limits blurred, nor does it have a single 
authorial originating consciousness: there are drafts cancelled by Ezra Pound, and 
Eliot‟s added Notes which function, in Nevo‟s view, as a parody of rather than help to 
the exegesis of literary criticism (457, 459-460). Nevo compares The Waste Land to 
other early poems of Eliot, challenging enough in themselves, and appreciates „the 
radicalization of the irrational and the incoherent which has taken place‟ by identifying 
the absence of the basic phenomenological condition for meaning to appear: in those 
other poems, „there are personae and stories to be described. There are figure and 
ground. Here none‟ (456). 
And yet, absent structures must somehow assert themselves, even if only to be 
identified as missing frames of understanding. „Disunification‟ can happen only to a 
unity. And in The Waste Land, Nevo says, a poem that refuses all known definitions of 
poetic unity, „there are moments of all these generic constellations‟ (455). The poem 
promises, does not fulfil the promise and, in desperation, promises again. Its event is the 
event of seduction, with nothing to follow. The poem behaves just like that lover of the 
maiden who has been undone in Richmond and Kew and learned not to mind: „After the 
event / He wept. He promised “a new start.” / I made no comment. What should I 
resent?‟ (CPP 70) 
Maud Ellmann frames The Waste Land in a metaphor of seduction. The poem is 
„A Sphinx Without a Secret‟ (91); „like any good sphinx, [it] lures the reader into 
hermeneutics, too: but there is no secret underneath its hugger-muggery‟ (92). The life 
of this poem, its „game,‟ also „the nightmare that it cannot lay to rest,‟ is „the ritual of its 
100 
 
own destruction‟ (109). Reading The Waste Land, Ellmann seems to suggest, means 
participating in this ritual, while an aspiration to explain it „in search of the totality it 
might have been‟ (92) leaves the poem itself in „the “waste” beneath the 
redevelopments‟ needed to construct that desired totality (91). Hence the poem has been 
„thoroughly explained, [but] is rarely read;‟ and reading „its broken images‟ opens up 
its self-destructive, „suicidal logic‟ (91-92). One way or another, that is, killing is not to 
be avoided. To explain The Waste Land, „to force it to confession may also be a way of 
killing it‟ (91). But if we choose the other way, that of submitting to the poem‟s own 
doings, we are entangled in the „obsessive rite‟ that „surreptitiously repeats the horror 
that it tries to expiate‟ (95), the invasion of the dead into the world of the living (94). 
We either kill the poem in an act of explanation ourselves or go through the rite of 
suicide that it stages for us. The poem assumes nothing beyond itself; there is only it, 
and it makes sure nothing remains after its own end. 
My own vision of The Waste Land is that its circling around the motif of death is 
an inevitable side effect of the poem‟s refusal to locate the event of meaning in any of 
the sites of human existence which it articulates as given reality. The poem throws at 
the reader – or throws the reader into – the world as it is: overcrowded with meanings 
already present, given and therefore already past the experience of their emergence – 
their event – in the reality of here-and-now. Hence they are dead meanings, „Unreal‟ 
(CPP 73). In „Tradition and the Individual Talent‟ Eliot speaks of „the dead poets‟ 
asserting their „immortality‟ in what we often consider to be the most individual parts of 
a contemporary poet‟s work, this life of the dead made possible by „the historical sense‟ 
which is „not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence‟ (SE 14). The Waste 
Land is overwhelmed by this presence of the past, and this overwhelming presence of 
the already-dead past forecloses the possibility of the poem‟s own living presence by 
taking up all present space. The horror that the poem faces and reproduces is, as 
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Ellmann puts it, „the semantic epidemic‟ (104), while the response to it is an obsessive 
abjection of all those meanings, for they are not the poem‟s own. And abjection is a 
failed attempt to deny presence, the presence of that which is being denied asserting 
itself in the very act, the statement of denial: in order to deny, it needs to state, to point 
to that which it denies, and that means acknowledging its presence. 
Ellmann characterises The Waste Land as „one of the most abject poems in 
English literature‟ (93), defining its abjection with reference to Kristeva and Bataille. 
Kristeva gives Ellmann a metaphor that identifies abjection with the passage itself, the 
„betweenness‟ (96, 98) on which The Waste Land thrives by confusing distinctions and 
making the signifieds of its signifiers migrate into the spaces of their semantic others. 
Such is the migration of the first person pronoun which „roams from voice to voice‟ 
without warning (96), as well as the figure of Tiresias, an androgynous blind seer, „the 
very prophet of abjection, personifying all the poem‟s porous membranes‟ (97). But the 
„utmost abjection‟ in Kristeva is signified by corpses, „because they represent “a border 
that has encroached upon everything”: an outside that irrupts into the inside, and erodes 
the parameters of life;‟ and so it is not the dead themselves that cause the anxiety of The 
Waste Land but „the collapse of boundaries [...], be they sexual, national, linguistic, or 
authorial‟ (Ellmann 94). Kristeva herself draws on Bataille‟s definition of abjection, 
saying that it „is merely the inability to assume with sufficient strength the imperative 
act of excluding abject things,‟ while this act is fundamental in a culture‟s self-
definition because it „establishes the foundations of collective existence‟ (Ellmann 93, 
110). Ellmann comments: „Waste is what a culture casts away in order to determine 
what is not itself, and thus to establish its own limits‟ (93-94). 
But abjection thus defined has an enabling aspect, an aspect I want to 
foreground. The act of „excluding abject things‟ points to them nevertheless, for in its 
intention of exclusion it identifies „the foundations of collective existence,‟ or „the 
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parameters of life,‟ simply by focusing on some things rather than others. In this focus, 
abjection asserts the structure in which the rejected appears as a fundamentally 
significant dimension of existence. Ellmann notes the moment of return of „abject 
things,‟ the fact that gestures of rejection „reinvent the waste they exorcise‟ (94), and 
reads The Waste Land as a poem of „betweenness,‟ stuck in the space of denying what it 
says with no space beyond this denial to escape to, „caught in a perpetual allusion to the 
texts [among other things] that it denies‟ (96). This vicious circle is an acknowledged 
effect of the poem. What I wish to emphasise is that this space of „betweenness‟ is also 
the space of indeterminacy, of the pre-articulate immediate experience of reality rather 
than just a space defined by the terms between which the poem posits itself in its 
obsessive rejection. The rejected is evoked and thus returns, but this return brings more 
than the rejected: it also evokes the unpredictability of the „betweenness,‟ its openness 
to more than the things between which it is. It seems that The Waste Land defines its 
existential space in this residue, in this indeterminate „more‟ – in that which has not 
been said yet and hence is not yet in known systems of relations between things and 
terms – rather than in the „betweenness‟ proper where everything, to use Ellmann‟s 
vocabulary, is epidemically contaminated and displaced. 
In Ellmann‟s reading, the Eliotic abjection in The Waste Land and beyond 
appears as a neurotically repeated attempt at purifying that which is contaminated and 
displaced, the attempt itself having exactly the opposite effect to what is intended, for it 
multiplies the epidemic instead of restoring the purity of things (Ellmann 104). I want to 
suggest that this Eliotic desire for purity is a desire for the precision and clarity of 
articulation aiming not only to define their limits but also to exhaust the relations in 
which these limits appear. Establishing this clarity, exhaustively negating all the cross-
contaminations of available terms means delineating the space that is being spoken 
here-and-now, that which has not yet been said but demands expression – which is, in 
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Eliot‟s philosophical terms, immediate experience, or the real itself. It will take a 
journey to Four Quartets to see the dynamic of the positive construction of the 
meaningfulness of this existential space. Meanwhile, The Waste Land maps out the 
territory, so to speak, the cultural landscape – the given reality – in which the poem 
finds itself and which it registers as the space of its own being without yet being able to 
say what this being is. I have noted moments of a positive experience of existential 
harmony in The Waste Land: the episode of the hyacinth girl and the poem‟s closure 
with the word of peace, „shantih;‟ but the problem with these moments of epiphanic 
experience is that they are radically cut off from language, marked by the inability to 
speak and / or understand. In its denial of everything it finds already articulated, already 
in language, in its rejection of all cross-connections and re-productions of these 
articulated meanings, The Waste Land tries to identify, to point to – to situate its reader 
in – this experience of immediate reality which is in the reality articulated but itself is 
not an articulation. 
This is, effectively, the vision of Davidson‟s hermeneutic reading of The Waste 
Land. The absence of the metaphysical centre in the world it presents is the absence of 
reality to language, but this is an absence that by itself is undeniably present, and this 
presence is the reality of human existence. The poem‟s reiteration of the motif of death 
is its refusal to give a permanent – ideal, linguistically fixed, metaphysical – life to any 
thing, while life asserts itself in the persistence of desire. In Davidson‟s reading, this 
desire is a desire for the wholeness and completeness of being, for the sufficiency of 
self, also – to say the same from the opposite perspective – „the desire to escape the 
absence by defining our existence‟ (103). All culture is produced „in the endless 
elaboration of a relational linguistic world, to cover the absence‟ (103). It is in human 
nature to want „to know Being as a whole – something changeless, eternal, and 
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complete;‟ but the reality is that of „change, finitude and absence‟ of this complete 
wholeness because it „can only be manifest in beings which are themselves finite‟ (103). 
The Waste Land embodies this underlying tension of hermeneutic existence by 
resisting assimilation into a unifying term, enacting „the existence of the details [...] not 
to be submerged in a unity of idea‟ (108). Its fragmented narratives, „caused by the 
metaphoric technique,‟ convey „the contingency of this world and its resistance to 
symbolic enclosure:‟ 
The parataxis and symbolism in the poem set in motion a restless search for 
meaning which can never be satisfied because of the metonymic density of the 
world, just as the metonymic realism sets up expectations for a coherent world 
which are shattered by the creative force of metaphoric intervention. (114) 
 
The Waste Land evokes absence, enacts it in its language by not saying what it 
wants to say. It is not „a merely symbolic presentation of nothingness which fills the 
void with the idea of nothingness‟ (emphasis Davidson‟s). It „releases absence as no-
thing‟ (emphasis mine), „as a function of the dense and changing particularity of the 
world‟ which does not lend itself to linguistic conceptualisation but overwhelms with 
conceptually inassimilable multiplicity. „The details simply exceed the themes‟ (114). 
A major technique to articulate this density of the world‟s particulars is an all-
inclusive language of allusion. The Eliotic allusion does not, as Davidson notes, provide 
a key to the meaning of the poem, nor even significantly shift it, but increases the 
semantic density of the poem‟s language by being a „linguistic connection to a broader 
culture‟ in which the poem speaks (115; 115-116). The poem insists on „the cultural 
nature of linguistic material,‟ while the multiplicity and significance of the poem‟s 
intertextual references are such that they make the poem a condensed expression of the 
world itself. The texts to which The Waste Land alludes are „texts which have been 
absorbed into the culture and have actually shaped our world,‟ and thus the poem „self-
reflexively establish[es] a common world which both fills our consciousness and yet 
extends far beyond it‟ (116). The Waste Land, by promising and yet not providing the 
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word for what it means, insists that the reader experiences this world as its meaning, 
that the experience of reading the poem is the experience of turning in the circle of „that 
ceaseless hermeneutic between desire and death in which finite existence always just 
escapes our efforts to capture it in the word‟ (Davidson 134). 
This paradoxical juncture is experienced by many readers of this uncanny poem. 
It turns out, after all, that in a paranoid re-asserting of the absence of a unifying 
meaningful structure that the poem makes its reader expect, in its refusal to assimilate 
into a generalising statement of its meaning, The Waste Land somehow attributes this 
non-meaning to existence nevertheless. Somehow, all indeterminacies accepted, there is 
no doubt that the tension in which these indeterminacies appear is the tension of the 
„true foundation‟ of human being (Davidson 134). I want to claim that The Waste Land 
conveys this effect by placing its negations in fundamentally significant sites of the 
human understanding of reality. While none of the identifiable structures of meaning 
and no principle of coherence actually unify the poem, its enigmatically disturbing 
appeal is enforced by the fact that it locates meaninglessness in the right places for the 
reader to recognise in the poem‟s abjections a statement on – or, rather, a linguistic 
enactment of – human existence. „There are limits to ambiguity,‟ Stephen Thomson 
says about „Marina:‟ „No one, I wager, will ever seriously read “Marina” as a poem 
about a ship, with “daughter” a mere metaphor‟ (119). In the same way, the reader of 
The Waste Land knows that the matter of concern here is existential anxiety, the human 
condition: the hermeneutic circle begins in this semantic field whatever interpretative 
statements are achieved in the course of the explanatory turns that the reader chooses to 
make. Cleanth Brooks describes the ways in which The Waste Land‟s symbolic 
structure ultimately gives „the effect of chaotic experience ordered into new whole‟ 
(167), while William Spanos methodologically destroys the poem‟s unity in a 
hermeneutic project of „a dis-assembling [... the] figure‟ of The Waste Land in order „to 
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retrieve the poem from the tradition‟ („The Waste Land: A Phenomenological 
Destruction‟ 229). But in either of these contrasting readings the effort of understanding 
the poem‟s message builds on the assumption already formed that it is dealing with the 
questions of life and death (Brooks 137) and the possibilities of „dis-covering‟ their 
truth (Spanos, „The Waste Land‟ 229). 
This effect – the fact that the hermeneutic circle of interpreting The Waste Land 
finds itself interpreting the structure of existence per se – is an independent effect of this 
poem, an effect conveyed in its own terms. Writing his analysis of The Waste Land‟s 
symbolic structure in 1939, Brooks does not have the luxury of referring to Eliot‟s 
philosophical writing for the context of the philosophical premises underlying the poem 
as we do, but he states nevertheless that the poem is realist, that it aims to convey the 
experience of the modern chaotic reality being ordered into a „new whole‟ (167). At the 
same time, there are evident parallels between Eliot‟s theoretical thought about the 
nature of reality and the structures that make human reality the substance of The Waste 
Land. Rather than assuming that Eliot‟s poetry originates from his philosophical 
premises, I regard the fact of these parallels as the manifestation of Eliot‟s consistency 
in his concern with the nature of reality and an aspiration to express its experience in 
language, theoretical or poetic. In other words, Eliot‟s philosophy and poetry are not in 
a derivative relation to one another but they both originate from that enigmatic, non-
articulable wholeness of reality experienced as the presence of here-and-now. This 
experience, as well as its articulation in both philosophical and poetic language, is not 
Eliot‟s alone but commonly human. The commonness of both the world and our 
inclinations to interpret it in some ways rather than others is the condition of our pre-
reflective understanding that reading Eliot we are concerned with the fundamental 
issues of existence itself. 
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My inquiry into The Waste Land below explores the junctions of the 
articulations of experiential reality, parallel and yet intertwined, independent from one 
another and yet mutually interpretative. I want to foreground the ways in which Eliot‟s 
poetry reiterates his philosophical thought about the real, while being aware of the 
indirectness of the relations between them. As discourses with different purposes and of 
different structures, theory and poetry do – and mean – different things. Poetry enacts 
the sense of reality which philosophy talks about. Poetry makes its language mean by 
mimicking the structure of the perception of the reality which theory attempts to 
describe reflectively, identifying the dimensions of the meaningfulness of the real. 
Eliot‟s poetry is the language which his philosophy takes to be the carcass of 
meaningful reality, of the lived world. But this difference – poetry being the discourse 
of the immediate experience of reality while philosophy is a discourse of reflection on it 
– is not a conceptually neutral shift of emphasis onto one of the two aspects of 
meaningful experience, the immediacy of perception or the signifying structure of 
language. Eliot‟s philosophy does not explain his poetry in the conventional sense of the 
word, by providing key terms to unlock the indeterminacies of poetic meaning, with 
poetry assumed to be saying the same as philosophy but less clearly because poetry is a 
discourse of linguistic ornamentation. With Eliot, poetry is philosophical not because it 
is grounded in a conceptually coherent philosophical system but because its language is 
the body of a thought which is philosophical in its intention of attending to and 
articulating the structure of experienced reality. The indeterminacies of Eliotic poetic 
language are inevitabilities of this thought; they are articulations of the complexities of 
the experienced real and not a homage to the rhetorical convention of poetic discourse. I 
see Eliot‟s philosophy as indicating significant relations which reappear in poetry in 
their full complexity, the enactment of this complexity in poetic language being the only 
way they can be articulated. Eliot‟s poetry not only embodies his theoretical thought 
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about language and reality but also extends it, complicates it and comments on it by 
playing out the experience which in the philosophical language is a hypothetical, 
conceptually identified abstraction, an experientially void marker to designate the gap in 
a philosophical system that wants to think what it itself is not: the immediacy of 
experience. 
The Waste Land is a poem that articulates the difference between the immediacy 
of experience and the systematicity of theoretical thought. It exposes the gap between 
the immediate experience of given reality and its epistemological conceptualisation, or 
knowledge. In the terms of the underlying opposition of Knowledge and Experience, 
this poem wants to do away with the conceptual order of language – knowledge – which 
it assumes to be false and, instead of this language of knowledge, it wants to speak 
immediate experience only. The Waste Land wants to be the counterpart, the exact 
opposite of what Eliot knows knowledge to be. In this intention, the poem faces the 
truth of the fundamental Eliotic premise – a premise forgotten in the zeal to speak 
immediacy itself – that experience is informed by knowledge, that experience is an 
aspect of the known, the latter‟s non-conceptualisable supplement that cannot be 
thought or spoken about as a thing in itself because it is not a thing but an aspect of 
things known to be real. Four Quartets will contemplate this interdependence between 
knowledge and experience and use it as the major enabling force. The later poem will 
take the coherence of language as a structure and the dependence of its meanings on the 
things it says for the fundamental given, a starting point from which it will manipulate 
linguistic expression into an articulation of the complementarity of knowledge and 
experience itself. But The Waste Land does not yet have this confidence. It wants to 
have immediate experience by itself, in its pure state, as the other of knowledge. It 
wants to get rid of the linguistic order in which it knows the world and see the remains 
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that must be – given that there is nothing else except the linguistic order of knowledge 
and the pre-articulate immediate experience – reality itself. 
The logic that most powerfully unifies a literary work is narrative. The Waste 
Land defies this logic in its play with the narrative that it claims – deceptively again – 
for its centre and the unifying frame, the legend of the Grail. 
 
 
AESTHETICS OF EVASION: THE ABSENT UNITIES OF THE GRAIL 
 
It is impossible to say now what significance of anthropology to The Waste Land would 
have been recognised had not Eliot acknowledged Sir James Frazer and Jessie Weston 
in the Notes. The poem contains so many references, their source narratives overlapping 
and commenting on one another in so many ways that no single source – not even a 
combination of two sources, as Eliot‟s acknowledgement in the opening note suggests – 
seems to hold centrality firmly enough to unify it, to assimilate the universe of texts 
interwoven into the ex-centric texture of its lines. In 1956, Eliot tells the story of the 
Notes‟ appearance with a striking directness in his tone. It was „discovered that the 
poem was inconveniently short‟ to be published on its own as a book, and he „set to 
work to expand the notes, in order to provide a few more pages of printed matter, with 
the result that they became the remarkable exposition of bogus scholarship that is still 
on view to-day‟ („The Frontiers of Criticism,‟ OPP 109). And three years later, in 1959, 
Hugh Kenner describes the Notes in the terms of textual expansion rather than of any 
interpretative assistance to the understanding of the poem: Eliot „dilated on the Tarot 
Pack, copied nineteen lines from Ovid and thirty-three words from Chapman‟s 
Handbook of Birds of Eastern North America,‟ added a few casual observations and, 
„with the aid of quotations from Froude, Bradley, and Hermann Hesse‟s Blick ins 
110 
 
Chaos, succeeded in padding the thing out to suitable length‟ (129-130). And yet, 
however sceptical a view this history suggests about the status of the Notes, and 
however contingent the character of their functioning (noted by many critics but also 
directly addressed [Nitchie]), they have performed their mischievous trickery of luring 
Eliot‟s critics into the woods of The Waste Land‟s quasi-explanatory symbolic systems 
perfectly well. 
In 1956, Eliot singles out the case of Weston to describe the unwanted effect of 
the „bogus scholarship‟ attached to The Waste Land: „It was just, no doubt, that I should 
pay my tribute to the work of Miss Jessie Weston; but I regret having sent so many 
inquirers off on a wild goose chase after Tarot cards and the Holy Grail‟ („The Frontiers 
of Criticism,‟ OPP 110). Indeed, the vagaries of Weston‟s presence in The Waste Land 
encapsulate the Janus face of this poem: its seductive duplicity is manifest yet again in 
the fact of Eliot‟s acknowledgement itself and the nature of the significance given to 
both Weston and Frazer in the note. There is a „plan and [... the] symbolism of the 
poem‟ (CPP 76) but they are not in the poem itself, they are elsewhere, in Weston‟s 
From Ritual and Romance which, Eliot says, „will elucidate the difficulties of the poem 
much better than [his] notes can do‟ (CPP 76). And the Note proceeds with an 
implication, in the same sentence after a semicolon, that the poem is something other 
than this „plan‟ can show. Eliot refers to Weston only those „who think such elucidation 
of the poem worth the trouble‟ (CPP 76). Finding „the plan‟ that will „elucidate the 
difficulties of the poem‟ is not, therefore, a self-evident purpose of reading it – the poem 
itself may well be found, instead, in „the difficulties‟ rather than in their „elucidation.‟ 
But such is the nature of critical enterprise that it thrives on explanation and, therefore, 
goes chasing the wild goose of an interpretative key even if it has been given signs that 
this chase, in fact, makes us forget the very thing it is supposed to unlock. „We think of 
the key, each in his prison / Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison‟ (CPP 74), says 
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The Waste Land approaching its close. The critic‟s key is a principle of coherence 
which, we somehow tend to think, means unlocking a poem; but instead we lock 
ourselves in the prison of the explanatory enterprise itself. 
Just like all promises of this poem, the promise of the key to The Waste Land in 
Weston‟s book on the origins of the Grail is not quite fulfilled: From Ritual to Romance 
does not elucidate any difficulties but rather adds to them. To begin with, it is far from 
obvious what, in Weston, could be seen as „the plan,‟ for the book itself does not have 
any obvious organising structure. It aspires to answer the question of the origins and the 
meaning of the Grail legends, and does so in an ostensibly scholarly investigation which 
compares a myriad of narratives that are versions of the Grail myth or are related to it 
through similarities in separate elements. In addition to the variety of the sources of 
these narratives, both literary and mythological, as well as those of the anthropological 
descriptions of ritual practices in cultures all over the world, Weston accounts for the 
scholarship that has been carried out on every aspect of her inquiry. Her own 
investigation claims that multiple versions of the Grail cannot be assimilated into one 
proto-narrative because, in this legend, narrative itself is a superstructure rather than the 
lost origin. Multiple versions of the Grail differ from one another not because they 
deviate from some unidentified mythological-religious narrative but because they 
assemble elements that themselves are narrative explanations of fertility rites, while 
both rites and the narratives framing them differ from culture to culture though they all 
interpret the same natural reality. The sameness of reality is, Weston concludes, the 
source of both the legend‟s appeal and of its openness to re-telling its tale in yet another 
manner: „The Grail romances repose eventually, not on the poet‟s imagination, but upon 
the ruins of an august and ancient ritual, a ritual which once claimed to be the accredited 
guardian of the deepest secrets of Life‟ (187); and it is this capacity of the Grail to 
reach, through ritual, to „the deepest secrets of Life‟ that the legend is retold now and 
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again in a variety of genres, „making its fresh appeal through the genius of Tennyson 
and Wagner‟ (188). 
Weston‟s thesis – that the Grail romances derive directly from ritual practices – 
is the only axis of coherence in the book‟s discourse. From Ritual to Romance does not 
give a synopsis of the Grail legend anywhere in the text, nor does it follow the 
development of its narrative stage after stage. There is no plot common to all versions, 
and therefore they can be discussed only in terms of differences in plot elements, such 
as the difference in the formulation of the task of the hero in Gawain, Diû Crône and 
Perceval versions (12-24). And even these are not located in the sequence of their 
appearance in the Grail narrative but looked at as if they were independent fragments. 
Further: though some elements that Weston discusses clearly are those that shape the 
plot (such as the Fisher King, for example [113-136], or the mystery of the Grail [137-
163], or the Perilous Chapel [175-188]), there are others are that build up a network of 
symbolic meanings rather than of narrative coherence (like the symbols of a fertility cult 
and Tarot cards [65-100]), and in some chapters Weston goes into quite extensive 
descriptions of ritual practices in cultures all over the world, comparing them before 
indicating their significance to the Grail (34-64, 81-100). Nor is there a method that 
defines the principle of Weston‟s juxtapositions: she draws parallels between elements 
found in the Grail and ritual practices wherever they appear, be they events that 
initialise the movement of the plot, as the task of the hero is, or symbols, such as the 
Lance and the Cup representing the Male and the Female respectively in both ritual 
practices and the Grail (75-76), or structures of formal representation, such as the form 
of a dialogue in Rig-Veda hymns related to the genre of drama (27-28). Weston‟s 
presentation of this panoramic view of rather contingent and fragmentary similarities is 
regularly interrupted by extended references to works by other scholars, sometimes for 
evidence and support and sometimes to disagree with their methods and conclusions. If 
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this can be considered a „plan,‟ The Waste Land certainly borrows it; but the reader will 
have to put some effort into elucidating what „the plan‟ is for it to begin elucidating any 
of the difficulties of Eliot‟s poem. 
Eliot‟s critics tend to erase Weston‟s presence2, regarding her as a satellite to the 
adjacent, more obviously productive fields of reference. If she is mentioned at all, her 
importance to The Waste Land is assimilated into that of Frazer‟s work which Weston is 
seen to extend, or else From Ritual to Romance is regarded as one of Eliot‟s many 
sources of the Grail legend itself, alongside Wagner, Nietzsche‟s critique of Wagner and 
Verlaine (CPP 61-62, 67, 76,77; Kearns 197, 198n; Kenner 146; Smith, T. S. Eliot’s 
Poetry and Plays, 86). Scholars of Eliot‟s work on anthropology tend to disregard 
Weston, apparently seeing her as a literary scholar, a folklorist rather than an 
anthropologist. Harmon mentions only the fact of Eliot‟s „testimony‟ that he used 
Weston, along with Frazer, in The Waste Land, which is another proof that Eliot had 
anthropology on his mind while writing the poem (804). Manganaro refers to Weston – 
in those instances when she is not presented as an extension of Frazer‟s presence in 
Eliot‟s work – only to leap to the Grail and say that the legend in The Waste Land 
„functions implicitly, unimaged but ever-present‟ (Myth, Rhetoric and the Voice of 
Authority 85), as „the poem‟s narrative arc of expectations, its functionality as quest-
romance‟ (Culture, 1922 149). Brooker silences Weston, with help from Kenner and 
Litz, redirecting attention to Frazer alone: „Litz and Kenner are right to lament that 
generations of readers have been sidetracked by a spurious plot and a nonexistent hero, 
but they are wrong to dismiss Frazer and his fellows‟ („The Case of the Missing 
Abstraction‟ 543). Weston, meanwhile, merely doubles an aspect of Frazer‟s 
significance to Eliot, by using his „method of generating abstractions through the 
                                                 
2
 There are exceptions to this tendency, of course: Gregory Jay, for example, looks specifically into how 
Weston transforms the Grail legend in the aspects relevant to Eliot and how Eliot does and does not 
continue Weston‟s line of thought (61-63). 
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comparative study of fragments [...] to generate (construct) a parent myth behind the 
Grail legends‟ (548). And Smith goes directly for the parent myth itself: The Waste 
Land, he claims, „summarizes the Grail legend, not precisely in the usual order but 
retaining the principal incidents and adapting them to a modern setting‟ (T. S. Eliot’s 
Poetry and Plays 70). Smith corroborates his claim with the evidence of Eliot‟s 
acknowledgement of his „indebtedness to both Sir James Frazer and to Jessie L. 
Weston‟s From Ritual to Romance‟ – somewhat strangely undisturbed by the fact that 
Eliot‟s copy of Weston held in the Haughton Library is not annotated and that some 
pages of it Eliot left uncut (70, 311n) – and, indeed, he consistently reads The Waste 
Land as a modernist resetting of the Grail plot. 
This relocation of the source of an explanatory system – from Weston to the 
Grail or Frazer – does not quite solve the problem of the unity of The Waste Land but 
works, rather, as another move of deferral of the promised unity of meaning. Brooker 
blames Smith for initiating a version of the Eliotic „mythical method,‟ canonised but 
actually misleading in its claim that „The Waste Land, like Ulysses, is based on a 
background myth, that this myth provides a shadow plot and shadow hero‟ (Brooker 
541). And Smith himself, in fact, in his later work more emphatically hedges his thesis 
that the Grail as presented in Weston makes The Waste Land accessibly coherent: 
Weston and Frazer „each has a coherent system of ritual and myth with which Eliot may 
be compared and by which its coherence may be tested,‟ but Eliot‟s borrowing from 
them is transformative, and the transformation is clearly in the direction of obscuring 
the sources: „The Waste Land is tentative where Weston is doctrinaire, diffuse where 
Frazer is organised‟ (The Waste Land 53). As to Frazer, Eliot only borrows from The 
Golden Bough „certain material,‟ which „implies in no way Eliot‟s outright acceptance 
of Frazer‟s interpretations‟ (54) – the coherence of the source, in other words, is broken 
down by the manner of Eliot‟s use of it. And the manner of use itself, Smith goes on to 
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say, is found in Frazer‟s work just as well: „Eliot contrived in “Ulysses, Order, and 
Myth” a recipe for literature which should transcend narrative and incorporate the 
hypotheses of the social sciences, and such discoveries as those marshalled in Frazer‟s 
The Golden Bough‟ (60). It seems that Eliot relies on his anthropological sources here 
and there but there is no way to define the principle of this reliance. 
To complicate the matter of the key source further, scholars of Frazer‟s work 
and of his influence on Eliot do not seem to believe in the coherence of The Golden 
Bough itself, effectively claiming that Eliot learned from Frazer techniques of breaking 
a coherent development of meaning rather than relying on any kind of systematic 
conception that might have been discerned in Frazer‟s work. This tradition of a stylistic 
rather than a conceptual juxtaposition of Frazer‟s writing with Eliot‟s begins in 1973 
with John B. Vickery‟s study of the significance of The Golden Bough to modernist 
literature. For Vickery, The Waste Land is the apotheosis of Frazer‟s presence in Eliot‟s 
writing, its development traced throughout Eliot‟s poetry and criticism, from The 
Sacred Wood (the title of which, Vickery claims, comes from the first chapter of The 
Golden Bough [234]) to Four Quartets. Vickery frames his reading of The Waste Land 
in the narrative of the development of religious consciousness. It is Frazer who might 
have „brought Eliot to the Anglican Communion and an acceptance of orthodox 
Christianity,‟ by emphasising „the pattern of death and resurrection‟ (243) and by 
accounting for „nature myths, mystery cults, and the Grail legends [...] as progressive 
stages in the gradual evolution of man‟s religious consciousness‟ (245). In Vickery‟s 
account, The Waste Land, relying on both The Golden Bough and the Grail, is a 
narrative poem representing the emergence of religious consciousness in its 
protagonist‟s quest. 
Though by itself such omni-presence of Frazer in Eliot may sound rather 
overemphasised, Vickery corroborates his thesis not only with conventional literary 
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analysis tracing parallel motifs in The Waste Land and The Golden Bough but also with 
analogies between their styles. Vickery admits that „Eliot‟s abrupt transitions from topic 
to topic and his juxtapositions of apparently ironic materials‟ might have been learned 
from Laforgue and Corbière,‟ but there is also a source of the same stylistic model 
„nearer to home:‟ this kind of discourse defined the „comparative method of the 
classical school of anthropology, especially in the form in which it was utilized by 
Frazer‟ (237). This style, for Vickery, is a „permanent effect‟ of The Golden Bough on 
Eliot‟s poetry that translates the directness Frazer‟s presentation of his material into a 
poetic technique of communicating „subtle insights with a powerful immediacy‟ (237). 
In Frazer, this effect of immediacy is conveyed by detailed description of self-contained 
scenes of cultural realities (rites) rather than theorising about their meaning. And though 
these scenes by themselves often show similarities and parallels, their „irregular 
overlapping produced so jagged an outline as to appear almost to be dissolving into 
chaos‟ (238). In other words, the abruptness and fragmentation of style, in Frazer, 
mimics reality in the same way as it does in the writing of literary authors, and it is this 
principle that marks Frazer‟s presence in Eliot: 
Not in style, to be sure, but in the panoramic view of man‟s variety and 
disparities, irony, incongruity, and insight are welded together as firmly as in the 
poetry of Donne, Marvell, or any other of those who thought with their 
fingertips. (238) 
 
This analogy between Frazer‟s method of comparative sociology and Eliot‟s 
poetic technique is the bottom line of Eliot‟s „mythical method‟ – this is also the thesis 
of Brooker‟s juxtaposition of Eliot‟s and Frazer‟s methodological positions. She 
distinguishes as many as four categories of misinterpretation in „Ulysses, Order, and 
Myth‟ in Eliot criticism („The Case of the Missing Abstraction‟ 540-543), and offers an 
alternative to all of them, redefining the Eliotic „mythical method‟ as „a near-synonym 
for “scientific” or “comparative” or “inductive”; or more precisely as a term for the 
scientific method as transformed by its application in the arts‟ (543). Brooker looks into 
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the genesis of Frazer‟s method, which suggests to her the structure of the method itself. 
Frazer‟s investigations began with his interest in one myth. He could not find analogies 
to it as a whole – which, by implication, would have explained its meaning – but he 
could see analogies to its parts, and then went on collecting and putting them together 
for comparison (545-46). The ghost of a single myth behind the volumes of Frazer‟s 
work, in Brooker‟s view, is absolutely central to his method (547), just as it is for 
Weston, for the focus of her attention is „a parent myth‟ behind the differences of the 
Grail legends that she investigates (548). 
The crucial twist in Brooker‟s admirably coherent and analytically explicit 
argument is that she does not identify this assumed myth with a narrative that Frazer 
might be thought to be proposing after all, nor does she claim any other frame of 
coherence in Frazer‟s work. In Brooker‟s view, Frazer‟s assumption of a unifying 
structure, a single myth which he declares to be the focus of his interest, remains a unity 
hypothetically assumed but never actually surfacing in Frazer‟s discourse as an 
organising pattern of any kind, narrative or logical, the discourse itself presenting 
cultural reality as it finds it: 
The unity of The Golden Bough does not depend on the chronological or logical 
arrangements of Frazer‟s fragments. Frazer merely collects and preserves 
fragments as he finds them in the present, broken, distorted, changed by history 
and evolution. With minimal or no damage to his thesis, he could rearrange 
them, or he could throw some out and/or add others. And Frazer does not 
assume the existence of a culturally shared myth or abstraction. He brings his 
own myth and takes special care to keep it always in the reader‟s mind. (549) 
 
This „special care,‟ Brooker says, amounts to repeated references to the myth of 
the Dying God, in the title The Golden Bough and throughout its twelve volumes (549). 
But this is a void marker, a „reference point myth [which] exists as an abstraction‟ 
(551), without a possibility of identifying what kind of abstraction it is nor a defined 
content it communicates. In Frazer‟s method, unity „does not derive from the sequential 
relation of part to part, either chronologically or logically,‟ nor does it come „from the 
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reference of the work to an abstraction pre-existent in culture,‟ nor does it exist „on the 
surface of the work‟ which, instead, is intentionally fragmented to represent the 
fragmentation of historical reality (549-550). Having refuted every possibility of a 
defining unity, Brooker takes the only way out to save it – even if only as an idea, a 
pure hypothesis of unity itself – by relocating unity from the text being read to the 
process of reading: 
Unity derives finally from the relation of the fragments to the comprehensive 
abstraction generated as the reader compares them to each other and to 
abstractions which emerge in the process of reading. (550) 
 
With a few substitutions of terms, Brooker‟s description of Frazer‟s comparative 
method could be quoted word for word to describe the structure of The Waste Land. 
And Brooker draws this analogy herself: „In The Waste Land, the myth is suggested by 
the title and by the notes, and is reinforced by fragments of the myth within the poem‟ 
(551). 
Perhaps, however, there is a slight qualification to be made. Given all his 
admiration for Frazer‟s work, Eliot did not think Frazer had succeeded in keeping the 
idea of the deep structure the parent myth at bay, nor did he believe that there had to be 
a deep structure assumed at all. Rather the opposite: an interpretative intervention into 
the otherwise ingenious corpus of anthropological descriptions of The Golden Bough is 
the only fault that Eliot finds with Frazer in 1913 (IPR, Gray 130); and he reiterates this 
response again in a 1924 review for Vanity Fair, more emphatically praising Frazer for 
having „withdrawn in more and more cautious abstention from the attempt to explain‟ 
yet mentioning nevertheless that the first, two-volume, edition of The Golden Bough 
„was an attempt to explain the Priest of Nemi‟ („A Prediction‟ 29). If The Waste Land 
indeed mimics the unity – or rather the absence of unity – of The Golden Bough, the 
Grail must not be though to unify it even in a fragmentary presence. 
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Indeed, the Grail does not seem to provide a unifying frame to The Waste Land 
even though formally this is now and then claimed. Smith is one among many to say 
that the Grail underlies the poem and then hedge this statement with a denial of an 
identifiable unity that the legend might be thought to be bringing into the poem. What is 
it exactly, we might want to ask, that remains of a summary of a plot if it does not keep 
„the usual order‟ and only „retain[s] the principal incidents [...] adapting them to 
[another] setting‟ (T. S. Eliot’s Poetry and Plays 70)? Helen Gardner effectively states 
the same: like Ulysses, The Waste Land builds on a myth to which the poem constantly 
refers, these references, in Gardner‟s view, being the major axis of the poem‟s unity 
(The Art of T. S. Eliot 85, 87). But when it comes to characterising what this unity is, all 
that is left of the myth is two thematic motifs, „the mysterious sickness of the Fisher 
King and the blight of infertility which has fallen upon his lands,‟ and the decisive turn 
of the plot, the question or „the magic act‟ of „the destined Deliverer‟ which removes the 
curse (85). Gardner does not regard these elements as contributing to a unity of plot: 
unlike Joyce, Eliot „discards plot and his poem has no conclusion or solution.‟ Eliot‟s 
„constant references to the underlying myth‟ – though considered by Gardner the main 
device holding the poem together – are accompanied by „musical repetition and 
variation‟ that must be there to order „an extraordinary variety of styles‟ in which the 
poem is written (87, 85). And this supplementary formal patterning seems to be a 
necessity rather than a free choice, for the source of the unifying structure, the Grail, 
does not actually contain one: there is „something in the Grail legend [...] that resists the 
ordering of plot. The “meanings” are always overflowing the narrative and 
overwhelming the design‟ (87). Further, Gardner sees Eliot complicating this already 
defective narrative organisation inherent in the Grail itself even further, by building the 
poem „on the predicament which the myth embodies, [but] omitting any of the solutions 
of the predicament which we find in the various Grail stories‟ (87). These omissions 
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defer the climax of the narrative tension that the presence of the Grail makes the reader 
assume: „The Waste Land moves, if it moves at all, towards some moment which is 
outside the poem and may never come, which we are still waiting for at the close‟ (87). 
The tension is located in an expectation unfulfilled, or – yet again – in the act of 
reading. 
With the Grail, just as with Frazer, critical exegesis turns in exactly the same 
interpretative circle. The critic finds a source of unity that itself appears not to possess 
the unity it promises to provide, which leaves the only possible solution: to turn unity 
into a readerly expectation that is raised but not fulfilled and then transformed into an 
element of the reading process which draws solely on the reader‟s response. The poem 
demands active participation from its reader in the construction of its uniformity, while 
references to its sources enlarge the circle of interpretation but do not answer the 
question of its meaning. Meaning – in Eliot‟s poetry as well as in his philosophy, as it 
turns out – is a matter of immediate experience and not of linguistic structures alone, 
even if these structures are poetic. And The Waste Land pushes the event of meaning 
into the only locus of experience, the act of reading in which the reader is the only 
experiencing agent. If the Grail myth indeed gives an interpretative key of central 
significance to The Waste Land, this key seems to be the significance of the only 
crucially decisive event of its disordered plot. This event is the act of the quester‟s 
question, the act itself, regardless of what exactly the quester asks, bringing the miracle 
of the revival to the Fisher King and of his land. The meaning of the „heap of broken 
images‟ (CPP 61) of The Waste Land depends on the same involvement of its quester, 
the reader. As Kenner puts it, „all that is requisite is sufficient curiosity; the man who 
asks what one or another of these fragments means [...] may be the agent of their 
regeneration‟ (147). Like the past in Kenner‟s reading of The Waste Land, the poem 
„exists in fragments precisely because nobody cares what it meant; it will unite itself 
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and come alive in the mind of anyone who succeeds in caring‟ (147). By relying on the 
responsiveness of human mind, 
Eliot develops the nightmare journey with consummate skill, and then manœvres 
the reader into the position of the quester, presented with a terminal heap of 
fragments which it is his business to inquire about. (148) 
 
Cleo McNelly Kearns sees Eliot paying special attention to those versions of the 
Grail in Weston that emphasise the importance of the healing question from the quester, 
while The Waste Land places the reader in the position of Parsival (197-201). For 
Bolgan, The Waste Land‟s fusion of multiple subjective agents into one – the healer is 
also the healed, and the quester merges with the Fisher King – disables the aesthetic 
effect of the poem, for it fails to provide a central persona for the reader to identify with 
to see the poem‟s world (30-33). But Kearns sees this fusion as both intentionally 
constructed and extended outside the poem‟s text to include the reader: „[T]he quester 
who must ask the saving question [...] is not a “character” within the work, but the 
reader, a figure not only implicit in but also invoked by the text‟ (199). Through the 
Grail and by other means (such as the „you‟ of the poem), The Waste Land makes 
a direct plea to the reader to enter the poem‟s discourse, to overcome the 
inhibitions that allow its riddles to go unchallenged, and to ask of this disturbed 
text, of its speaker, and of the culture from which it comes, „What ails you?‟ By 
refraining from asking this question [...] we participate [...] in Parsival‟s evasion. 
(199) 
 
By asking the question and, more importantly, in trying to hear the poem‟s 
answer, the reader co-authors The Waste Land‟s meaning, if meaning indeed must be 
the outcome of the reading act. „Each reader of The Waste Land will construct a variant 
of Frazer‟s monomyth,‟ says Brooker, and in the process of this re-construction „the 
reader becomes Eliot‟s co-poet‟ („The Case of the Missing Abstraction‟ 551). In a 
similar way, in his use of the Grail, Eliot weaves the plot of Parsival in a complexity of 
syntax which makes the reader and the writer interchangeable, either of them able to 
play the quester‟s role in making the poem‟s meaning come alive (Kearns 197-198n). 
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It may seem that in this conclusion the Grail has been found, the question of the 
significance of anthropology to The Waste Land answered. Via The Golden Bough or 
the Grail, The Waste Land says that unity is not a textual structure but arises in the 
discursive situation in which the text is read, springing out of the reader‟s quest into the 
meaning of the object of attention, the poem which is the analogue of the world for the 
quester in the Grail myth. Unity arises in the process of experiencing the poem in the act 
of reading, or – if it has to be specified as a particular meaning, a particular kind of 
„abstraction‟ – it is a re-articulation of this experience that is derived from the poem 
every time anew. But the joy of discovery does not last long, for the Grail slips away 
once we take another step back and reflect on the conclusion itself. Eliot‟s readers seem 
to agree that through the Grail The Waste Land shifts the responsibility for constructing 
its meaning to the reader, but what they do not say is that this is true of every poem and 
even every kind of text. Even further: this relocation of meaning from the structure that 
articulates it to the experience of discerning it is at the basis of Eliot‟s hermeneutic 
vision of all reality, whether this reality is already structured, textualised or not. 
This shift to experiencing meaning rather than rearticulating it in presumably 
clearer, more coherent, analytic terms is just as alive in Eliot‟s 1956 reflection on the 
effect of his Notes to The Waste Land, where he considers their story as a paradigmatic 
case of the intrusion of critical discourse into poetic experience. In „The Frontiers of 
Criticism,‟ Eliot remembers his poem as an example of the perception of a literary work 
that raises the question of the limits of literary criticism. Joyce epitomises this 
questioning, yet not in Ulysses, with which The Waste Land is commonly compared, but 
in Finnegans Wake, a far more daring challenge to the critic. This challenge makes 
Finnegans Wake, Eliot says, an ideal work for scholarly investigations – for 
„exegetists,‟ also „practitioners of hermeneutics with emulative zeal‟ – because it calls 
for their „labours [...] to unravel all the threads and follow all the clues in that book‟ 
123 
 
(OPP 109). And yet, though such exegesis is absolutely needed to understand anything 
in „that monstrous masterpiece,‟ Finnegans Wake – like „most poetry‟ of which it is, for 
Eliot, an example („a kind of vast prose poem‟) – is not quite „written in that way or 
requires that sort of dissection for its enjoyment and understanding‟ (OPP 109). 
Obscurity of meaning, Eliot says, does not necessarily mean that there is a 
meaning obscured, a riddle to be solved. It may be that it is there for the work to be, 
„without elaborate explanation, merely beautiful nonsense‟ which the author wrote 
without realising „how obscure his book was,‟ while critics, being „unconscious of the 
fact, [...] invented the puzzle for the pleasure of discovering the solution.‟ This „error,‟ 
Eliot says, is the error „of mistaking explanation for understanding‟ (OPP 109). Just as 
in our experience of reality which Eliot describes in his philosophical papers, there are 
two modes of apprehending a literary work, reciprocally interdependent and yet distinct: 
there is critical „explanation‟ striving for the systematic, analytic knowledge of the work 
as a defined meaning, and immediate pre-reflective „understanding‟ of the same work, 
the experience of the formation and transformations of meanings that its linguistic 
texture conveys. Knowledge and experience, „explanation and understanding,‟ evoke, 
enable, and enrich one another, and they may even merge in cathartic „moments of 
knowledge‟ (KE 155) that subsume immediate experience into their meaningfulness, 
this meaningfulness itself arising as a moment in which knowledge and experience 
complement one another in an event of insight. But for most of the time they are not the 
same, and the distinction must not be lost. 
The Waste Land, Eliot implies in „The Frontiers of Criticism,‟ dwells in the 
woods of the immediate pre-analytic experience. It is a poem for immediate 
„understanding‟ but it neither assumes nor expects us to solve any puzzles that are the 
bread and butter of critical „explanation.‟ 
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THE ALL-PERVASIVE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A POET-ANTHROPOLOGIST: THE PECULIAR 
CENTRALITY OF TIRESIAS 
 
Yet the story of the significance of the Grail myth and, more generally, of the Notes in 
The Waste Land is two-sided. As we have just observed, this story denies what seems to 
be the major function of the Notes: they were composed without an intention to provide 
an explanatory frame for the poem. The case of the Grail myth shows clearly that the 
Notes do not serve this function. But at the same time, this story exposes the necessity 
of having a unifying frame in mind in order to be able to see that the poem‟s unity lies 
elsewhere than in conceptual or narrative logic. In the case of The Waste Land this is a 
paradoxical unity, for it is the experience of reality as fundamentally ununifiable, an 
experience that the poem aims to (re-)produce for the reader by its language. The Notes 
reinforce and extend this effect. They manifest the presence of the machinery of the 
analytic critical discourse next to the poem, while constructing this manifestation in 
such a way that no analytically discernable unity is allowed to take over the experience 
of excessive fragmentation that the poem‟s language provides. Even if it is the absence 
of a meaningful unity that is being stated, the statement itself is enabled by the 
complementarity of linguistic structure and extra-linguistic experience that for Eliot, as 
my argument goes, defines reality itself. Every kind of linguistic order must be present 
as a hypothetical possibility and tried out for us to be able to see and say that the poem 
is not defined by any of them, and that it is to be experienced rather than explained. 
When regarded as a part of the poem‟s textual body, the Notes point to these 
hypothetical unities that The Waste Land does not realise. They function as an extension 
of the poem‟s strategy of seduction: they promise an analytically discernable unity, such 
as that of the Grail narrative, but then the poem refuses to accept it. The history of the 
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composition of the Notes, as well as the way they function, makes it evident that this 
was not an intended and thoroughly designed effect, for Eliot indeed composed them in 
a casual manner, „with diffidence, even indifference,‟ as Rainey puts it (Revisiting The 
Waste Land 38), without quite thinking about how they would determine the reception 
of the poem. Yet having been written with this attitude, the Notes perform a function 
that is even more important for my discussion here: they manifest Eliot‟s immediate, 
pre-reflective responses to his own poetry, indicating contexts that resonate in Eliot‟s 
mind as he comments on some of The Waste Land‟s lines.3 In this immediate response 
documented in such localised commentary, the significance of every note being 
restricted to a line and sometimes a word, Eliot turns the Notes into the field of an even 
further disruption of a sense of unity that a poem is conventionally expected to give. 
There is one exception to The Waste Land‟s law of fragmentation, a paradoxical 
exception, for it brings about a figure that fully conforms to the poem‟s law of 
fragmentation, by embodying the paradigm of disruptions that define the poem‟s vision 
of reality. This figure is Tiresias, a figure that simultaneously is and is not the unifying 
core of The Waste Land. Tiresias is the centre of the aesthetic unity of the poem because 
his perception of the world is defined by the tensions through which The Waste Land 
conveys for its reader the vision of the excessive and disordered reality. But because 
this vision is a vision of disorder, Tiresias does not perform a unifying function in the 
conventional sense of the word. In the light of Eliot‟s philosophical premises about 
reality, Tiresias appears as a figure that exposes the experience of reality as a structure, 
a constellation of different ways of perceiving and understanding reality without, 
however, unifying these perceptions into a meaningful vision of the world. This 
paradoxical non-unifying unity – Tiresias as an embodied deconstruction of the Eliotic 
consciousness-in-the-body – is the subject matter of the remaining part of this chapter. 
                                                 
3
 Nitchie elaborates on this kind of functioning of the Notes, highlighting it as their structural 
characteristic rather than deriving this function from the circumstances of their composition. 
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■ 
Critics usually begin exploring the interpretative potential of Tiresias‟s figure with 
Eliot‟s note to line 218 (CPP 78). This note is itself seen as ascribing to Tiresias a 
narrative centrality which then is observed to deviate from the expectation of 
conventional narrative structures raised by the note. This kind of reading assumes that 
Eliot speaks from the viewpoint and in the idiom of literary criticism, as the fact that the 
note is Eliot‟s comment on the meaning of his poem suggests. But in fact his voice here 
is of Eliot the philosopher, a voice that does not yet quite distinguish between the 
ostensibly aesthetic, formal structures of a literary work and the significative structures 
of language – just as it was the case in the 1919 essay on Hamlet but not in the 
Edinburgh Lectures of 1937. From this philosophical viewpoint, Eliot‟s Tiresias (read in 
the full complex of his appearance in the poem: the note and the narrative fragment) in 
effect articulates his notion of the perceptual structure of reality signified in language, 
this notion developed in the philosophical terms in Knowledge and Experience. The 
note on Tiresias reads: 
Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a „character‟, is yet the most 
important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-eyed 
merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not 
wholly distinct from Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one 
woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias. What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the 
substance of the poem. (CPP 78) 
 
This description begins with the fundamental given of Eliot‟s phenomenological 
worldview, the irreducible point of view, which is the point of perceiving reality and of 
signifying it in the process of perception. Tiresias is said to be „a mere spectator,‟ a 
perceiving eye; he is not a psychological subject, not a „character,‟ but the function of 
watching, the seer of the poem‟s reality in the literal sense of the word. Tiresias is the 
point of view for the reader to assume in order to follow the poem‟s articulation of its 
vision of reality. 
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This Tiresian point of view is peculiar, however: it differs from the actual 
viewpoint, the reader‟s, by being purely linguistic. In Eliot‟s note on Tiresias‟s 
significance, Tiresias himself appears as an element of the poem‟s linguistic network. 
We will have to look into what kind of consciousness Tiresias‟s is to understand his 
capacity to unite all personages of the poem, as Eliot says in the note. But the series of 
identifications by which Eliot characterises Tiresias already establishes this figure as a 
linguistic function, a marker of a common semantic denominator. The underlying 
principle of these identifications is that of analogy between the elements being 
identified with one another – any analogy, without assuming a narrative continuity or 
the sameness of the narrative function of the analogous elements. The one-eyed 
merchant, though a human figure, is a card in Madame Sosostris‟s pack (CPP 62). The 
seller of currants appears in the poem over a hundred and fifty lines later (lines 53 and 
210 respectively) as „Mr. Eugenides, the Smyrna merchant / Unshaven, with a pocket 
full of currants‟ (CPP 68). The Phoenician Sailor is the dead body in the sea of Part IV, 
„Death by Water‟ (CPP 71). And Ferdinand is a Shakespearean voice, from The 
Tempest, who speaks twice in the poem, quoting different lines of the same passage 
from the play, in lines 192 and 257 (CPP 77, 78; Rainey The Annotated Waste Land 
103), while his name is never mentioned in The Waste Land. Given the degree of the 
poem‟s fragmentation and the demand it puts on the reading process to establish links of 
coherence that will carry it through, this net of identifications – the one-eyed merchant 
in line 53 is the Smyrna merchant in line 210 and the drowned sailor of lines 312-321, 
and they are all Ferdinand, a shadow presence somewhere in between all these – is far 
from self-evident. But they share common markers. Mr. Eugenides is referred to as a 
„merchant‟ which is also the identity of the one-eyed man pictured on the card in 
Madame Sosostris‟s pack, verbal repetition relating them to one another. Neither of 
them is explicitly said to be a sailor, but shipping is a part of most of merchandising 
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businesses, and Madame Sosostris warns her client to „[f]ear death by water,‟ the kind 
of death that fell on Phlebas. And with this, comes Ferdinand who believes – having 
heard Ariel singing to him about it, the song quoted first in the Sosostris episode and the 
quotation repeated in „A Game of Chess‟ – that his father has been drowned in the sea. 
There is no structure that would bring all these „personages‟ together under a common 
denominator other than their anthropomorphic identity, as Eliot‟s meticulously precise 
choice of the word denotes. „Personage‟ is a person claiming some status of importance, 
but also an effigy of a person, a symbolic marker of it, as well as a character 
impersonated on stage, and The Waste Land‟s „personages‟ are all these. In other 
respects, the network of identifications Eliot draws relies on common semantic markers 
of the „personages‟ being identified with one another, which does not build a coherence 
of the narrative kind, but is a network of contingent linguistic associations. This 
network is the structure of Tiresias‟s – and the poem‟s – reality. 
This linguistic principle works just as well in the field of non-linguistic, physical 
differences between points of view. The sameness of all these personages, scattered 
throughout the poem‟s lines and its narrative planes, is characterised as the principle 
according to which „all the women are one woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias.‟ 
This statement formulates the peculiarity of Tiresias‟s perception of the world in the 
context of Eliot‟s premise that the perception and understanding of reality are grounded 
in the body. The sameness of sex implies the sameness of physical ground and thus the 
sameness of the viewpoint marked by gender identity („all the women are one woman‟) 
– which, however, is not relevant in Tiresias‟s case, for his is the androgynous body, the 
difference of sex being erased in his mythical biography. „[T]he two sexes meet in 
Tiresias,‟ Eliot says and proceeds with a quote from Ovid‟s narrative of Tiresias‟s 
change of sex and of its consequences in full. The course of events of Tiresias‟s 
metamorphoses establishes him as an Eliotic abstract point of view in two respects: both 
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sexes meeting in Tiresias, he is a universally human experiencing viewpoint; and the 
significance of this fact in Ovid‟s narrative about the misfortune that Tiresias‟s 
androgynous experience brings him performs the Eliotic premise of the primacy of 
immediate experience over conceptual knowledge. Tiresias‟s androgyny is the reason 
for which he is called to settle the dispute between Juno and Jove. The two gods want to 
know who, men or women, get more pleasure from sexual life, and Tiresias is the only 
one who has had both experiences and can judge (Rainey The Annotated Waste Land 
107-108). Immediate experience is the ultimate authority of knowledge, an authority 
accepted even by gods. 
Ovid‟s narrative about Tiresias continues, and its events turn Tiresias into a 
consciousness that breaks through the other limit defining the finitude of human being, 
the limitation of time, turning it into the limitless kind of consciousness, linguistic. Juno 
does not like Tiresias‟s answer and blinds him for it; but then Jove compensates the loss 
by giving Tiresias the gift of seeing the future. With the loss of one kind of sight and the 
gift of the other, Tiresias‟s reality is removed from sensuous perception into 
consciousness alone. What Tiresias „sees‟ (Eliot‟s emphasis draws attention to the 
peculiarity of the meaning of this word speaking of Tiresias) is the vision of a blind 
man: it does not denote seeing physical reality present to the senses but means the 
presence of things in consciousness, as they appear to the mind‟s eye. This shift from 
the physical reality present through immediate perception into consciousness is pushed 
further by Jove‟s gift of seeing the future. With Jove‟s gift, Tiresias‟s perception breaks 
the limit of the finitude of human existence in time. And perception beyond the 
temporariness of one‟s physical existence undermines the sense of temporality itself, for 
everything – past, present and future – are equally present to Tiresias‟s consciousness 
here-and-now. 
130 
 
These mythic transformations of Tiresias make him an incarnation of Eliot‟s 
philosophical notion of consciousness as the medium of signifying reality. With the 
physical limitations of human reality erased, both of sex and of temporality, the horizon 
of Tiresias‟s immediate experience is limitless: the field of his vision – and so „the 
substance of the poem‟ – is human reality per se, in its all-inclusiveness and the 
immediacy of its experience. But at the same time and somewhat paradoxically, 
Tiresias‟s present is removed from immediate experience, for presence of things 
manifests itself most powerfully through the sense of vision. There are other senses, of 
course, through which immediate reality appears to the perceiving body. But vision is 
special. The eye is the physical experiential ground of and the metaphor for the Eliotic 
notion of a point of view. The point of view is as irreducible as the act of seeing is once 
vision is given. And a point of view also denotes a perspective, a principle of selection 
of the reality to which a point of view attends and of the coherent organisation of that 
reality, just as the physical act of seeing is both limited and directed, for we do not see 
what is behind us, and we cannot choose not to see what is in front of our eyes. Further, 
the continuity of reality being perceived builds on the continuity of the change of 
perspective which moves together with our body, and this continuity we experience as 
the continuity of the space and time which is our lived reality. Without physical vision, 
which is both the experience and the metaphor of the notion of a point of view, nor any 
limits that define the finitude of human existence, either of sex or of biographically 
determined historical time, Tiresias‟s consciousness is deprived of this experience of 
perspective. Tiresias can assume all possible viewpoints – he is the „personage [...] 
uniting all the rest‟ (CPP 78) – but his is not a physically coordinated viewpoint in 
itself. That leaves his consciousness with the only matrix of coordination – language. 
Thus the limitless and perspectiveless consciousness of Tiresias, with no ground 
of the immediate experience that defines the here-and-now of its own being, is language 
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itself. All reality is equally present to this consciousness but it is all present in objects of 
the post-immediate kind, the kind defined in Knowledge and Experience as „a complex 
of image and feeling‟ (KE 49), which Tiresias either remembers as past or foresees as 
future, his own or someone else‟s. In this linguistic reality, the narrative of Tiresias in 
the poetry of The Waste Land presents him as the Eliotic phenomenological-linguistic 
subject, the subject that constructs its reality as a relational whole of objects that are also 
linguistic meanings, while these objects-meanings themselves are recognisable as 
selfsame real existents on the ground of repeated reference to them in experience. The 
development of Tiresias‟s perspective in the course of his narrative, as I am about to 
observe, shows this definition in action. The focus of Tiresias‟s vision wanders in the 
associative network of the language he speaks until it is fixed on an event that was the 
origin of his fate. 
This fatal event is the act of mating. Tiresias‟s disgust at the sight of mating 
snakes was the beginning of his metamorphoses: he struck them apart and was turned to 
a woman; seven years later, he saw the same scene again, did the same hoping for the 
reverse transformation and so „was a man again‟ (Rainey The Annotated Waste Land 
107-108). The quarrel between Juno and Jove which he was called to settle followed, as 
did the consequences. Tiresias‟s narrative pictures the intercourse, not of snakes but of 
human beings, the typist and the „man carbuncular.‟ But this narrative has a preamble. 
Given the structure of Tiresias‟s consciousness I have just described, this event is not 
seen taking place somewhere in a London apartment, for Tiresias does not see 
physically, nor does he need to. All events of historical reality, of past, present and 
future, are present to this speaking consciousness without restrains of their sequentiality 
of their linear distribution in time. Tiresias speaks in the fullest awareness of the whole 
world. The words uttered are the only pointers of his focus, while the rest of the reality 
he knows – all reality there is, that is – is in immediate proximity, threatening to 
132 
 
interrupt the developing line of coherence. The opening seven lines of Tiresias‟s 
narration enact the struggle of this all-perceiving over-responsive consciousness to hold 
its attention steady until it identifies an object to cling to. It is only in the eighth line of 
the narration that the central narrative agent, the typist, is named, and Tiresias finishes 
his first sentence only in line nine: 
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back 
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits 
Like a taxi throbbing waiting, 
I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives, 
Old man with wrinkled female breasts, can see 
At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives 
Homeward, and brings the sailor home from sea, 
The typist home at teatime, clears her breakfast, lights 
Her stove, and lays out food in tins. 
(CPP 68, l. 215-223) 
 
The sentence enacts in its language the process of conscious awareness 
overcrowded with incompatible perceptions and obsessed with analogies that keep 
falling into view, these emerging analogies delaying the meaning that a sentence is 
expected to articulate. „The eyes and back‟ are, as must be inferred, those of a clerk 
getting up from the desk at the end of the day. But the poem does not say this. Instead, it 
names the opposite sides of a human body that can be perceived at once only if the 
perception is omnivisible, with all possible perspectives of vision actualised at once as 
Tiresias‟s, or if they are immediately understood to denote one entity, a human person. 
The unstoppable energy of life, the natural given of a human being, is named „the 
human engine.‟ The poem impatiently foretells the presence of the taxi in the next line, 
as well as the mode of automatism in which the coming scene will be told. They both, 
„the human engine‟ and the taxi, wait, except Tiresias has an extra analogy with the 
machine to think about, in their common „throbbing,‟ however different the reasons and 
the meaning of the vibration that neither of them can help. The subject of the sentence 
comes in the fourth line only, and syntactically it is the fourth phrase, following three 
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modifiers of time the last of which contains a simile. And the subject, „I Tiresias,‟ is 
separated from the predicate, „can see,‟ by three more modifying phrases. 
These delays are only the beginning of an unsolvable confusion of grammar as 
to the object of the transitive verb „see.‟ The repeated „At the violet hour‟ is a modifier 
of time. Against common convention, it follows the predicate „see‟ without even a 
comma to separate its syntactic independence, so that the reader must rely on the 
preposition and on the memory of readerly perception in which the phrase must have 
inscribed itself as the opening phrase of the verse paragraph. The following clause, „the 
evening hour,‟ may come up as a modifier to „the violet hour‟ to specify its meaning. 
But it can also be read as the object that Tiresias „can see:‟ he contemplates the world 
which is the same every day at this „evening hour that strives / Homeward, and brings 
the sailor home from sea.‟ In any case, line 222 has a few surprises. Its opening phrase, 
„The typist home at teatime‟ is an object of predication but, repeating the structure of 
the preceding phrase, „the sailor home from sea,‟ it clings to the same verb „bring‟ („the 
evening hour [...] brings the sailor home from sea [and] the typist home at teatime‟) 
rather than to the verb „see‟ denoting Tiresias‟s perception. Then follows a list of the 
typist‟s actions, but the fact that these are the typist‟s actions is only logically inferred 
because syntactically they are not linked to any subject at all (as it would have been in, 
say, „The typist [comes] home at teatime, clears her breakfast,‟ etc., or in „the evening 
hour [...] brings [...] the typist home, [and she] clears her breakfast,‟ etc.) – it is only 
metaphorically that „the evening hour‟ can clear someone‟s breakfast and lay out 
another meal instead. In this deviation of grammar from the referential logic that the 
narrative suggests, the verb „see‟ loses its object in the mist of half-articulated 
attributive and predicative relations. But at the same time its transitivity permeates 
everything that follows in the sentence – as if „the evening hour,‟ with all its strivings 
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and accomplishments, the typist, and her movements around the room were all objects 
of the same kind perceived by Tiresias‟s omnipotent perspectiveless mind-vision. 
But once the narrative agent, the typist, is identified, Tiresias‟s eye clings to it 
and coherence is there. The typist is the point of view from which to perceive and 
understand, and the narrative follows its formal convention from now on. It begins by 
setting the scene, the typist‟s living space. The divan which is also her bed is the centre 
of her abode and of the action that is about to take place, also a hybrid, a meal at first 
with the intercourse to follow; and the narrative takes a look through the window, 
outside the room but still a space inhabited by the typist, her combinations „perilously 
spread‟ to dry. The other narrative agent arrives into this space, the young man 
carbuncular, and the poem proceeds with the narration of the action, in sufficient detail 
and without interruptions to follow its course without effort. The poem sees the typist‟s 
guest off, and rounds up the narration with a verse paragraph of the typist‟s reflection 
on the event. A more coherent narrative is hardly to be imagined. 
Tiresias‟s signifying voice creeps into it twice. The experiential viewpoint is the 
typist‟s – this reality is lived by, with, and through her. But the speaking consciousness 
– the signifying instance – is Tiresias‟s. His first interruption states this explicitly: 
I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs 
Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest – 
I too awaited the expected guest. 
(CPP 68, l.228-230) 
 
Tiresias introduces himself as the peculiar, androgynous experiencing body that 
he is, „old man with wrinkled dugs‟ marking both kinds of bodily experience, female 
and male. Both will be important in the course of his narrative, for he is about to assume 
the young man‟s point of view. In just a few lines, he „guesses‟ that the time is right, 
„[e]ndeavours to engage her in caresses‟ and, finding them „unreproved, if undesired,‟ 
„assaults at once.‟ The typist‟s viewpoint is absent in this part of narration, for the point 
of view can inhabit only one experiencing body at a time, even though Tiresias‟s 
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androgynous consciousness-in-the-body switches from one to the other without 
difficulty. While switching his experiential viewpoint from one agent of the narrative 
action to the other, Tiresias keeps his all-pervasive linguistic awareness alive. He 
„perceived the scene, and foretold the rest:‟ he is the signifying consciousness that has 
this experience already articulated in language, in an articulation that is yet in future for 
both the participants of the event and for the reader. Both the limitlessness of Tiresias 
immediate experience and the timelessness of his reality are taken further in his second 
interruption, now in parenthesis: 
(And I Tiresias have foresuffered all 
Enacted on this same divan or bed; 
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall 
And walked among the lowest of the dead.) 
(CPP 69, l.243-246) 
 
Tiresias has „foresuffered all enacted on this same divan or bed.‟ The fact that he 
is the signifying instance does not distance him from the pain of the experience he 
articulates. And unlike an ordinary human being, Tiresias suffers all experience taking 
place, for both the typist and the man. The latter two lines delineate the entire horizon of 
the reality present to Tiresias‟s consciousness: from the time when he „sat by Thebes 
below the wall‟ to the time and the space of the afterlife when he „walked among the 
lowest of the dead.‟ The multiplicity of viewpoints which Tiresias‟s consciousness 
identifies and identifies with in this horizon-less reality is unimaginable, and so is the 
amount of pain he experiences with them in the constant, ceaseless present of his 
limitless consciousness, without beginning or end in either space or time. 
 
■ 
The Tiresias section thus encapsulates Eliot‟s vision of reality as given to experience in 
language, experience itself determined by the focus of consciousness on some 
signifying relations over others while keeping the whole spectrum of these relations in 
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mind. This notion of reality as linguistic is among the core tenets of Eliot‟s thinking, 
and this centrality is reflected in the function of the Tiresias episode in the structure of 
the poem itself and not only asserted in Eliot‟s note. And the episode claims a central 
position in the poem formally. This section is the most extensive and the most coherent 
narrative in the poem – in fact, the only sufficiently well articulated narrative, with all 
links of coherence explicitly present. This coherence comes up as exceptional in the 
poem as it stands in the final, published version, with the Notes or without. But this 
exceptional status is even more assertively witnessed by the poem‟s development, as 
seen in the drafts, for the Tiresias episode is the only narrative passage that survives the 
process of revision. The revision of the section itself, in addition, compressed it and 
made it more fluent, in content by removing phrases and lines that do not directly move 
the narrative line forward (the draft gives a far more extensive characterisation of the 
young man, for example [WLF 44-45], in the published poem condensed into barely few 
words), and in form by giving the narrative in a single verse paragraph instead of 
quatrains as it appears in the drafts. The stability of rhythm and rhyme (found to this 
degree in no other fragment of the published poem) supports the flow of language in the 
reading process, enhancing coherence even further. 
Coherence is not the principle on which The Waste Land builds as a whole. The 
dynamics of the revision process shows Eliot irresponsive to markers of narrative unity 
and disregarding Pound‟s advice on strengthening the narrative flow. Pound needs to 
tell Eliot, for example, that Phlebas is an integral part of the poem‟ to prevent him 
removing the lines of „Death by Water‟ together with the narrative of the sailor that 
preceded it in the draft (WLF 129). Eliot does not see the link himself or does not regard 
its possibility as sufficient grounds to keep the passage in the poem. And there is an 
instance of the disruption of a narrative line which Eliot left in the poem against 
Pound‟s advice. „A Game of Chess‟ closes with a scene in a pub, a conversation 
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regularly interrupted by the publican‟s shout „HURRY UP PLEASE IT‟S TIME.‟ 
Pound feels that Eliot begins this syncopation too early: „Perhaps not so soon, C[ou]ld 
you put this later;‟ and on the carbon copy he remarks again, „later?‟ (WLF 12-13, 18-
19). The first shout, indeed, comes in the third line of the fragment, before the scene of 
the conversation has actually been set. But Eliot leaves the line where it is and, further, 
removes the syntactic markers of the conversation, inverted commas, leaving the reader 
to negotiate the way through the speaking voices (WLF 12-15; CPP 65-66). It is the 
destruction of coherence that is the tendency of Eliot‟s moves in revising the poem, 
while enhancing meaningful links, the smoothness of Tiresias‟s narration is a happy 
exception. 
This exception is enabled by the fact that Tiresias embodies the Eliotic notion of 
what human reality is, and through this it claims centrality in the poem on the plane of 
content. Tiresias‟s narration is perfectly coherent and yet it does not evoke Eliot‟s 
resistance to the sense of unity that dominates The Waste Land because the structure of 
that narration – the way in which the real that is being articulated is perceived and 
understood – expresses Eliot‟s own sense of immediate reality as described in his 
philosophical work. All definitive dimensions of Tiresias‟s sense of the real that make 
him the incarnation of Eliot‟s philosophy are given in the poetry itself. I began my 
reading with the note but the aspects which define Tiresias as a linguistic, experientially 
limitless consciousness are all given in the poetry. Tiresias introduces himself as the 
androgynous body and as a mind that has no limits to the horizon of its vision. And he 
identifies with both the typist and the man freely, actually demonstrating the presence of 
multiple ways of experiencing reality in his mind, as well as the non-psychological 
linguistic principle of identifications that his consciousness builds as it articulates its 
limitless reality. The only detail that the poetry does not mark in its language explicitly 
is the kind of significance that the act of copulation has in Tiresias‟s biography – for 
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this detail the reader has to go to the originating source, Ovid. But the poem is not quite 
about Tiresias as the linguistic subject. Tiresias is the quintessential medium that 
perceives-and-signifies, but the object of the poem‟s attention – through Tiresias – is the 
reality itself. 
This reality is anthropological. Tiresias‟s consciousness is rooted in his 
androgynous body, and the turning point that determined his singular identity is mating, 
an act which is the same kind of natural ground for cultural self-conception as seasonal 
change is for fertility rites. Fertility and its cultural interpretations are the pivotal points 
of attention in Frazer‟s descriptions of cultural practices all over the world in all 
historical periods, as well as in Weston‟s foregrounding of the ritual meanings in the 
variants of the Grail. And for Tiresias‟s mind all human history is equally present. A 
seer from classical mythology, an inhabitant of Thebes and the Underworld, observing a 
couple in the modern cultural setting, Tiresias holds in his mind and body the entirety of 
human culture in its all expressions. This property of Tiresias‟s mind is inferred from 
rather than explicitly claimed in his narrative. But The Waste Land – the poetic 
expression of what Tiresias actually „sees,‟ this reality the substance of the poem – 
thrives on exploring this aspect of reality by creating a discursive network of the richest 
and densest kind through both direct quotations and less direct allusions to a myriad of 
artifacts, a network that is a miniature, condensed poetic expression of the complexity 
of the culture in which the poem speaks. Tiresias, for Eliot, is the quintessential 
expression of human being, simultaneously natural and cultural, immediately 
experiencing and distantly observant, a linguistic mind living in the sensuous body. In 
his figure, Eliot finds a confirmation from anthropology of his philosophical view of 
what human existence is. 
Tiresias‟s singularity, the outcome of his mythical biography, breaks through the 
limits that define the finitude of human being, thus exposing their significance, giving a 
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figure to imagine what it would be like not to be defined by these limits and in this way 
to think what human existence is. It takes Eliot a dissertation in philosophy to describe 
his vision of human reality. Tiresias, his story narrated by Ovid, is a mythical-poetic 
articulation of the same fundamental premises, in just nineteen lines that Eliot quotes in 
his note, except that it appeals to the participatory, aesthetic channels of communication 
rather than logical-linguistic, the property of philosophical contemplation. The content, 
however, is the same – both ways of expression attempt to understand the structure of 
human reality, and they identify the same significant sites that define it. That is why, as 
Eliot introduces his quotation of Ovid in the note, „[t]he whole passage from Ovid is of 
great anthropological interest‟ (CPP 78). Lionel Kelly reproaches Eliot that in this 
statement he makes „no allowance for the determining perspective of the authority he 
cites‟ and that Eliot does not see „Ovid‟s endeavour as culturally determined‟ (197). But 
this is exactly Eliot‟s point: a culturally determined frame of articulation is meaningless 
unless its meaning is grounded in commonly human reality, in experience that in itself 
is not culturally determined though every culture – every human being, in fact – 
articulates this given ground in a peculiar way. Ovid‟s authority, from this viewpoint, is 
given paramount recognition. Ovid uses the poetic convention of his time – which is 
indeed culturally determined – in such a way that its mediatory intervention is invisible 
and irrelevant, for it communicates dimensions of existence that are fundamentally 
human. Ovid, for Eliot, is an epitome of a poet-anthropologist. 
And so is Eliot‟s Tiresias. His description meticulously conforms to the 
Durkheimian imperative in Eliot‟s interpretation of 1913. Tiresias regards his subjects 
purely „in terms of social behaviour‟ which, however, denies a possibility of meaning, 
for meaning is internal, a matter of experience. Observed from „a purely external point 
of view,‟ the behaviour of Tiresias‟s subjects comes up as „mechanism‟ (IPR, Gray 126-
127). This tonality of the mechanistic begins at the beginning of Tiresias‟s narration, 
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with the identification of human body with the engine of a taxi, both „throbbing 
waiting.‟ It is held evenly throughout the narrative in its language of bare report as it 
describes the details of the scene and the action taking place, and it is further reinforced 
by the „indifference‟ observed in both the typist and the man. She looks to him bored, 
he finds his caresses „unreproved, if undesired‟ by her, and he does not mind: „His 
vanity requires no response.‟ And the narrative fragment closes as it began, with another 
attribution of the mechanistic to the human: the typist „smoothes her hair with automatic 
hand‟ and her company for the rest of the evening is a machine, a gramophone on which 
she puts a record (CPP 69-68). 
The typist‟s silence – the only thought her „brain allows [...] to pass‟ is „half-
formed,‟ and it is a sigh of relief that her ordeal is over – is a more powerful expression 
of her pain than any words could be. It is even more powerful when seen in the 
historical context to which this episode refers, the reality of poverty, social deprivation 
and neglect into which women of this newly emerged profession were thrown (Rainey 
The Annotated Waste Land 50-70). Markers of this reality are there in the poem: the 
smallness of the typist‟s room, so that her washing must be dried outside, her „food in 
tins‟ for supper, and the multifunctional „divan or bed.‟ Tiresias the experiencing body, 
as said in the parenthesis spoken in his own voice, does not go through this reality as 
indifferent as his description strives to be: he has „foresuffered‟ the typist‟s future in his 
ceaseless present. Meaninglessness – the inarticulability of the meaning of this 
experience, the mechanistic nature of the lived reality of Tiresias‟s subjects – is not 
merely produced by the „purely external point of view‟ of the observer but appears to be 
a given of the reality observed. Formal, mechanistic repetition is the way of modern 
rites to communicate the pain of being. 
And yet, there are mountains in which „you feel free,‟ and the epiphanic vision 
of the hyacinth girl elsewhere in the poem, and the thunder prays. And though Kyd‟s 
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„Hieronymo‟s mad again‟ – after all this effort to make sense of the reality that The 
Waste Land speaks, – there is the harmony of „shantih,‟ „The Peace which passeth 
understanding‟ (CPP 61, 62, 75, 80). After all, Tiresias‟s vision is of a limitless 
consciousness of all possible reality, the consciousness of excess, which is not the real 
structure of human experience but a mythological invention to try out its limits, to go 
beyond them in imagination. The meaninglessness of this excessive reality, perhaps, 
comes with the absence of perspective, the side effect of Tiresias‟s omni-
perceptiveness, while human reality as it is – finite in space and time and limited by the 
peculiar capacities of a given mind and body – finds its meaning in its limitations. This 
human reality of meaning in limitation is played in the music of the poetry of Four 
Quartets. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
THE SUBTEXT OF HAMLET IN THE WASTE LAND AND FOUR QUARTETS 
 
 
My thesis about the importance of Hamlet in Eliot‟s poetic writing is that this play 
contains aesthetic structures that for Eliot articulate the experience of immediate reality 
and that they appear in this function in his poetry. This is not to say that Hamlet is a 
literary source for these poems in the conventional sense of the word, nor even to claim 
Eliot‟s critical, analytic recognition of Hamlet‟s presence in his poetry. Rather, I want to 
observe manifestations of Eliot‟s responsiveness to the play, sometimes accompanied 
by analytic conceptualisations of what formal structures evoke the response but 
sometimes recognisable only in structural analogies between Shakespeare‟s drama and 
Eliot‟s poetry. Hamlet contains both kinds of signifying structures realised by The 
Waste Land and Four Quartets as these poems rely on one or other of the two 
complementary constituents of aesthetic experience. There are images and motifs that 
articulate the disordered immediacy of the earlier poem, but also those that organise 
immediate experience into an aesthetic unity, as the later poem aims to do. To 
foreground these contrasting structures in Hamlet while describing their relation to the 
poems I read is my present purpose. 
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ANTHROPOLOGICAL STRUCTURES OF IMMEDIACY IN HAMLET AND THE WASTE LAND 
 
The Waste Land explicitly quotes four of Shakespeare‟s plays. The most extensive 
allusion, to Antony and Cleopatra in the opening of „A Game of Chess,‟ as well as the 
lines from The Tempest, are acknowledged in the Notes, with the line from Ariel‟s song 
quoted twice without acknowledgement; the closing part of the poem refers to 
Coriolanus, and the pub scene closes with a line from Hamlet, Ophelia‟s farewell given 
word for word (WL, CPP 64, 67, 77; 69, 78, 62, 65; 74, 66). In addition to these, Peter 
Milward hears echoes from Macbeth, Cymbeline, Troilus and Cressida, The Merchant 
of Venice, King Lear and Pericles. As to Hamlet, Milward sees it appearing in The 
Waste Land implicitly two times: the image of dust is most prominent in this play out of 
all Shakespeare‟s plays (219), and the dialogue in „A Game of Chess‟ – „“Do / “You 
know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember / Nothing?”‟ (WL, CPP 65) – 
borrows the formal structure from the conversation between Gertrude and Hamlet about 
the Ghost: 
HAMLET    Do you see nothing there? 
QUEEN GERTRUDE Nothing at all, yet all that is I see. 
HAMLET  Nor did you nothing hear? 
QUEEN GERTRUDE  No, nothing but ourselves. 
(3.4.122-124; Milward 223) 
 
Smith gives the same list of Shakespearean sources of The Waste Land, 
outlining a more complex network of associations. He claims, for example, that quoting 
Ophelia‟s farewell Eliot has in mind Laforgue‟s „Hamlet‟ rather than Shakespeare (T. S. 
Eliot’s Poetry and Plays 81; The Waste Land 127), and that the persona‟s answer 
„Nothing‟ to the unnamed lady in „A Game of Chess‟ echoes Cordelia‟s reply to King 
Lear and Ophelia‟s answer to Hamlet, „I think nothing, my lord‟ (3.2.112) (T. S. Eliot’s 
Poetry and Plays 81). From this list Milward singles out The Tempest as exercising a 
unifying function, saying that it „is of all Shakespeare‟s plays the most central to the 
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meaning of The Waste Land‟ (225). In proposing this view Milward is not alone. 
Wilson notes the centrality of the water image in both The Tempest and The Waste Land 
(57-58). Greene claims that the poem carries the same message as the play, as both 
present art as a form of redemption and self-control. For Jay, the presence of The 
Tempest in The Waste Land presents a case of a disseminated underlying structure, 
manifest clearly enough to be recognised as such but, nevertheless, transfigured to form 
the poem‟s own web of imagery (54). And in Neil Corcoran‟s view, the poem‟s 
repeated revisiting of the play turns The Tempest into „a kind of repeated undersong 
[...], to a point of implying [...] the presence of a ghostly, skeletal or attenuated 
narrative‟ (111). 
Smith, even though his account of the poem is punctuated by references to the 
play throughout, considers The Tempest as „one of Eliot‟s minor sources‟ (T. S. Eliot’s 
Poetry and Plays 70), and suggests an intermediary source, Shakespeare’s Mystery 
Play: A Study of The Tempest by Colin Still, which turns the play into another 
manifestation of Eliot‟s anthropological interest (70, 84). Ronald Tamplin takes the hint 
and proposes that Still‟s book is a major source for The Waste Land: „[I]t directs and 
extends material from Weston and Frazer and ensures that the patterns in the poem 
deriving from comparative religion ascend rather than coalesce, move rather than mark 
time‟ (352). Still, in other words, functions as the literary supplement to Eliot‟s 
anthropological sources, a work that indicates for Eliot the possibilities of ordering the 
material found in Frazer and Weston that are „not helpful‟ enough by themselves, in 
Tamplin‟s view (352). 
Besides the fact that this statement somewhat unnecessarily downplays the 
significance of anthropology in The Waste Land and Eliot‟s thinking in general, it does 
not sit quite well in the timeline of the poem‟s genesis. Still‟s book came out in 1921. 
Eliot indeed drafted most of the lines that made their way into the published version of 
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The Waste Land in the autumn of that year, as Tamplin assumes (352), but the fragment 
in which Eliot plays with The Tempest‟s line „Those are pearls that were his eyes‟ was 
written in May (Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land 35; WLF 122-123). Also, even 
though Tamplin delineates a network of correspondences between Eliot‟s poem, 
Shakespeare‟s play and Still‟s anthropological reading of The Tempest, Still does not 
appear in this reading as a sufficient source of the unifying structure of the poem. 
Tamplin goes outside Still, more than once, to highlight relevant ritual symbolism in the 
poem (364, 367), and eventually concludes that Eliot may not have intentionally relied 
on Still but that a bulk of the material used by Eliot and Still overlaps, which turns 
Still‟s study into a helpful point of reference to the reader functioning „as a control upon 
what we might have understood in any case‟ (371). 
In its effort to find a unifying structure for The Waste Land and almost explicit 
recognition of failing to accomplish the task, Tamplin‟s reading is another example of 
the vicious circle of searching for the Grail into which Eliot entices his readers by his 
references to anthropological sources of the poem, particularly to Weston. Still‟s study 
of the anthropological subtext in The Tempest repeats Weston‟s inquiry into the Grail 
legend‟s origins in both the purpose and methodology. Still aims to show that The 
Tempest is a mystery play, an allegory of initiatory rites, these rites providing the 
symbolism for the play‟s imagery and constituting its unifying core (6-9). He does this 
by outlining a network of detailed comparisons and large scale analogies between 
anthropological descriptions of initiation rites from different periods and regions and 
The Tempest, this network matching Weston in complexity and scale. This complicates 
the line of Still‟s argumentation to such a degree that the author feels the need to ask his 
reader to be patient and follow the abundance of evidence he presents until it 
accumulates and foregrounds his argument (10-11). In the context of this parallel 
between Still‟s study and Weston‟s, The Tempest appears as a textual field of the same 
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kind as the Grail myth: a literary form that mediates significative structures functioning 
in ritual which for Eliot is the quintessential form of immediate aesthetic effect, without 
establishing an aesthetic unity of the literary kind conventionally associated with 
narrative unity. 
I want to claim this kind of function for Hamlet in The Waste Land. Without 
explicitly framing the poem in its narrative unity (which is, by definition, impossible if 
the play is seen from Eliot‟s perspective of 1919, as lacking aesthetic unity of any 
order), Hamlet contains images and tropes that duplicate significative structures of ritual 
practices described in Frazer. Further, the network of analogies and repetitions I am 
about to highlight among The Waste Land, its anthropological contexts, and Hamlet 
foregrounds a specific kind of relation. This relational network circles around the word 
„violet,‟ the word that marks in both Hamlet and The Waste Land articulations of the 
Eliotic vision of the significative process as described in my reading of Knowledge and 
Experience. This network does not establish any interpretative links between the three 
texts in which „violet‟ appears, nor is it strong enough to say that either Hamlet or The 
Golden Bough is Eliot‟s source for one of the most aesthetically effective collocations 
of The Waste Land, as „the violet hour‟ is. And yet somehow „violet‟ points to the 
contexts that shaped Eliot‟s sense of the aesthetic, weaving around itself a web of 
repetitions that, if seen on their own terms, appear to be coincidental rather than 
intended to serve any specific purpose. In this function of marking contexts outside the 
poem without ascribing to those contexts an interpretative function, „violet‟ appears as a 
figurative expression of the mediatory presence per se: it is present in – even directs – 
the perception of other things to which we attend, but there is no role for it to play 
beyond this mediatory presence. „Violet‟ appears as this figure of sheer mediation in 
The Waste Land‟s lines referring to the „violet hour‟ of the evening. And this mediatory 
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significance of the image expands as we look into its functioning in Hamlet and The 
Golden Bough as seen in conjunction with The Waste Land. 
 
■ 
Eliot‟s responsiveness to Hamlet on the level of minute verbal correspondences comes 
up in the drafts of The Waste Land: he cancels, on Pound‟s advice, entire episodes 
modelled on Joyce and Pope (Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land 19-20; WLF 38-39, 
127), but leaves verbal allusions to Hamlet against Pound‟s hesitations. This applies to 
two instances. Eliot ignores Pound‟s suggestion to remove the words „Good night‟ said 
twice in what became line 171, the penultimate line of the pub scene closing with 
Ophelia‟s farewell of the published poem. Eliot transforms the words into the cockney 
„Goonight,‟ but leaves them where they are, reinforcing the repetition of the same words 
(now in standard English) in the line from Hamlet (WLF 14-15; WL, CPP 66), the final 
version reading as follows: 
Goonight Bill. Goonight Lou. Goonight May. Goonight. 
Ta ta. Goonight. Goonight. 
Good night, ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good night, good night. 
 
The other instance makes a more tentative case, but it points to a more 
significant half-presence of Hamlet in The Waste Land. In one of the draft typescripts of 
the Tiresias episode, Pound circles the words „violet hour,‟ suggesting removal or 
change (WLF 42-43). There are more changes that Pound suggests to the adjacent lines, 
some of which Eliot accepts, such as removing the last metric foot in the first and third 
lines of the episode. He even takes Pound‟s suggestion of shortening the line a step 
further, cutting out the word „the hour‟ that follows the collocation marked by Pound, 
but „the violet hour‟ remains where it stands in the draft, untouched: 
At the violet hour, the hour when eyes and back and hand 
Turn upward from the desk, the human engine waits – 
Like a taxi throbbing waiting at a stand. 
(WLF 42-43) 
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At the violet hour, when eyes and back 
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits 
Like a taxi throbbing waiting. 
(WL, CPP 68) 
 
Pound does not comment what exactly it is that he doubts, but only singles the 
phrase out, in this one instance out of the four that the word „violet‟ appears in The 
Waste Land, all lines in which the word appears read and marked by Pound twice (WLF 
30-31, 42-43; 74-75, 84-85). The collocation indeed stands out. Opening the Tiresias 
episode, it is expected to set for the reader the scene of the narrative action that is about 
to begin, and orient her in the environment she needs to imagine to follow the literal 
meaning of the poem‟s lines. Instead, it presents a semantic riddle, for it is a modifier of 
time characterised by a visual attribute. The reader has two options to choose from. She 
can stop and interpret what „the violet hour‟ might refer to, in which case the opening 
phrase is producing an effect that goes against the signal of the long paragraph that has 
just begun and that suggests a heightened pace of development as compared to the 
considerably shorter verse paragraphs preceding and following it. Or else the reader can 
skip the phrase for now, delaying an interpretative decision about its meaning till after 
the passage is read further along. Pound, in other words, has marked for Eliot an 
instance of functional ambiguity. 
This functional ambiguity does not last long. The logic of delay in orienting the 
observing eye underlies the opening of this passage, as I have described it in the 
previous chapter; and the collocation reappears five lines down, its meaning now 
modified as „the violet hour, the evening hour that strives / Homeward, and brings the 
sailor home from sea.‟ The hour is both located in the time of the day, „evening,‟ and its 
visual modifier, „violet,‟ is given a tentative objective source through its reference to the 
sailor‟s marine environment, the sea and the sky at this hour appearing to the eye in 
different shades of blue. This tentative link is reinforced, and the colour linked to the 
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cityscape directly much further in the poem, in „What Thunder Said,‟ where „violet‟ 
modifies the atmosphere of falling cities, the word again used twice in close proximity, 
seven lines apart: 
What is the city over the mountains 
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the violet air 
Falling towers 
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria 
Vienna London 
Unreal 
 
 A woman drew her long black hair out tight 
And fiddled whisper music on those strings 
And bats with baby faces in the violet light 
Whistled, and beat their wings 
(WL, CPP 73) 
 
The manuscript for these lines shows an expansion of the attributive function of 
the adjective „violet,‟ in what seems to be a change made in Eliot‟s instant response to 
the line as soon as he has put it down on paper. Line 379 of the published poem in the 
manuscript looks as follows: 
And bats with baby faces, in the violet air light, 
(WLF 74-75) 
 
Eliot writes „violet air,‟ automatically repeating the collocation of the earlier 
line, but then immediately changes his mind: he crosses the word „air,‟ sooner than he 
has put the comma at the end of the modifying phrase, and replaces it with „light.‟ This 
substitution complicates the pattern of repetition and difference. The repetition of the 
adjectival modifier „violet‟ echoes the rhythm of the earlier use of the word, in the 
expository part of the Tiresias episode, while the nouns this time are different, in 
contrast to the full repetition of the collocation in the Tiresias passage. This semantic 
bifurcation of the meaning of „violet,‟ however, suggests the same movement towards 
specifying the meaning of an expression as in the Tiresias episode, where the second 
instance of „the violet hour‟ is explicitly modified as „the evening hour.‟ This 
development from the least to the most specific (also from the least to the most explicit) 
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meaning underlies the sequential distribution of all four instances in which the 
attributive modifier „violet‟ is used. Reading the sequence of the word‟s appearances 
backwards, it is the light that illuminates the air and gives a shade of violet to the 
cityscape in the evening, and such an evening hour in the city is the setting of the event 
and the whole landscape of the poem that Tiresias observes. 
Characterising a specific time of the day, the evening hour, by a visual quality, 
the colour „violet,‟ sharpens the imaginary visual perception in the background of which 
we understand of the poem‟s lines in the act of reading. This unusual collocation makes 
us, just as Dante makes Eliot, „visualise all the time‟ („The Noh and the Image‟ 103), 
relying on the sensory – aesthetic – dimension participating in our interpretative 
activity. But this visual experience does not have a reference point. The search for the 
literal meaning I have just performed makes it clear that „violet‟ refers to an intangible 
object, which is not an object in the strict sense of the word at all but a presence 
manifest through and in other objects which it contaminates while remaining 
unperceivable by itself. Neither the hour, nor the air, nor even the light can be seen in 
colour unless this colour is made visible by the objects that reflect it taking this colour 
as their attribute. „Violet‟ in The Waste Land is a perfect marker for and figure of a 
mediatory presence. No-thing in itself, nor even an attribute of a thing, it colours the 
whole field of perception, in The Waste Land literally, as the colour of the city in the 
evening. It is perceived immediately, as the visual characteristic of all objects even 
though it is not their property but a quality of the medium – the light permeating the air 
at the evening hour of the day – by which the eye perceives all objects. 
It is in this kind of presence that „violet‟ functions in Hamlet. The word appears 
in the play three times, just as in The Waste Land there are three collocations in which 
the adjective is used. In contrast to its adjectival form denoting the colour in the poem, 
it refers in Hamlet to the flower in all three instances. But the flower as referred to in the 
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play is never actually present: in one case „violet‟ is used figuratively, and in two other 
instances it is referred to as an absence. This absence of violets appears as loaded with a 
symbolic value in the narrative of Hamlet, and this symbolic value – evidently in the 
context of Eliot‟s interest in anthropology, though anachronistically for Shakespeare – 
is rooted in vegetation rites described by Frazer and Weston. In Hamlet, if the play is 
looked at from the Eliotic perspective, the violet marks the paradigm of mediation 
forms that communicate meaning for immediate perception, language and ritual, while 
the object to which it refers is not actually present to the senses. 
The first reference to the violet comes in Laertes‟s warning to Ophelia not to 
trust Hamlet: 
For Hamlet and the trifling of his favour, 
Hold it a fashion and a toy in blood, 
A violet in the youth of primy nature, 
Forward not permanent, sweet not lasting, 
The perfume and suppliance of a minute, 
No more. 
(1.3.5-10) 
 
„A violet in the youth of primy nature‟ here is a metaphor of fragility and 
instability, the flower encapsulating a range of tangible qualities of what itself is 
intangible, not properly an object: Hamlet‟s disposition. It manifests itself as a 
constellation of qualities, like those of a violet but, in contrast to a violet, they cannot be 
attributed to an object of physical reality to which one can point: „the trifling of 
[Hamlet‟s] favour‟ is the complex of the qualities Laertes enumerates alone, impossible 
to locate in any specific point of reference as one can speaking of a flower. Instead, 
ways in which these qualities are perceived permeate the perceiving subject: it is „sweet 
not lasting,‟ literally referring to the sense of taste and metaphorically to pleasure, also 
like a „perfume,‟ both taste and smell present in the body of the perceiver. And these 
qualities are said to be in motion, as a flower „in the youth of primy nature‟ is known to 
be in a constant development rather than mature stasis, „[f]orward not permanent.‟ The 
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exact combination of the immediate perception of this metaphorical violet which is 
Hamlet‟s favour keeps its identity only for a fleeting moment, as prone to change as a 
young violet is. 
In its objective structure – in showing itself to the perceiving point of view in 
immediate, sensuous perception as a constellation of sensory responses – Hamlet‟s 
disposition as Laertes describes is a case of the Eliotic bogey that scares the child: an 
intangible, unidentifiable object which is a „fullness of relations‟ (KE 116) immediately 
perceived and signified as this particular meaning, as I have described it in Chapter 2. 
And in Hamlet, as for Eliot in Knowledge and Experience and elsewhere in his writing, 
the unobjectifiable sensuous perception marks a living, truly experienced meaning 
carried through in language. Returning Hamlet‟s gifts, Ophelia speaks of „words of so 
sweet breath composed [that] made the things more rich,‟ and says that now, „[t]heir 
perfume lost,‟ these some time „[r]ich gifts wax poor‟ (3.1.100-102). Hamlet‟s words of 
affection for Ophelia have imbued his gifts with richness, as the violet light of The 
Waste Land‟s cityscape colours all that appears to the eye in the evening hour of the day 
– for only as long, however, as they are actually  perceived in these identities, as words 
of affection or the violet light. 
The other two references to the violet in Hamlet appear as foregrounding 
narratives told in the anthropological sources of The Waste Land. The first of these two 
references comes as Laertes sees Ophelia after Polonius‟s death. Throughout the scene, 
Ophelia comes and goes singing, an act that is in itself a variant of the lamentation rite, 
and Ophelia actually understands her action as ritual. Greeted by Laertes, she does not 
reply to his words but corrects him, saying „You must sing “Down, a-down,” and you, 
“Call him a-down-a”‟ (4.5.171-172). She then gives flowers to Laertes, naming the 
symbolic meaning of every one of them. Violets she does not have: „I would give you 
some violets, but they withered all when my father died‟ (4.5.182-184). 
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Frazer‟s and Weston‟s descriptions of fertility rites suggest a reason why violets 
may have withered. Lamentation for the dead god Adonis is a way of celebrating his 
cult, a couple of laments being quoted in Weston for the beauty of their poetic form (39-
40). And Frazer describes variant manifestations of the Adonis cult extensively, this 
part of The Golden Bough referred to in Eliot‟s headnote to the poem (CPP 76). Among 
the celebrations of the dying god, there are the gardens of Adonis, which are miniature 
versions of the vegetation cycle that the god represents, „baskets or pots filled with 
earth, in which [...] various kinds of flowers were sown and tended for eight days, 
chiefly or exclusively by women.‟ The plants in these baskets would shoot up very 
quickly but also wither very fast, for there was not enough earth for plants to grow roots 
(Frazer 341). These baskets represented the dead god: together with the images of 
Adonis, they would be flung into the sea, in hope of the god‟s resurrection. And 
growing plants represented Adonis‟s living phase: Adonis „must have been the Adon or 
lord of each individual tree and plant rather than a personification of vegetable life as a 
whole‟ (339). The god is buried every winter in the natural world, withered plants being 
seen as his body, and the gardens of Adonis re-enact this part of the life cycle in spring, 
just before this body comes back to life in the shape of fresh green. 
In Hamlet, Polonius‟s death is punctuated by the motifs of the vegetation cycle, 
as found in both Weston and Frazer. In one of his performances of madness, Hamlet 
calls Polonius „a fishmonger‟ (2.2.176). And his body, as Hamlet reports to Claudius in 
another of his mad talks, is eaten by fish, this weird supper a part of the natural cycle: 
„A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed 
of that worm‟ (4.3.27-28). In a closer parallel with the Adonis cult than with the Fisher 
King‟s narrative, one of Ophelia‟s lamentation songs maps the dead body on the soil of 
the burial: 
He is dead and gone, lady, 
 He is dead and gone. 
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At his head a grass-green turf, 
 At his heels a stone. 
(4.5.29-32) 
 
But the body of Polonius, for whom Ophelia laments, is not buried. It is last seen 
being taken away by Hamlet from Gertrude‟s bedroom (3.4.190), and Hamlet refuses to 
return it, answering to Rosencrantz‟s question that he „[c]ompounded it with dust, 
whereto „tis kin‟ (4.2.5). Without a body to be buried, Polonius, a Shakespearean 
analogy of Adonis, cannot come back in the form of violets: they have all withered 
because there is no dead body of the resurrecting living being for the flowers to grow 
from. This cycle in Hamlet gets a full articulation with Ophelia‟s death, in Laertes‟s 
wish as she is being buried that „from her fair and unpolluted flesh / May violets spring‟ 
(5.1.234-235). The violet in Hamlet marks the full cycle of life as seen in the symbolism 
of primitive ritual: it is first associated with youth, referred to by Laertes as a flower „in 
the youth of primy nature‟ (1.3.7); it is a flower that withers when there is no body to be 
buried for it to grow roots in, as Polonius is not properly buried (4.5.182-184); and it is 
expected to spring from Ophelia‟s dead and buried body. 
This value of the violet as an element that foregrounds the life cycle by marking 
its turns is restricted to Hamlet. In Frazer, the flower is a plant of the same value as 
many others seen as embodiments of Adonis. But Frazer‟s description of the appeal of 
the rite‟s symbolic meaning contains most significant elements of The Waste Land in 
close proximity, most of them also appearing in Hamlet as just described. As a part of 
his description of the Adonis cult, Frazer tells of ritual killings of corn harvesters, to 
appease the god of corn, whose souls were thought to come back in „the sprouting corn‟ 
but also „in the spring flowers:‟ „What more natural than to imagine that the violets and 
the hyacinths, the roses and the anemones, sprang from their dust, were empurpled and 
incarnadined by their blood, and contained some portion of their spirit?‟ (340). Frazer 
proceeds with two stanzas of Omar Khayyám‟s poetry, in Edward Fitzgerald‟s 
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translation, that speaks of „Hyacinth [that] the Garden wears / Dropt in her Lap from 
some once lovely Head‟ (340). Violets in The Golden Bough appear next to and in the 
same value as hyacinths, and a hyacinth garden in The Waste Land, as I have noted 
earlier, marks the only clearly epiphanic scene, a vision of a loved girl (CPP 62). The 
corpse in Stetson‟s garden expected to sprout in the spring (CPP 63) directly pictures 
the scene of a human body growing out of the natural ground. The Waste Land develops 
the image further in Part III, by mapping out the streets of London with parts of the 
human body, as Ophelia does in her song mapping the dead body on the soil of the 
burial: 
„Trams and dusty trees. 
Highbury bore me. Richmond and Kew 
Undid me. By Richmond I raised my knees 
Supine on the floor of a narrow canoe.‟ 
 
„My feet are at Moorgate, and my heart 
Under my feet. [...]‟ 
(CPP 70) 
 
While Frazer goes beyond Hamlet in placing the image of the hyacinth garden in 
proximity to violets, both appearing in The Waste Land, the presence of Hamlet in the 
poem steps out of Frazer‟s field of reference in containing another powerful image, the 
rat, in the contexts I have just discussed. Hamlet kills Polonius after he speaks from 
behind the arras where he is hiding to observe Gertrude‟s and Hamlet‟s conversation. 
Before thrusting his sword, Hamlet shouts, „How now, a rat? Dead for a ducat, dead‟ 
(3.4.23). Whether Hamlet, pronouncing these words, believes he is killing a rat, is hard 
to tell. Polonius gives himself away be speaking out, in words. These words perhaps 
would be accompanied by movement as well, but it takes some effort of imagination to 
see how one could take the kind of movement of an arras produced by a man moving 
behind it for the kind of movement produced by a rat. This doubt grows even stronger 
when we see Hamlet assuming he might have killed the King (3.4.25) and having no 
regrets after he discovers the victim of his sword is Polonius, calling him „wretched, 
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rash, intruding fool‟ and telling him to „[t]ake [his] fortune‟ (3.4.29, 31). The „rat‟ of 
Hamlet‟s exclamation might be another insulting name for Polonius, or anyone hiding 
to spy on Hamlet. Or (and perhaps more convincingly) this exclamation might be 
Hamlet‟s gesture of protecting himself from the blame for killing a noble person, 
presenting his action instead as an act of protecting the Queen. The object to which „a 
rat‟ denotes in this scene is indeterminable: neither the fact of reference of the word 
„rat‟ to a rat nor the frame of reference in which the word has a specific meaning can be 
determined unequivocally in the narrative space of the play. 
The Waste Land refers to the rat twice. Both references are enigmatically 
disturbing, inviting a close interpretative attention that the present discussion cannot 
afford. The reference in „The Fire Sermon,‟ however, at least lends itself to a narrative 
reading, on this plane referring to a rat the persona would be likely to see on the banks 
of the Thames: „A rat crept softly through the vegetation / Dragging its slimy belly on 
the bank‟ (CPP 67). But the lines that mention the rat in „A Game of Chess‟ read almost 
like a reflection on the unsolvable ambiguity of Polonius‟s death, the rat appearing as an 
image of an ominous indeterminability of meaning in the face of multiple frames that 
define it, every one of them equally possible but none more likely to be true than others. 
„I think we are in rats‟ alley / Where the dead men lost their bones‟ (CPP 65) – these 
words appear four lines below the most extensive allusion to Shakespeare in The Waste 
Land, the pastiche of Enobarbus‟s description of Cleopatra on her throne, and just above 
the lines that have been heard to echo King Lear and, more importantly, two moments 
from Hamlet. One of these moments is Gertrude‟s and Hamlet‟s exchange with 
reference to King Hamlet‟s Ghost, present to Prince Hamlet but not to the Queen, who 
sees or hears „nothing‟ where Hamlet sees the King (3.4.122-124 WL, CPP 65; Milward 
223). Being „in rats‟ alley,‟ in this context, seems to denote the space of indeterminacy, 
where half-defined things change their identities depending on the frame of reference in 
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which they are interpreted. The violet and the rat contain structures of this kind of 
indeterminacy. But Hamlet also provides Eliot with the figure that encapsulates the very 
nature of indeterminacy, a dead man who has lost his bones, as Polonius did when killed 
by Hamlet: the Ghost. 
 
 
SHAKESPEAREAN DEFINITIONS OF THE AESTHETIC UNITY OF FOUR QUARTETS 
 
The kind of presence of Hamlet just observed in The Waste Land manifests Eliot‟s 
responsiveness to the immediate affectivity of the significative structures found in the 
play and scattered throughout the poem without, however, centring their network on a 
single unifying core. This effect of Shakespeare Eliot conceptualises in his criticism on 
the playwright, with reference to Hamlet in particular. The figure of the ghost presents 
Eliot with a case that articulates the constitution of the correlation between the pre-
articulate immediate perception of the reality of objects and its articulate objective 
structure, this constitution being manifest most fully in the appearance of King Hamlet‟s 
Ghost. This structure of a half-defined object present to immediate perception, its 
undefined constituent identified as the experiential supplement of the pre-articulate 
significative perception in process, underlies the aesthetic unity of Four Quartets. 
The purpose of the remaining part of this chapter is to foreground Eliot‟s 
definitions of objective correlation in his consideration of the Shakespearean aesthetic 
effect in the Edinburgh Lectures and elsewhere, keeping the focus specifically on the 
manifestations of the experiential aspect in Eliot‟s descriptions. In the 1919 essay on 
Hamlet Eliot asserts the absence of the unifying aesthetic structure in the play and then 
explains how this absence is manifest. In contrast, in the criticism I am about to look at 
Eliot‟s starting point is the unity of aesthetic experience, while an objective structure 
158 
 
that a work of art articulates is seen as emerging from it. In other words, rather than 
applying a ready-made definition to a work of art as he does in the 1919 essay on 
Hamlet, Eliot derives a definition from the experience of aesthetic unity as given. The 
Edinburgh Lectures contain perhaps the only fully explicit description of the 
Shakespearean aesthetic unity carried out from this analytic perspective in Eliot‟s 
criticism, which I will look into immediately below. I then move to an analysis of two 
examples of the objective correlative that Eliot gives in the original version of his early 
essay on Hamlet but excludes from the variant included in the collections, the storm in 
King Lear and the closing scene in Othello. And I close my discussion with a 
description of the correlative structure realised in the ghost figure as discussed in Eliot‟s 
criticism and manifest in Hamlet. 
The importance of this discussion to Four Quartets is that Eliot, in his explicit 
and implicit examples of objective correlation, articulates dimensions on which this 
poem builds its aesthetic unity. Four Quartets enacts the process of the emerging 
objective reality. This process is aesthetic experience itself and its suspense resolved in 
a cathartic moment of an articulation of the meaning that signifies this experience in a 
word. Eliot conceptualises this in his readings of Shakespeare, and the dimensions of 
aesthetic experience that he identifies in these descriptions underlie the aesthetic 
affectivity of Four Quartets. My reading of the poem in the chapter below will not 
apply these descriptions as a methodological guidance but will follow, instead, the inner 
logic of the poem. This inner logic, however, mirrors the structures of aesthetic 
affectivity that I am about to show Eliot observing in Shakespeare. The sequential order, 
in which the opening of a work leads to a moment of meaningfulness; the insistence on 
the actuality of the experiential, processual aspect in the formation of meaning; the 
assumed unity of the given experiential point of view that builds this meaning in the 
interaction of a variety of modes in which it perceives and understands reality, a literary 
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work organising this interaction into meaningful experience – all these aspects Eliot 
recognises in Shakespeare and realises in his own manner in Four Quartets. 
 
■ 
Eliot‟s responsiveness to the immediate effects of Shakespeare‟s drama is a consistent 
element in his otherwise changing view of the playwright‟s work, as especially clearly 
witnessed by the development of his view on Hamlet. His position as a critic on the 
overall effect of the play shifted, and he suspended from publication his most extensive 
and ostensibly positive statement on the play and, more generally, on Shakespeare. The 
Edinburgh Lectures, though read in English more than once (in 1937 in Edinburgh, 
1941 in Bristol, and in 1950 in Germany, for the German audience abridged to one 
lecture which was given in English), were published only in a German translation 
(Marathe 95; Warren 124). Yet next to these gestures of ambivalence about the worth of 
his own views, there is a piece of firm ground of which Eliot is confident. He uses the 
passages of close reading from Hamlet and Romeo and Juliet that were written for the 
Edinburgh Lectures in a 1949 essay, „The Aims of Poetic Drama,‟ soon revised for the 
Theodore Spencer Memorial Lecture given at Harvard in 1951, and then publishes it in 
an essay collection (EL II 1-6; „Poetry and Drama,‟ OPP 75-76, 87-88) (Warren 124). 
While Eliot is unsure, that is, about the ultimate effect of larger structures in 
Shakespeare, those of the aesthetic unity of an entire work as an aesthetic object 
contemplated from a reflective distance, he is confident about his descriptions of the 
play‟s immediate effects, those in which he sees aesthetic experience brought about by 
the tissue of Shakespeare‟s language. In the case of Hamlet, Eliot is quite explicit about 
this. The play „is far from being one of those plays which have the most plausible 
stories,‟ he says, „and it certainly has not the best controlled plot,‟ nor is Shakespeare at 
his best in this play in following „dramatic rules‟ (EL II 6). But Hamlet is the best at 
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making the spectator identify with its protagonist (6-7), and its language is versified in 
such a way that its organisational pattern is „perfectly transparent; one looks quite 
through it and only sees the meaning.‟ Not only is „any distinction between poetry and 
prose‟ lost in the perception of the play‟s verse, but language itself disappears in the 
aesthetic experience of the reality that the play communicates: „we are too absorbed in 
the meaning to consider the medium‟ (4). It is this effect that Four Quartets aims to 
produce, relying on both the Shakespearean aesthetic structures of conveying it and the 
Eliotic premises about the nature of reality that, for Eliot, enable the effect. 
The claim about the transparency of Shakespeare‟s verse is the thesis of Eliot‟s 
description of the opening scene of Hamlet in both the Edinburgh Lecture II and „Poetry 
and Drama.‟ But in the fuller account of 1937, Eliot describes this effect of transparency 
in terms of the sequential development of Shakespeare‟s plays in the reading process, 
which he highlights in a juxtaposition of Romeo and Juliet and Hamlet. In both plays, 
Eliot finds the moment of the immediate experience of the play‟s referential reality, a 
moment when the organisational pattern of the play‟s language is „perfectly transparent‟ 
so that „one looks quite through it and only sees the meaning‟ (EL II, 4). But in Hamlet 
the movement towards this moment is impossible to observe because, as Eliot sees it, its 
opening lines throw the spectator into the referential reality of the play instantly. 
Therefore, he must begin his explication of the Shakespearean immediacy by looking at 
Romeo and Juliet. 
Romeo and Juliet conveys the same effect of immediacy in the balcony scene, 
with yet another kind of patterning clearly at work, „musical,‟ in the arrangement of 
voices which works in the harmony of a duet with an effect comparable to the early 
work of Beethoven (EL II 3; OPP 87-88). In Eliot‟s view, the two opening scenes of 
Romeo and Juliet are „unpromising,‟ some or other element missing for them to have a 
proper effect. But with the appearance of the Nurse, „the versification begins to come to 
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life,‟ largely because Shakespeare versifies conversational language („the living 
speech‟) more successfully that anyone else of all „poetic dramatists,‟ English or 
otherwise (EL II 1-2). Then Eliot moves to the discussion of the balcony scene and its 
musical pattern which creates and increases suspense till the music of the verse and the 
semantics of the whole scene fuse in the word „lightning,‟ given to the leading voice of 
Juliet in this scene and repeated further – a linguistic patterning that makes Romeo and 
Juliet, for Eliot, „one of the swiftest moving of all plays‟ (3). This dynamic of leading 
the reader towards a moment of aesthetic immediacy, closed in a single unifying image, 
is the underlying logic of suspense in Four Quartets. 
And yet Eliot‟s praise of the balcony scene in Romeo and Juliet is only a 
preamble for the discussion of the dramatic scene that he perceives as quintessentially 
immediate, the opening of Hamlet, „a far more stupendous piece of writing than the 
balcony scene of Romeo and Juliet‟ and „as fine an opening scene as you can find in the 
whole drama anywhere‟ (4). In „Poetry and Drama,‟ the purpose of Eliot‟s reading of 
the first twenty-two lines of the play is to demonstrate the structure of the scene which, 
though analysable on reflection, has „the immediate impact‟ of making the spectator 
„unconscious of the medium of its expression‟ (OPP 75). But in the Edinburgh Lecture 
II, Eliot raises an additional question, that of multivocality, in the lecture appearing 
under the name of multiple styles. Eliot‟s discussion of Romeo and Juliet is punctuated 
by the statement that it is an unusual „mixture of styles‟ (EL II 2), with „a greater variety 
of versification than in any previous play‟ (3). And when it comes to the perfection of 
the opening scene of Hamlet, Eliot says that the real question with which he is 
concerned is „the astonishing variation of style, without ever any sense of incongruity‟ 
(EL II 4). An analysis of the scene follows, demonstrating that this scene conveys an 
exceptional effect of immediacy by marking every character with a distinctive rhythmic 
pattern of speech, an analysis repeated with some changes in the 1951 lecture and in the 
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collected essay in 1957 (EL II 5-6; OPP 75-77). In the unpublished lecture, Eliot 
concludes his close reading with the following: 
I am not sure that, at least for the English audience, a too consistent plot and 
economical action are not a disadvantage. What is wanted is plenty of incident, 
suspense, surprise and variety. Hamlet is superior in providing all these, together 
with a dominant tone which unifies them and makes each incident essential. (EL 
II 8) 
 
Stylistic variation, that is, must be there for the language to mimic the structure 
of reality which Eliot sees crowded with points of view that speak in distinct voices. In 
this mimicry, by creating an analogous perceptual structure, Shakespeare‟s poetic 
language in Romeo and Juliet and in Hamlet conceals itself in presenting, as it were, 
reality as it appears in direct experience. The lack of organisational patterns on the 
larger scale, those of plot, is irrelevant, even unwanted, „at least for the English 
audience‟ that has not been nurtured by the French tradition of classical drama and 
therefore does not have the conditioned expectation of the Aristotelian dramatic unity 
(EL II 10). But there must be another centre of unification, the perceptual-and-
signifying point of view and voice which here appears under the name of „a dominant 
tone.‟ Four Quartets will transform this unity of „a dominant tone‟ into the unity of 
immediate and yet meaningful experience, by concentrating its articulation of the 
unifying image-meaning around a single perceiving-and-signifying point of view. 
 
■ 
In The Waste Land, this assumption of the aesthetic unity situated in the perceiving-and-
signifying viewpoint is absent, or, rather, it is assumed as given – or not – in the 
perceiving body, which is impossible to control. And so The Waste Land articulates 
multivocality alone, modelling its articulation on the opening scene of Hamlet that Eliot 
finds particularly effective. The acting agents of the play, according to Eliot‟s 
description, crowd it swiftly, announcing their presence by „short, brusque ejaculations 
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[...] suitable to the situation‟ that is being staged. Then the pace slows down with the 
appearance of Horatio and Marcellus, the rhythm changing „again on the appearance of 
Royalty, the ghost of the King‟ and again, now „to staccato in Horatio‟s words to the 
ghost on its second appearance‟ (OPP 75-76). The language of the opening scene in 
Hamlet, by changing the tempo and the rhythm of its verse, distinguishes the voices of 
the characters from one another, conveying a sense of their multiplicity in the language 
they speak, making it audible even if the play is read on the page rather than seen on the 
stage. This is exactly how Eliot opens The Waste Land, as the poem throws the reader 
into its overwhelmingly multivocal, excessive, overcrowded reality in the opening verse 
paragraph and extends the effect throughout its lines to the very end, multiplying voices 
and simultaneously blurring distinctions between them, to close with words in another, 
foreign language and voice, speaking a weird kind of peace, „shantih,‟ that passeth 
understanding. 
Four Quartets, in contrast, actively directs the aesthetic experience of the 
perceiving-and-signifying point of view, as Eliot sees it done in Shakespeare‟s plays, 
most explicitly in Romeo and Juliet. In this play, Shakespeare leads his spectator to a 
moment in which aesthetic immediacy is experienced in the reading act as meaning 
emerges out of a network of rhythmic effects and connotations that eventually come 
together in a word, an expression that encapsulates the experience in a meaning, as 
„lighting‟ does according to Eliot‟s description. In the light of the Eliotic philosophical 
premises, this manipulation of the perceiving point of view into experiencing a moment 
of aesthetic unity involves balancing two complementary constituents of meaningful 
reality: the indeterminate pre-articulate immediate experience, in this dichotomy 
appearing as the process of signification, and the structural unit – a word – that denotes 
that experience as the perception of the object which is its meaning. In the linguistic 
process of everyday language use as it appears in Eliot‟s analysis of memory in 
164 
 
Knowledge and Experience and James‟s descriptions of the psychological process of 
perceiving linguistic meaning that I have discussed in Chapter 2, the experiential 
constituent of the signifying process is subsumed by the structural meaning as soon as 
this meaning has been perceived by the signifying consciousness. The processual 
tension of experiencing meaning dies out once the meaning has been articulated. 
Aesthetically organised language relies on this inclination of the perceiving 
consciousness while working against it. Poetic language must be patterned in such a 
way as not to allow the full assimilation of the experiential energy into the linguistic 
concept that articulates the meaning, keeping both aspects of meaningful experience, the 
structural and the experiential actively evoked. Four Quartets encapsulates this 
doubleness in the composite image of the fire and the rose, not directly related to 
Shakespeare. But it is in Shakespeare that Eliot recognises and foregrounds this 
dichotomy analytically, most fully in his descriptions of the aesthetic functioning of the 
ghost figure, the unacknowledged agent of the correlation between immediate 
experience and objective reality. 
Eliot‟s does not want to allow the assimilation of experiential indeterminacy into 
a linguistic concept, even when he speaks from the analytic point of view, that of a 
literary critic. This unwillingness is witnessed by the changes he makes to his 1919 
piece on Hamlet where he defines the objective correlative, turning the review of J. M. 
Robertson‟s study of the play, which the piece originally was, into an essay to be 
collected in The Sacred Wood.
4
 These changes are three. Two of them are clearly 
required by the shift in genre and, with it, in the object of attention. The essay, whether 
titled „Hamlet and his Problems‟ (The Sacred Wood 95) or simply „Hamlet‟ (SE 141), 
claims to speak of Hamlet itself rather than of Robertson‟s work on it, as the review 
                                                 
4
 Charles Warren reads Eliot‟s early essay on Hamlet in the context of Robertson‟s work (16-18), 
highlighting Eliot‟s selective use of Robertson‟s argument and in some respects going beyond him. 
William H. Quillian gives a fuller account of Robertson‟s importance in the development of Eliot‟s 
position on Hamlet (49-74). 
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does. Thus Eliot cuts the opening sentence introducing the work being reviewed, „We 
are very glad to find Hamlet [sic] in the hands of so learned and scrupulous a critic as 
Mr. Robertson‟ (Athenaeum 940). He also adds a reference to and a quotation from the 
work of another important figure of the Shakespearean scholarship of the time, Robert 
Stoll (SE 141-142), to widen the context in which Eliot wants to resituate now his own 
reading of Hamlet, rather than Robertson‟s. But the third change he makes is not fully 
explained by the generic transformation of this text from a review into an essay: Eliot 
removes the two closing sentences of his original review. The very last one, again, 
refers to Robertson. It effectively concludes the review with Eliot‟s reinforcement of 
Robertson‟s view, saying that „[t]he material proved intractable in a deeper sense than 
that intended by Mr. Robertson in his admirable essay‟ (Athenaeum 941), thereby 
closing the review with a return of focus on Robertson. This clearly had to be removed 
for the text of the review to function as an essay on Hamlet rather than on Robertson‟s 
work on the play. More significantly, together with this last sentence, Eliot cuts the 
preceding one: „In the Storm in Lear, and in the last scene of Othello, Shakespeare 
triumphed in tearing art from the impossible: Hamlet is a failure‟ (Athenaeum 941). 
This cancellation is not demanded by the change in genre that the review is 
undergoing by being collected as an essay. Further, it seems rather strange that Eliot 
decides to cut this statement out. This sentence effectively gives two more examples of 
Shakespeare‟s successful realisation of an aesthetic unity by actually providing an 
objective correlative in both King Lear and Othello even though these plays, like 
Hamlet, represent a reality that is just as hard to control by means of an aesthetic 
structure. By implication, the difficulty is the same as Shakespeare faced in Hamlet: 
picturing the experience of the disorder of the real is „the impossible‟ task for an artist 
because a work of art by definition presents a kind of order, a task that Shakespeare 
„triumphed‟ in accomplishing in the two other plays but not in Hamlet. In Lear, Eliot 
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sees Shakespeare achieving this paradoxical ordering of disorder by framing the chaotic 
reality of Lear in a structure that means disorder, mimicking it on the formal plane and 
denoting it in its semantic content, the storm. In an important way, the objective 
correlation in Lear goes further than it does in Macbeth. Eliot‟s examples with the 
Macbeths operate within the referential reality of the play only, the observing point of 
view assuming their viewpoint and appreciating the exactness with which Shakespeare 
controls the perceptual energy of both his characters and the spectator. Meanwhile, in 
identifying the storm as the objective correlative in Lear, Eliot is looking at the play 
from a properly critical, analytic distance, regarding the play itself as an object of his 
attention at the same time as responding to the objects of its referential reality, that of 
Lear, in an identification of the observing point of view with that of the character. 
The storm in King Lear is the background of Lear‟s descent into madness, as he 
sees the order of his world falling apart. The storm begins when Regan, after Goneril, 
explicitly refuses to obey him (2.2.457-458), and it is no longer there when Lear is 
called a madman (3.6.9-14). Lear expresses his rage at his daughters‟ disobedience and 
then his despair by means of metaphors of storm, calling for it and describing his state 
of mind in its imagery. He leaves Regan‟s house to travel into the storm that has just 
begun, „minded like the weather, / Most unquietly‟ (3.1.1-2). „Contending with the 
fretful elements,‟ he „[b]ids the wind blow the earth into the sea / Or swell the curled 
waters ‟bove the main, / That things might change or cease‟ (3.1.3-6). „Blow, winds, 
and crack your cheeks! Rage, blow, / you cataracts and hurricanes, spout / Till you have 
drenched our steeples, drowned the cocks!‟ (3.2.1-3) we hear him cry and then 
conclude, „This tempest in my mind / Doth from my senses take all feeling‟ (3.4.12-13). 
The storm, for Lear, is both the objective, physical reality that immediately surrounds 
him and the figure that signifies the disordered reality of his whole world as he sees it 
falling into chaos on every plane of his existence: the nature that surrounds him, his 
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kingdom, and his mind. This multifaceted functioning of the storm image is also present 
for the spectator of the play who observes the chaos of storm on the stage and 
understands it to be King Lear‟s state of mind as expressed in his metaphoric 
exclamations. The storm in King Lear is a perfect objective correlative: it establishes 
the correlation between the direct experience of physical reality and the linguistic 
structure that articulates its meaning on all levels of the perceptual-significative act for 
both Lear‟s point of view and that of the spectator. 
One of the reasons why Eliot may not have been comfortable with this example 
seems to be that this correlation is, in a way, just a little too complete. The storm image, 
though its semantic dimension is enacted in the action of Lear in its full multifaceted 
force, also lends itself to linguistic functioning only. As an image, it is a concise 
significative unit that expresses the dominant, unifying semantics of the entire play 
which may then be understood as an expansion of this dominant motif. The correlation 
between the direct perception of the stormy chaos on the stage and its linguistic 
articulation would be present and experienced in its fullness while watching a 
performance, but the analytic perspective and the language of criticism thrives on the 
possibilities of reducing the experiential and operating in linguistic concepts alone. Eliot 
does not want to facilitate this reduction even in the critical discourse, nor does he want 
to allow this reduction to define his description of the double structure of the aesthetic 
experience, the emotive charge in it – the pre-objective, yet unsignified „feeling‟ – 
playing as important a role as the fact that a work of art must be „an expression of 
significant emotion‟ (SE 22). 
In addition to this, in both examples cancelled by Eliot for the collection, the 
successful realisation of objective correlation seems to derive its unifying effect from 
the position of these images in the plot sequence of each play, both of them marking the 
resolution of the narrative suspense. Eliot‟s reference to Othello shows this dependence 
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particularly clearly. He does not specify what exactly it is that makes the last scene the 
objective correlative of the play but only names it formally, as „the last scene,‟ the 
closing unit in the linear structure of plot. And in the terms of the events of plot that 
Othello‟s closing scene includes, it is a concentrated resolution of the narrative 
suspense: Othello enters Desdemona‟s bedroom, kills her, learns of his delusion about 
her infidelity, and kills himself (5.2). The scene begins with a turn of the plot towards 
resolution and knits up all threads of the narrative suspense one after another. The 
aesthetic closure that Eliot sees Shakespeare realising in Othello but not in Hamlet is 
narrative closure: the last scene of the play realises this kind of closure exhaustively, 
and Eliot gives no hint to any other kind of unity he sees this scene as proving. The 
storm in King Lear marks the same kind of a turning point towards resolution as the 
beginning of the bedroom scene in Othello. The storm begins with Lear realising that 
his world has fallen apart, and it goes on until a new kind of order is established, Lear 
having lapsed into madness, unable to cope with the chaos. This is where the resolution 
of the play‟s plot begins, while the rest of the dramatic action only exposes the scale and 
the details of the destructive impact of this turn on the lives of the other characters in 
Lear. 
Eliot‟s immediate aesthetic response, that is, recognises the affective impact of 
sequential distribution, coinciding in Shakespeare with narrative sequentiality, but he 
does not want to give it a dominant, properly unifying significance explicitly. The fact 
that Eliot‟s analytic eye does not see an analogous unifying structure in Hamlet, „a 
failure‟ in the respect in which Lear and Othello are a success (Athenaeum 941), 
witnesses yet again that narrative structure takes its part in the complex of signifying 
and affective tensions that determine Eliot‟s sense of objective correlation in this play. 
The ghost appears in and dominates the opening part of Hamlet, the stage of the 
creation and build-up of the narrative suspense, and it disappears from view before the 
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plot approaches resolution. As the ghost appears in the opening part of the play only, 
Eliot‟s analytic eye misses the presence of the figure of semantic closure, which an 
objective correlative by definition is. In Four Quartets, he will correct this deficiency. 
Though narrative structure in itself is of a ghost-like nature in this poem, as it appears 
and disappears depending on shifts in the interpretative point of view, the ghost enters 
the stage of its performative action very late, to reinforce its semantics of objective 
correlation with the affect of closure supplementing the experience of reading as the 
poem approaches the end. Its semantics, meanwhile, unfolds in the poem in the 
sequence of narrative steps that mirror those of Hamlet‟s Ghost in Shakespeare‟s play. 
 
■ 
It is the peculiar ontology of the ghost that makes it the figure of objective correlation. 
The ghost is an existent that by definition does not have an objective integrity, its 
identity depending on way in which its appearances are perceived and interpreted. In 
this ontological ambiguity, the ghost is a variant of the bogey as Eliot describes it in 
Knowledge and Experience (116): an object that exists in perception only and only for 
the perceiving point of view, its identity prone to change together with a shift in 
viewpoint. The ghost is a kind of an object that Eliot would call a half-object: it is never 
an object of reality fully distinct from the subject to which it appears and which 
constructs the meaning of these perceptions. Ezra Pound, in a book that Eliot reviewed 
in 1917 („The Noh and the Image‟), articulates the nature of this ambiguity of the ghost 
figure in his comment on the major difficulty in translating a play by Ujinobu, „Awoi 
No Uye,‟ that pictures a princess tortured by a ghost. It is impossible to separate, Pound 
says, „what belongs to Awoi herself from things belonging to the ghost of Rakujo, very 
much as modern psychologists might have difficulty in detaching the personality or 
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memories of an obsessed person from the personal memories of the obsession‟ (Pound 
& Fenollosa 114). 
Eliot‟s review of this book actually focuses on this ambiguity of the ghost‟s 
identity, an ambiguity deriving from the impossibility of determining which elements of 
it are produced by the perceiver‟s mind rather than actually perceived in the immediate 
presence of a ghostly object. The Japanese theatre manages to keep this ambiguity alive, 
which Eliot in this review regards as the token of its aesthetic effectivity, superior in 
comparison to the Western tradition in which the ghost is located in the subject‟s 
perception unequivocally: 
The phantom-psychology of Orestes and Macbeth is as good as that of Awoi; 
but the method of making the ghost real is different. In the former case the ghost 
is given in the mind of the possessed; in the latter case the mind of the sufferer is 
inferred from the reality of the ghost. The ghost is enacted [...]. In fact, it is only 
ghosts that are actual; the world of active passions is observed through the veil 
of another world. („The Noh and the Image‟103) 
 
In this review, Eliot elaborates that the Noh theatre relies on possibilities of 
aesthetic appeal – the appeal to the sensual immediate perception of what is happening 
on the stage – far more heavily than Western drama building on realistic conventions 
and the structure of plot. Eliot even gives an example of a similar reliance on the 
perceptual imagination in the Western literary tradition: „in reading Dante,‟ he says, „we 
need to visualise all the time‟ (103). It is through this exploitation of the perceptual 
planes of aesthetic experience that the Noh makes the ghost real to the spectator and 
opens to her experience the reality of the possessed. The spectator is forced to construct 
the identity of the ghost in the same way as and together with the character on the stage, 
interpreting the immediate pre-objective perceptions through which the ghost appears, 
in opposition to the Western theatre where ghosts appear as already located in the 
character‟s mind, clearly identified as ghosts of one kind or other. 
This kind of reliance on immediate pre-objective perception out of which 
objective reality appears simultaneously for the character and the spectator while 
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keeping the ambiguity about the meaning of this reality, however, creates a problem of 
aesthetic order, just as it did in Eliot‟s 1919 reading of Hamlet. The ambiguity of the 
identity of the ghostly reality so well communicated in the Noh by not defining the 
nature of the ghost conflicts with Eliot‟s assumption that the ultimate function of a work 
of art is to articulate the meaning of reality „in imposing a credible order upon ordinary 
reality, and thereby eliciting some perception of an order in reality‟ („Poetry and 
Drama,‟ OPP 87). Indeed, when Eliot‟s view is restricted to the European context alone, 
he does not want any ambiguities about objective identities of the existents that appear 
on the stage. Shakespearean ghosts therefore present a problem: 
The fault is not with the ghost but with the presentation of a ghost on a plane on 
which he is inappropriate, and with the confusion between one kind of ghost and 
another. The three witches in Macbeth are a distinguished example of correct 
supernaturalism amongst a race of ghosts who are too frequently equivocations. 
It seems to me strictly an error [...] that Shakespeare should have introduced into 
the same play ghosts belonging to such different categories as the three sisters 
and the ghost of Banquo. („Four Elizabethan Dramatists,‟ SE 115-116) 
 
Eliot hedges this reproach to Shakespeare: this „error is condoned by the success 
of each passage itself‟ and, more generally, he explains that the Elizabethans aimed „to 
attain complete realism without surrendering any of the advantages which as artists they 
observed in unrealistic conventions‟ (SE 116). He acknowledges the aesthetic 
effectiveness of the Shakespearean representation of the ghost, and yet sees it as 
effective in spite of the fact that it does not conform to identifiable laws of aesthetic 
unity. 
Shakespeare, indeed, realises both the European and the Japanese conventions of 
the dramatic representation of the ghost as Eliot describes them, in Hamlet more fully 
than in Macbeth, apparently leaving Eliot at a loss: he avoids discussing the structure of 
representation of King Hamlet‟s Ghost. In his review of Pound‟s book on the Noh, Eliot 
mentions both plays, but Hamlet only gives an occasion for Eliot to remark on the effect 
of immediacy conveyed by the opening scene, while his explanation of the difference 
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between the English and the Japanese conventions of representing the ghost refers to 
Macbeth only. The rhetoric of his analysis of Hamlet‟s opening, when he comes to read 
the scene closely two decades later in the Edinburgh lectures and, yet later, revises this 
reading for „Poetry and Drama,‟ shows him a little indecisive about the Ghost‟s identity. 
In the Edinburgh Lecture II he speaks of „the appearance of the Ghost‟ and „an abrupt 
change of rhythm in Horatio‟s words to the Ghost on its second appearance‟ (EL II 5). 
But in „Poetry and Drama‟ the first reference is rephrased as „the appearance of Royalty, 
the ghost of the King‟ while leaving the second reference to the Ghost in its original 
wording (OPP 76). The difference is subtle: even named as „Royalty,‟ the Ghost is still 
„the ghost of a King;‟ but it nevertheless shows an explicit awareness, absent in the 
earlier variant of the same text, of the double identity of the apparition, as well as Eliot‟s 
willingness to acknowledge this duplicity. In 1917 Eliot avoids mentioning Hamlet‟s 
Ghost at all; in 1937, he regards it as a ghost, assuming that the name makes the 
meaning self-evident; and in 1951 and 1957, he feels a need to register the ghost‟s split 
indeterminate identity openly in the language he speaks about it. Eliot does not know 
what he thinks about Hamlet‟s Ghost, but in 1951 he also knows that this not-knowing 
is a defining aspect of the experience that an indeterminate object, such as a ghost, 
evokes. 
This line of the development of Eliot‟s view on the function of the ghost is 
another manifestation of the shift in his responsiveness and focus, from the effects of 
immediacy alone in the early period to the ways of their integration into an aesthetic 
unity later in his career. The ghost in Hamlet is, indeed, a mediatory figure that 
integrates both kinds of requirements that for Eliot define a successful aesthetic 
structure: of aesthetic immediacy and the determinacy of meaning, or of the Japanese 
and the English conventions. Hamlet presents an even more complicated case than 
Macbeth. If Macbeth unnecessarily complicates its aesthetic structure by presenting two 
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kinds of ghosts, the supernatural witches and the ghost of Banquo which is a product of 
Macbeth‟s mind, Hamlet has one ghost that, when seen from the Eliotic perspective, 
cannot be unequivocally identified as any of these. Focusing on the narrative line of the 
play, King Hamlet‟s Ghost clearly appears as a supernatural being. The play begins with 
its appearance to a number of characters other than Hamlet, so that the spectator knows 
for sure that the ghost is not the product of Hamlet‟s imagination. Yet at the same time 
the Ghost‟s representation realises the dynamics of the formation of the object of reality 
as Eliot describes it in Knowledge and Experience, and in this line of reading it appears 
as an equivalent of a bogey: a bear that is real at the time of its direct perception but 
disappears once the point of view has assumed the analytic, observing position. 
The irresolvable ambiguity of Hamlet‟s Ghost builds on the implicit assumption 
that underlies Eliot‟s vision of the perceptual process and destabilises the certainty of 
the ghost‟s identity established by Hamlet‟s narrative line. While insisting on the 
uniqueness of every living point of view in what Eliot refers to as practical reality, the 
theoretical perspective from which Eliot describes the structure of perception and 
experience assumes that this structure is universal. The analytic description of the 
process in which reality emerges in perception as the reality of objects distinguishes 
between modes of perceiving and signifying that reality, implicitly attributing these 
modes to every possible experiencing viewpoint, while the individuality of every given 
point of view for the description of the structure of experience per se is irrelevant. The 
experiencing viewpoint, in other words, appears as an abstraction, a locus where the 
immediately perceived is signified in an interaction of all modes of perceiving the real, 
while the identity of the object that is perceived is a result of this interaction. Keeping 
the focus of attention on the objective identity of the Ghost thus understood pushes into 
the margins of attention the fact that it appears to different characters of the play, for it 
is only the ways of its appearance and their combination that matters. These 
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appearances determine what this object is, while the fact of the multiplicity of the 
viewpoints which perceive it is of secondary importance. 
The representation of King Hamlet‟s Ghost, in fact, foregrounds the structure of 
an object‟s appearance to different channels of perception, for it shows itself in deficient 
structures of perception in different instances. It is first an indefinite „thing,‟ then a 
„fantasy‟ and an „apparition,‟ the indeterminacy of its identity and intentions towards 
those to whom it appears evoking the wish to hear it speak (1.1.19-27). It then shows 
itself clearly enough to be recognised as King Hamlet (1.2.188-241); but when it speaks 
to be heard by the guards, it is invisible, only heard from under the floor (1.5.151-182). 
It chooses how fully it wants to appear to different viewpoints at different moments, in 
full control of its appearances to every point of view: the guards get to perceive the 
Ghost only defectively, in one way or other at a time, but Hamlet sees it and hears it 
speak simultaneously (1.5), even in the presence of another viewpoint, Gertrude‟s, that 
does not register the Ghost‟s presence while being in the same place at the same time 
(3.4.93-127). This representation of the ghost deconstructs the structure of the 
perceptual process in which an object emerges in a particular identity, identifying and 
singling out its constituent elements and their combinations in its exposition of the 
paradigm of objective presence, from the non-appearance (to Gertrude) and half-
appearances (to the guards) to the fully fledged presence (to Hamlet) of the object to the 
perceiving point of view. 
The fullness of the Ghost‟s appearance to Prince Hamlet makes him the unifying 
point of view, the Eliotic centre of aesthetic unity stated in the Edinburgh Lectures, as I 
have discussed above. In addition to „a dominant tone‟ that for Eliot unifies the play, 
Hamlet is a character that allows for the highest degree of the identification of the 
spectator‟s point of view with the character, thereby opening up for the spectator the 
Shakespearean experience of reality (EL II 7-8). This chain of identifications of 
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experiencing viewpoints – spectators with Hamlet‟s and with Shakespeare‟s – is 
enabled by Eliot‟s implicit assumption that on the level of perceptual structure all 
experiencing viewpoints are the same, for they shape their unique visions of reality by 
establishing links between the same set of the modes of immediate and analytic 
experiences. Hamlet‟s encounter with his father‟s ghost articulates this set. Not only 
does Hamlet see the Ghost and engage in conversation with it but he also reflects on the 
significance of this encounter, doubting the validity of the Ghost‟s accusations of 
Claudius and Gertrude and even of his own identification of the Ghost with his father. 
„The spirit that I have seen / May be the devil, and the devil hath power / T‟assume a 
pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps [...] / Abuses me to damn me,‟ Hamlet says, and 
decides to look for „grounds / More relative than this‟ before taking any action of 
revenge (2.2.600-606). And, importantly for the conception of Hamlet as the unifying 
point of view, this paradigm of the ways in which Hamlet senses his father‟s presence 
goes beyond his ghostly identity, for Hamlet first sees his father in his mind‟s eye 
(1.2.184), learning about the Spirit‟s apparition to the guards after he shares this mental 
appearance with Horatio. 
 
■ 
Eliot articulates the structure of this unifying point of view – understood as a localised 
constellation of all actual modes in which objective reality is perceived and signified – 
in Four Quartets. The locus of this constellation is, ultimately, the speaking point of 
view. This viewpoint is Eliot‟s, but also the reader‟s, because to understand the poem‟s 
meaning is to go through the effort of the articulation of the reality immediately 
perceived, and this effort builds on the capacities of perceiving and signifying 
consciousness that all experiencing viewpoints share. To expose the ways in which the 
poem relies on this sameness and manipulates readerly experience into a moment of 
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aesthetic unity is the purpose of my reading of Four Quartets in the chapter below. I 
focus my attention on passages that I see as exploiting the interdependence between the 
perceptual and the signifying – or the bodily and the linguistic – dimensions of 
understanding reality most fully, and one of the crucially important moments in the 
poem is the passage in which it pays homage to Hamlet‟s Ghost, in the terza rima of 
„Little Gidding.‟ 
The homage itself is ghostly, hiding under the surface of Eliot‟s Dantesque voice 
as Eliot mimics the poetic form of The Divine Comedy and models the encounter that he 
depicts on Canto XV of Inferno. This dependence of the passage on Dante is even 
clearer in Eliot‟s manuscripts of the poem, as one of the drafts has the persona 
addressing the ghost as „Ser Brunetto‟ (Gardner, The Composition of Four Quartets 
174). The Shakespearean ghost appears through a similar double presence, though 
somewhat reversed. A direct allusion to Hamlet comes with the ghost‟s farewell, as it 
fades „on the blowing of the horn‟ (LG II, CPP 195), an Eliotic transfiguration of the 
Shakespearean crow of the cock in Hamlet (1.1.119-122). And „Little Gidding‟ 
constructs the event of the encounter on the basis of the example of Hamlet‟s Ghost, 
rather than on the appearance of Brunetto‟s ghost to the persona of Dante. Dante, in the 
Canto about Brunetto, encounters „a company of spirits‟ each of which „stared steadily‟ 
at him until, after a while, he „was recognised by one, who took [him] by / the hem and 
cried out: “This is marvellous!”‟ (Dante, Inferno, XV.16-24): the Dantesque ghost 
singles itself out of an indeterminate multiplicity of spirits. And it is the spirit that 
approaches Dante‟s persona rather than the other way around: only after it has spoken to 
the persona and „stretched his arm towards [him]‟ the persona „fixed [his] eyes upon his 
baked, brown features‟ and recognised the ghost as Brunetto (XV.25-30). But Four 
Quartets reverses this interaction, repeating instead the dynamic observed in Hamlet: 
Eliot‟s persona meets „one walking‟ (LG II, CPP 193, emphasis mine) just as the guards 
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and then Prince Hamlet see one ghost. And for Eliot‟s persona the interaction begins 
with his own gaze at the ghost, as it does for both the guards and Prince Hamlet in 
Shakespeare, even though this gaze registers the ghost looking at him: „as I fixed upon 
the down-turned face [...] I caught the sudden look of some dead master‟ (LG II, CPP 
193). This change of direction – from the immediacy of perception towards reality, 
emerging as the reality of the world‟s existents, rather than reality falling into 
perception and overwhelming it with its excessive presence – underlies the difference 
between The Waste Land and Four Quartets. The excess of reality in The Waste Land 
was the subject matter of my chapter on the poem; my reading of Four Quartets aims to 
foreground its articulation of perceptual – aesthetic – unity. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
 
FOUR QUARTETS: A POEM OF ‘CONCENTRATION WITHOUT ELIMINATION’ 
 
Four Quartets is a poem of inclusion and closure. It is the direct opposite of The Waste 
Land‟s mad disorientation in response to the excess of reality as it comes into view: 
Eliot reflects on that early experience in the recognition that „human kind cannot bear 
very much reality‟ (BN I, CPP 172) and contemplates the limitations that make reality 
bearable. It is in 1913 that Eliot sees „the enchainment of our ideas in explanation‟ in 
contrast to „the real laws of nature‟ (IPR, Gray 124), emphasising the unknowability of 
the link between them and, with it, the inaccessibility of reality beyond our direct 
experience. But in 1934, reality for Eliot is the enchainment itself. This is the reality of 
living in the body, as given to us by the law of nature, as well as in the presence of 
things beyond the limits of the physically given here-and-now: „the enchainment of past 
and future / Woven in the weakness of the changing body, / Protects mankind from 
heaven and damnation / Which flesh cannot endure‟ (BN II, CPP 173). The Tiresian 
consciousness of The Waste Land, the linguistic all-inclusiveness of all there has been 
and will ever be, is the ground on which Four Quartets builds its vision. The vision 
itself, however, is no longer a mind-vision of a blind seer overwhelmed with the excess 
of reality present to it, for all this reality is now woven in the body, in itself a limit 
which the poem sees as a blessing. The weakness of the body is to be accepted with 
gratitude, for it protects us from all which our „flesh cannot endure.‟ It is the threads of 
this web that Four Quartets exposes, weaving them into the web of reality to be 
experienced by the reading eye, the poem‟s meaning – its intended purpose – being the 
experience itself. 
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Both The Waste Land and Four Quartets seek for ways of marking the field 
denoted by the basic premise of Knowledge and Experience, the timeless unity of 
immediate experience in which there are no objects, space or selves because this 
experience is pre-linguistic, while distinctions are the given of our post-immediate 
condition (KE 31). For The Waste Land, this post-immediacy is a curse, and it 
acknowledges this curse by obsessively restating absence, the absence of reality to 
language, so that the only way of speaking reality is saying what it is not. But Four 
Quartets keeps the full perspective of Eliot‟s philosophical premise in view. The post-
immediate condition in which this poem speaks is the middle way in the journey from 
the unknowable all-inclusive whole of immediate experience to the all-pervasive order 
of the Absolute, the experience of a meaningful unity in which all distinctions now 
present melt. For this poem, the post-immediacy of human condition means that 
everything that appears to view has derived from the pre-linguistic whole of immediate 
experience and therefore nothing can be rejected but must be welcomed, in the belief 
that all this reality will fall together into a meaningful whole. Four Quartets – itself a 
post-immediate, linguistic existent – contemplates the emergence of reality to view, in 
the formation of distinctions as experienced in the post-immediate world of objects in 
which we live, and enacts the process of this emergence in its language, until bringing 
all it has created for the reading eye into one moment of experiencing meaning. 
Enacting this process, Four Quartets closes the gaps of incomprehensibility that 
The Waste Land left gawping open. This poem does not explain the incomprehensible, 
for that which cannot be comprehended cannot be explained. But the poem encloses its 
horror, delimits it in the knowledge that incomprehensibility is only a part of the cycle, 
that it is „surrounded / By a grace of sense,‟ punctuated by moments of „concentration / 
Without elimination‟ in which „both a new world / And the old [are] made explicit, 
understood / In the completion of its partial ecstasy, / The resolution of its partial 
180 
 
horror‟ (BN II, CPP 173). Peace, in this poem, no longer needs to be the mysterious 
„Shantih‟ that „passeth understanding‟ (WL, CPP 75, 80) nor is it blinded when 
„Looking into the heart of light‟ (WL, CPP 62). In the garden of Four Quartets, this 
blinding light is the source of the transformations of immediate reality, a sequence of 
perceptions named – identified in complete images, even if only for a passing moment 
before they turn into something else or disappear – to form meaningful continuities with 
the environment in which they appear, relational wholes in which this emerging reality 
is experienced. If looked into „[w]ith a little patience‟ that for The Waste Land defines 
being itself (CPP 72), the vision of this blinding sunlight dissolves into a world of 
objects present in perception here-and-now. This vision is a prototype of contemplative-
performative moves that constitute the content and the significative dynamics of the 
poem. This is the „first world,‟ as the poem names it twice in inviting the reading eye to 
follow its emergence in its lines and signalling that there are more worlds of this kind 
coming in the poem‟s course. 
Dry the pool, dry concrete, brown edged, 
And the pool was filled with water out of sunlight, 
And the lotos rose, quietly, quietly, 
The surface glittered out of heart of light, 
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool. 
(BN I, CPP 172) 
 
The sunlight here has the depth of the vessel that it fills in, as water would have 
if there were any in the dry pool at which the eye, blinded by the sun, is looking. 
Perception itself, the knowledge of the world that the watching eye has in its memory, 
turns the substance in the pool, light, into what it is supposed to be, water, and then the 
eye sees the surface of this water though consciousness knows this is not water the eye 
is looking at but sunlight. So „[t]he surface glittered out of heart of light‟ in a signifying 
move of immediate perception, in a moment of suspended disbelief, forgetting the 
knowledge that there is no water in the pool – allowing the lotos, the flower of 
forgetfulness, to rise, „quietly, quietly‟ – and letting perception itself build its own 
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meaningful unities, delicately complete like a Chinese jar, another prototypical image of 
aesthetic fragility that the poem will give (BN V, CPP 175). These unities arise in a 
fusion of the known with the perceived, complementing one another, supplying 
elements for a complete vision of meaningful reality to appear. What is known to be 
sunlight turns into water, and then this water is seen to have a reflective surface which, 
in its turn, reflects the roses that are retained in this perceptual whole by memory‟s 
possession of percepts just grasped in the field of attention even though they are no 
longer present to the senses. 
The wholeness of the perceptual vision that the poem remembers and describes 
relies on this dynamics of retention, and the language in which it is conveyed enacts it. 
The description is punctuated by the pronoun „they,‟ its reference found in the roses, 
named just before the vision begins, said to have had „the look of the flowers that are 
looked at‟ and to have moved with us. They move „as our guests, accepted and 
accepting:‟ accepted as our guests in the world that is our present reality and accepting 
our definition of that which is perceived as roses. To keep the reading eye glued to these 
roses is the only way of identifying what the „they‟ of the line in this sentence and the 
pronouns of the previous one mean: 
And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses 
Had the look of flowers that are looked at. 
There they were as our guests, accepted and accepting. 
So we moved, and they, in formal pattern, 
Along the empty alley, into the box circle, 
To look down into the drained pool. 
Dry the pool, dry concrete, brown edged, 
And the pool was filled with water out of sunlight, 
And the lotos rose, quietly, quietly, 
The surface glittered out of heart of light, 
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool. 
Then a cloud passed, and the pool was empty. 
(BN I, CPP 172) 
 
This movement of both the perceiver and the perceived is performed „in a formal 
pattern‟ that the poem constructs to sustain the vision as we read on, in the same way as 
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it was experienced in the walk in the garden of Burnt Norton which the poem recollects. 
The reflection is not the actual reflection on the mirror-like surface of the empirically 
non-existent water in the pool, but a projection of the mind‟s eye, the presence of the 
roses remembered. The reflective surface is as if of water because the pool invites water 
by being a pool, a construction built to hold water. Water there by the law of the 
aesthetic unity of the world being perceived, the kind of unity that emerges by itself in 
the unknowable, unstoppable movement of immediate perception. This is not an illusory 
unity, not a false reality, but a unity that accepts the aesthetic law of the senses, bringing 
up the meaning of the immediately, pre-rationally real. The roses – and the whole world 
in which they appear, be it the garden of Burnt Norton or the one imagined while 
reading the lines of „Burnt Norton‟ – are a presence of the ghostly kind, half-real: 
undeniably here at the moment of immediate perception of them as this kind of existent, 
yet disappearing once the perceptual process has moved on.
5
 The vision emerges out of 
immediate perceptual associations, holds there for a moment, just long enough to be 
named, recognised, frozen in language as a complete meaningful form – „quietly, 
quietly‟ – and goes away with a change in the immediate environment: „Then a cloud 
passed, and the pool was empty.‟ The „partial ecstasy,‟ the „resolution of [the] partial 
horror‟ of the world, has reached the moment of its completion and is over – just for 
                                                 
5
 Ronald Bush reads this passage differently, eventually coming to a similar conclusion. A network of 
parallels with The Family Reunion makes Bush assume that the pronoun „they‟ denotes unidentifiable 
ghosts that the persona senses to be present in the garden. These ghosts follow the persona until he sees 
them reflected in the pool, in Bush‟s view a symbolic representation of his life, as they would be seen 
when they are behind him (190-191). But in a close reading of the same lines, given to demonstrate that 
„this poem‟s “passages” are made through effects that construct a new reality out of language‟ (193), 
Bush shows how Eliot combines rhythmic and syntactic patterning to make the reading eye stop on the 
reference to the roses and, once it does, never to withdraw its attention from them (194-195). Like the 
ghost of „Little Gidding,‟ the roses, the ghosts and the complex of motifs around them have been traced to 
sources beyond Eliot‟s oeuvre, such as Donne and Lewis Carroll (Smith, T. S. Eliot’s Poetry and Plays 
260), as well as Kipling and Elizabeth Barrett Browning (Gardner, The Composition of Four Quartets 39-
41), most of these references provided by Eliot himself. I interpret these responses as witnessing the 
network of relations between the ghost figure and the formation of referential meanings (the rose being a 
prototype example of their emergence) in this poem that I have discussed in the previous chapter. More 
aspects of this relational network are considered further below. 
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now, until another moment in which „a grace of sense‟ will show in „a white light still 
and moving‟ at the same time (BN II, CPP 173). 
 
■ 
Four Quartets stages this play of reality rising in immediate perception as the world of 
object-meanings in a variety of significative modes, making them supplement one 
another in a description and enactment of the emergence of the immediately real as 
meaning. While The Waste Land obsessively circles in deficient structures of 
signification to claim for the space of being the unstructured experiential flux, the other 
of the structural fixity of language, Four Quartets accepts this dichotomy as the two 
complementary aspects of reality as experienced in the process of their constant, 
unstoppable interaction. In Four Quartets, the meaningfulness of reality is a matter of 
the articulation of the pre-articulate which is given to experience all at once and is 
ordered into a network of meaningful relations by experience itself. This poem sets out 
a structure in which the experiential overlaps with the significative, identifying the 
dimensions of this overlap and playing out the effort of articulating the pre-articulate 
immediate reality, understanding this effort to be the fundamental structure and the 
dynamics of existence. If The Waste Land is true to reality by mimicking its disordered 
excessive structure, counting on the reader‟s natural inclination to order and reorder it 
into arbitrary chains of meanings, Four Quartets contemplates, mimics and directs the 
process of the ordering itself. Both poems build on the basic premise of the factual, 
empirical presence of the perceiving-and-signifying body, the reader. But in contrast to 
The Waste Land‟s expectation that the reading point of view will construct its own paths 
of coherence in the excess of reality presented, Four Quartets aims to keep control of 
the perceptual-and-signifying process of the reading act. To keep this control, the poem 
opens by articulating the dimensions of the process that a reading act as signifying 
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activity is, discerning a relational network of meaningful experience out of the pre-
articulate non-relational perceptual unity. The opening movement of „Burnt Norton‟ 
stages this process, aiming to bring about the event of the birth and existence of the 
world for a human eye, while simultaneously exposing the fundamental structures of 
experiencing reality that make this event what it is. Foregrounding this is the purpose of 
my reading of this movement immediately below. 
 
 
STAGING IMMEDIATE REALITY IN LANGUAGE: THE ‘FIRST WORLD’ OF ‘BURNT 
NORTON’ 
 
Four Quartets does not, as The Waste Land did, throw its reader into the linguistic 
universe at once but opens by demarcating the structure of the Tiresian linguistic 
consciousness. This is the kind of consciousness in which all experienced reality is 
stored in conscious memory and fore-knowledge as linguistic meanings. The all-
inclusive static existence of all time in linguistic consciousness appears against the 
background of reality as experienced, which the poem identifies with the immediate 
experience of that which is present in flux, as one limited vision of the immediately real 
transforms into another, the flow of these transformations constituting the experience of 
temporality itself. There is time as the history of lived experience, the semantic 
substance of linguistic memory and knowledge, the totality of all experienced reality 
static in its eternal all-inclusive presence; and there is time that is the marker of the 
immediate manifestation of things, in the flow of the direct experience of the real in 
which some existents of the all-inclusive linguistic reality assert their presence in the 
here-and-now perceivable to the experiencing point of view. The experience of the 
complementarity of these two kinds of time, one static and the other in flux, „Burnt 
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Norton‟ will call „the still point of the turning world.‟ This point is not to be called 
„fixity, / Where past and future are gathered‟ but, instead, the given without which 
„[t]here would be no dance, and there is only the dance‟ which is „neither arrest nor 
movement‟ (BN II, CPP 173) because it is a constant oscillation between the two kinds 
of time as our existence shifts from one kind of awareness of the world to the other. 
Four Quartets begins articulating this juxtaposition of linguistic and experienced 
reality as two ways of thinking time rather cautiously, as if speaking on the ground of 
the conventional understanding of the nature of time which, however, the poem‟s 
formulation instantly doubts: „Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in 
time future‟ (BN I, CPP 171; emphasis mine). This doubt is immediately supplemented 
with a direct reversal of this temporal directionality, the other, equally valid possibility 
that „time future [is] contained in time past.‟ The poem‟s thought moves in a space 
where both ways of interpreting temporal sequentiality are valid, without a possibility of 
establishing any of them as true. The „perhaps‟ qualifies both kinds of subordination, 
effectively saying that the past may belong to the future in the same way as the future is 
found in the past; and these two perspectives are connected by the conjunctive „and,‟ 
rather than the disjunctive „or.‟ These two ways of thinking temporality are 
complementary, co-existing in the all-inclusive present stretching to the limits of what is 
conventionally thought of as time past and time future. 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
(BN I, CPP 171) 
 
This totality of the real – understood absolutely, as the eternal presence of all 
time – is the point of departure for the contemplative statement of the subsequent 
sentence: „If all time is eternally present / All time is unredeemable.‟ The word choice – 
„eternally‟ and „unredeemable‟ – brings in the Christian frame of reference which will 
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underlie the poem‟s contemplation on existence as it goes on.6 But for now the poem 
proceeds to specify its meaning that time, if eternal, is unredeemable in another 
direction: „What might have been is an abstraction / Remaining a perpetual possibility / 
Only in a world of speculation.‟ An abstraction is a defining property of the linguistic 
structure. Linguistic meaning, the poem then says, is „a perpetual possibility‟ belonging 
to „a world of speculation,‟ the kind of world that in Knowledge and Experience 
appeared under the name of a systematically ordered metaphysical doctrine the 
truthfulness of which is hypothetical until it has been validated in the world of practice 
(KE 168-169). There is the real world, that is, and there are worlds of speculation, those 
of things that „might have been‟ but not actually are, and that are „a perpetual 
possibility‟ defined as „an abstraction.‟ They are linguistic meanings; they may turn real 
but in themselves they are a speculative, abstracted „possibility‟ of meaning which is yet 
to be validated as truth in experience. 
This half-existence of the eternally present time, of all reality that has ever been 
or might have been or will be, is its unredeemable sin. The poem is about to begin 
redeeming it by bringing some of its existents to life, enacting their movement in the 
immediate experience which is also the movement of time and the experience of 
temporality. „To be conscious is not to be in time,‟ it will say shortly; „But only in time 
can the moment in the rose-garden [...] / Be remembered; involved with past and future‟ 
(BN II, CPP 173). To be conscious of reality is not to experience it immediately. To be 
conscious of reality is to contemplate it in language where all reality is „a perpetual 
possibility‟ and „an abstraction.‟ But one‟s own existence is temporal, lived as a 
                                                 
6
 This notion of time – as the experience of temporality on the one hand, and as all reality eternally 
present to consciousness on the other – is steeped in hermeneutic thought, developed in detail in Book 
Eleven of St. Augustine‟s Confessions. Augustine makes this distinction to explain the difference between 
divine time, which is God‟s „ever-present eternity‟ (254), and human time experienced in motion. The 
divine eternity of things, for Augustine, originates from and exists in the Word, which makes God‟s 
eternity the eternity of the all-inclusive linguistic consciousness, as that of Tiresias in The Waste Land. 
For Augustine, to understand the nature of things means to reach towards God, the only purpose of human 
existence. This aspect of Augustine‟s hermeneutics is present in Eliot in his premise of the givenness of 
the interpretative intention in our perception of the world. 
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sequence of meaningful moments, such as the one in the rose-garden, that are placed 
somewhere specific in the time-line of one‟s life, „involved with past and future‟ 
defining one another in the time perspective of the experiencing body. „Only through 
time time is conquered‟ (BN II, CPP 173), in either direction. The time eternally 
present, the totality of the reality known in language, turns into the living present by 
presenting its existence to the immediate experience of the given here-and-now. And the 
flux of lived experience, a sequence of meaningful moments coming one after another 
in time, is preserved in linguistic memory, as a totality of meanings eternally present to 
be remembered and relived even though they are not in the here-and-now of the 
experiencing body. 
Thus the closing sentence of the exposition in „Burnt Norton‟ identifies the 
future and the past – „[w]hat might have been and what has been‟ – into one unnamed 
category, by implication the time that is not the living present, and claims the eternal / 
perpetual presence of all this time turned into a world of abstract existents. This is the 
stage of the poem‟s dramatic action, the „significant soil‟ (DS V, CPP 190) in which its 
words will „reach into the silence‟ (BN V, CPP 175) by bringing to life some of the 
potentially real existents of the linguistic universe in a void space of the present 
moment. 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
(BN I, CPP 171) 
 
Having outlined this space of the timeless presence of all reality, past, present 
and future, the poem at last explicitly specifies it as the space of consciousness aware of 
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all this timelessly present time, denoting this space as the space of memory: „Footfalls 
echo in the memory / Down the passage which we did not take‟ (BN I, CPP 171). 
Specified as „the memory,‟ it is the faculty of memory but also a specific memory, of an 
event remembered and thus present in the speaker‟s mind‟s eye to be referred to as „the 
memory.‟ The reader, this event the speaker refers to not being available to her as the 
memory, is invited to re-construct it by identifying her reading eye with the 
remembering eye of the speaking voice, re-enacting the remembered experience in the 
process of understanding the speaker‟s re-membering that reality in the words of the 
poem‟s lines. 
This sudden throwing of the reading eye into the world of specificities instantly 
places it in a constellation of particularised points of view. It indicates the speaker‟s 
viewpoint, for he is the perceiving eye in the reality remembered. And it forces the 
reader to identify with that viewpoint, for this is the only way to reconstruct that reality, 
make it present to the reader‟s own imaginative perception and thus understand what the 
poem says. The poem makes it easy for the reading eye to identify with the eye 
remembering: the memory is of a walk in the garden of Burnt Norton, its paths 
delineated in the poem‟s lines. 
What might have been and what has been 
Points to one end, which is always present. 
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. 
(BN I, CPP 171) 
 
But the poem does more than throwing the reader into the immediate reality 
remembered. It stages the same event that the reading eye is experiencing in the reading 
act, for it announces the presence of a living body yet unknown, walking into the reality 
of the perceiving eye, the identity of that ghostly being yet to be figured out. „Footfalls 
echo in the memory‟ that is about to be told, just as the words of the speaking voice will 
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be said to echo in the reader‟s mind just a few lines below, the poem speaking to the 
reader directly: „My words echo / Thus, in your mind.‟ 
This garden is a garden remembered, known, and the experience is the 
experience of recollecting, re-living the memory while knowing about the reality in 
which the remembered event occurs more fully than it was experienced at the time: the 
door at the end of the passage was never opened, and yet the speaking voice knows that 
this is the door into the rose-garden. This door is an entrance to a world that is known to 
be out there but has not been chosen to experience, was not actually entered, its 
„perpetual possibility‟ remaining „an abstraction‟ not realised. 
The poem plays on the semantic value of the door: it is a point of entrance, of 
crossing from one defined space into another, the two divided by a wall. These two 
spaces are separated so that it is not possible to be in both of those spaces at once, even 
though that other space, on the other side of the door, is visible to the eye from where it 
is. In Four Quartets, this division line is between that which has been given or chosen 
to actually experience and that which is known to exist out there in the field of 
perceivable reality and yet not actually, immediately lived through. This door is the 
figure of the reader‟s experience of the poem: here is my reality, the poem says, my 
world, a world that you can see and imagine yourself being in as you follow your eye 
discovering roses growing in my garden, while actually being on the other side of the 
entrance, in your own world. It is this symbolic value that the poem exploits, not the 
empirical reality of Burnt Norton. A biographically oriented reader willing to read this 
description as Eliot‟s memory of visiting Burnt Norton, with Emily Hale, in the summer 
or early autumn of 1934 (Gardner, The Composition of Four Quartets 35-36), will find 
that in the present garden of Burnt Norton the passage into the rose-garden does not 
have a door but is more like a deep arch, a doorway, that is, which is always open, 
inviting the visitor to sit down in its side spaces and enjoy the view in either direction 
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opening to view. And the passage luring the eye to follow is not towards the rose-
garden but in it; this passage going down the hill, with roses on either side is, in fact, all 
that the rose-garden is (see next page). This rose-garden does not refer to the 
topography of Burnt Norton but rather to that of „Burnt Norton,‟ in the linguistic tissue 
of the poetry in which the memory is recollected directing the flow of experiential 
energy into a meaningful harmonious whole of the world.
7
 
The plural „we,‟ then, who are walking in this space, includes the reader, and the 
map of the garden is a description of the linguistic mindscape in which the walk takes 
place, its pathways and doors and existents (such as roses) all made present by words 
that refer to them as meanings. And then the paths that have or have not been taken in 
the walk are threads of coherence built by making interpretative choices in the process 
of signifying the narrative happening in this space, these threads weaving into the 
poem‟s meaning. It is the walk itself that matters, the experience of reliving the reality 
once lived but now memorised, the linguistic reality that by itself is an unredeemable 
„abstraction,‟ „a bowl of rose-leaves‟ covered by the dust of having been dead for a 
while. The poem does not know „to what purpose‟ it is „[d]isturbing‟ this dust. 
Nevertheless, it intensifies the movement of bringing these now metaphorical roses to 
life, by crowding the garden with more echoes, „[o]ther echoes,‟ of both the voices 
speaking to us, of the bird, and of other presences yet unknown of which the bird 
speaks. We are about to find what these presences are, if only we agree to „follow the 
deception of the thrush‟ and go „[t]through the first gate, / Into our first world‟ to which 
we are now rather impatiently invited for an encounter with the existents of the poem‟s 
reality which we do not yet know. 
                                                 
7
 This conflation of the linguistic texture of the poem with the landscape has been read as the 
manifestation of the Eliotic transformation of the Romantic landscape poems of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. Spurr supplements Bornstein‟s thematic reading of this relationship with a stylistic analysis 
(80-95). Hansen traces Eliot‟s use and transformation of the Romantic landscape techniques enabling the 
aesthetic effect of Four Quartets back to five short landscape poems of Eliot‟s published in his Collected 
Poems in 1936. 
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The rose-garden of Burnt Norton 
Visited as a part of the programme of the inaugural T. S. Eliot International Summer 
School, June-July 2009. 
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My words echo 
Thus, in your mind. 
  But to what purpose 
Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves 
I do not know. 
  Other echoes 
Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow? 
Quick, said the bird, find them, find them, 
Round the corner. Through the first gate, 
Into our first world, shall we follow 
The deception of the thrush? Into our first world. 
There they were, dignified, invisible, 
Moving without pressure, over the dead leaves, 
In the autumn heat, through the vibrant air, 
And the bird called, in response to 
The unheard music hidden in the shrubbery, 
And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses 
Had the look of the flowers that are looked at. 
They were as our guests, accepted and accepting. 
(BN I, CPP 171-172) 
 
To enter and experience the poem‟s world, we must suspend our sense of truth, 
the knowledge of the world as we experience it outside the poem‟s world, and follow its 
voice of aesthetic deception instead: „shall we follow / The deception of the thrush?‟ 
The thrush is a bird likely to be heard in the garden of Burnt Norton. But its song cannot 
say anything unless we imbue it with meanings, just like we do when reading words 
while looking at letters on the page, meaningless black strokes on the white sheet of 
paper unless they are perceived as words. The Waste Land presented us with Philomel‟s 
fate to speak by her birdsong only the pain of the violence to which she had been 
subjected because this is what is heard in it by „the dirty ears‟ (CPP 64) that know her 
story. But Four Quartets turns the helplessness of Philomel the nightingale into the 
power of language to convey for us a sense of lived reality, through a material form, 
sound, that in itself means nothing, no more than the song of a bird, unless we hear it as 
meaningful. This poem also knows that the reality it is bringing to life is an imagined 
reality, „a deception,‟ the reality for the experience of which we must forget that it is 
being staged for us by the poem‟s language. Only on this condition of eliminating our 
awareness of the communicative act itself will the poem‟s worlds come to life. Water 
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will appear in the pool of sunlight and will reflect the roses that are, at first, „dignified, 
invisible.‟ Only after some time of „[m]oving without pressure, over the dead leaves‟ 
they will be identified as roses, tentatively, through an anaphoric repetition in the lines 
insistently pointing to them, „There they were.‟ And they will be found only if the 
watching eye accepts the imperative of the poem to „find them,‟ in determination to 
identify what the poem makes this watching eye to see. 
The vision of the roses in the pool follows, as I have described. The dynamics of 
its development, the epiphanic moment of its completion, and its abrupt disappearance 
are all driven by the aesthetic law of immediate perception, perception itself mimicked 
in the significative tensions of the language in which the vision is presented. The 
movement closes with the poem‟s self-reflection after the world it has created has gone: 
Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children, 
Hidden excitedly, containing laughter. 
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind 
Cannot bear very much reality. 
Time past and time future 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
(BN I, CPP 172) 
 
The bird reappears, now to bid a farewell, telling us to go, not into but from the 
world it has led us to, the garden being left full of yet unrealised living existents. The 
leaves of the garden, like the words of the poem, are „full of children, / Hidden 
excitedly, containing laughter‟ in an anticipation of the joy of discovery once they are 
found, as were the roses. Then the bird turns back on the experience we have just had 
and justifies our submission to the temptation of delimiting reality, deceiving ourselves 
as we followed the thrush and experiencing the world just pictured as if it was real: 
„human kind cannot bear very much reality,‟ the thrush says. This kind of deception is 
given to us together with our identity in kind as human beings. The poem is soon to 
speak of the given limitation of our vision as a blessing, protecting us from all that 
„[w]hich flesh cannot endure‟ (BN II, CPP 173). And the movement concludes with a 
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reiteration of the definitive dimensions of the stage on which the action has taken place, 
the eternal present of linguistic consciousness which has at its disposal all reality there 
is, past, present and future, this stage now cleared for another enactment of the same 
kind of perceptual-significative vision, another world to be experienced in reading the 
poem‟s language. 
 
■ 
The first movement of „Burnt Norton‟ stages the event of meaningful experience, at the 
same time exposing the structures of experiencing reality that enable this event. Its 
language, assuming the involvement of a reading eye and mind turning it into living 
discourse, enacts this event with a double purpose: to give a specific, particular aesthetic 
experience which it is, but also to look into what this experience is as experience per se. 
This reflective viewpoint frames the vision of the Burnt Norton roses on the narrative 
plane, speaking before and after the event the poem has staged. But it is also marked by 
the shift in register, a philosophical contemplation on how reality is given to experience 
opening and closing the movement, with an example of the kind of experience the poem 
is talking about given in the middle. Unlike most of the longer movements of the poem, 
this one is a single verse paragraph, with only two line breaks marking the moment of 
entry into the rose-garden of Burnt Norton, the lines foregrounded by these breaks in 
themselves a reflection on the action that is about to be performed: „But to what purpose 
/ Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves / I do not know‟ (CPP 171). This 
reflection is given after the narrative has already begun: footfalls that echo in the 
memory and the passage to the rose-garden that was not taken have just been 
mentioned. This reflection, rather, withholds the narrative action just as the scene has 
been set for it, slowing it down, exposing the dividing line between the world in which 
the speech act of the poem takes place and the world it constructs for the aesthetic 
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experience to happen. The event of meaningful experience is framed by reflection on 
what it is sequentially, by being reflected on before and after its enactment, but this 
reflecting point of view is also there while the event takes place, accompanying the 
experience of it throughout, reminding of its presence here and there. 
Thus the opening movement of „Burnt Norton‟ attempts to keep its feet on two 
grounds: to observe the sequential logic of language and perception, in the interweaving 
of which the poem creates its aesthetic visions, and simultaneously signal the constant 
presence of the reflecting eye that is never fully subsumed by the experience that the 
poem speaks. In this attempt, the movement presents the structural model of which the 
whole of Four Quartets is an expansion. This expansion takes place as a repetition of 
the kind of self-sufficient movements as the opening of „Burnt Norton‟ is, though the 
kind of self-sufficiency and the logic of inner cohesion vary from movement to 
movement – every one of them creates its own world. This repetition has a cumulative 
effect, for the poem‟s visions and reflections echo one another both verbally and 
semantically, comment on what has been said before, and specify and expand 
distinctions and links used as self-evident elsewhere. The poem as if keeps saying the 
same from yet another point of view, in yet another register. As Eric Gould puts it, 
Eliot‟s Four Quartets [...] are nothing if not a grand hermeneutic of poetry, a 
display of the poet‟s concern not simply with watching himself write, but with 
summing up the fate of poetry as the fate of language and reading. [...] The 
function of the poem‟s narrative is to carry a message in patterns which are 
repetitive, dialectical, even cybernetic, for the patterns are constantly evolved as 
functions of the reader‟s consciousness of the poem and of the limits imposed on 
poetry by language. (131-132) 
 
This network of expanding self-commentary which the poem is does not accept 
any outside logic of ordering. Neither the conceptual hierarchy of the philosophical kind 
nor narrative continuity, the literary principle of coherence, is strong enough to 
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assimilate the poem into their kind of cohesion.
8
 The reading eye is left with the poem‟s 
language one to one, to follow its shifts of register and the overlapping motifs of its 
formally self-sufficient movements and to experience the emergence of meanings that 
the reading mind itself constructs in its interpretative effort. This experience is the 
purpose of the poem‟s speech act, „[d]isturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves‟ (BN I, 
CPP 171), its self-sufficient aim.
9
 
„Burnt Norton,‟ however, does not only disturb this dust but also directs the 
energy of the disturbance into an aesthetic experience of meaningfulness, which 
develops sequentially. There is the beginning, the development towards an epiphanic 
vision, and the end, this enclosure marked both by the narrative logic of the vision of 
the roses and by the explicitly reflective stance that the speaking voice takes as it opens 
and closes the movement with a contemplation on temporality and presence. This 
sequential logic of enclosing the enacted event organises the whole of Four Quartets,
10
 
                                                 
8
 Spurr hears in Four Quartets two kinds of discourse, one associated with intellect and doctrine while the 
other is linked to the visionary poetic imagination (77-107). Spurr demonstrates these two kinds of 
discourses working against each other and finally concludes that Four Quartets claims idealistic 
triumphant resolutions, such as „a reconciliation of the temporal and the eternal, or human suffering and 
divine love [...] without having developed a textual unity that would make them wholly convincing,‟ the 
narrative line of the poem picturing „the actual experience of textual, psychological, and metaphysical 
disunity‟ (104). Stead reads Four Quartets as a failed attempt of Eliot‟s to establish an alliance between 
„pure discourse and pure Image,‟ in the line of the English poetic tradition that „has always occupied the 
middle ground‟ between emphasising poetic vision and speaking in metrically organised prose (175-185). 
Leavis reads this structure of Four Quartets as Eliot‟s strategy of evasion, as he „has no intellectually 
statable answer in his mind for us to elicit from the “music”‟ of the poem (174), also interpreting it as a 
poetic failure (155-264). Eliot criticism around and after the linguistic turn interprets the poem‟s 
resistance to logical ordering as a positive aesthetic programme of Eliot‟s manifest throughout his writing, 
the core of this programme seen in Eliot‟s challenging of the validity of logical thought and the resultant 
cross-contamination of philosophical, critical and poetic discourses (Davidson, Ellmann, Freed, Gould, 
Perl, Riquelme, Spanos). 
9
 To this demand of the poem a number of Eliot‟s readers respond by interpreting Eliot through the trope 
of figuration, most productively in reading Four Quartets but also underlying Eliot‟s writing beyond this 
poem (Ellmann, Jay, Riquelme). In Brooker and Bentley‟s study of The Waste Land this aspect appears 
by way of their insistence, on Eliot‟s behalf, on the primacy of the process of the reading act over the text 
itself, this displacement from the structure of language to its process emerging most explicitly in reading 
the closing movements of all parts of Four Quartets next to Derrida‟s „Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences‟ (8; 5). In Ricks, the processual aspect of Eliot‟s poetry appears under 
the term of animation, its energy in surplus in the early poetry, to the point of Eliot‟s failing to control the 
range of meanings it produces, while Four Quartets fully controls this energy, which has made some of 
Eliot‟s readers feel that this poetry „lessened in its life‟ (207). 
10
 James Olney‟s reading of Four Quartets focuses on and exposes its construction of aesthetic unity as 
heavily relying on sequential logic: the poem presents a concentrated reiteration of the major motifs 
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which is the matter of my concern in the closing section of this chapter. Before I move 
to it, I want to look into the poem‟s articulation of the structure that enables its own 
significative process, the split between the knowing and the experiencing point of view. 
It follows from Eliot‟s philosophical premises that this split is the fundamental given of 
our perception of all reality. And Four Quartets begins exposing this split from the very 
beginning: as early as in „Burnt Norton‟ I, it is manifest in the distinction between the 
experience of temporality and the presence of all time as linguistic consciousness. In 
fact, its articulation begins already on the threshold of the poem: the Heraclitean 
epigraphs that Eliot gives in Greek articulate the dimensions that define this split. The 
first epigraph – „But although the Logos is common the many live as though they had 
private understanding‟ (Riquelme 204) – highlights the distinction between the shared 
linguistic structure and the act of understanding linguistic meaning which is always a 
private, individual experience. And the second epigraph – „The way up and down [or to 
and fro] is one and the same‟ (Riquelme 202) – states the complementarity between the 
stasis of an existent „objective‟ structure of reality (the way) and the motion of 
experience in which it manifests itself to the experiencing point of view, this motion 
bound to have a specific direction (up and down, or to and fro).
11
 An awareness of this 
split never leaves the poem‟s discourse, the dichotomy of knowledge and experience 
                                                                                                                                               
developed in its course in the closing twenty lines of „Little Gidding,‟ the network of semantic and 
rhythmic patterns falling together into a poetic statement of existential unity (275-299). Without referring 
to Knowledge and Experience, Olney relies on the same basic premise as Eliot‟s: that the self is 
synonymous with the world in which it lives because they merge in conscious experience of the world as 
meaningful, so that „a work like Four Quartets stands for the whole integrated psyche of mankind; it 
becomes, for the moment, an epitome representation of the human effort towards consciousness‟ (261). 
Even though Olney places a far more explicit emphasis on the self than Eliot‟s philosophy and criticism 
readily accept, his conclusion about Four Quartets insists that the poem aims to lead the reader to a 
moment of experiencing the oneness of being without allowing for the conceptualisation of what it is 
(299). 
11
 Riquelme ascribes the function of a structural model to the whole poem – which I located in the first 
movement of „Burnt Norton‟ – to the epigraphs and the Heraclitean a-logical discourse in general (199-
275 passim; especially 203-207, 330-333). While I agree with Riquelme‟s reading, my response to Four 
Quartets is that it is a remarkably self-sufficient poem: it creates a dense intertextual network to manifest 
its own belonging to the culture in which it speaks, but it incorporates structures of interpretative value 
found in them in its own textual tissue, as if weaving an inner intertextual web of self-commentary. Thus 
while the epigraphs articulate distinctions that underlie the meaningful experience of reality, the opening 
movement of „Burnt Norton‟ begins by exposing their interaction, both the network of significant 
distinctions and the exposition expanded in the rest of the poem. 
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punctuating its discourse explicitly (EC II, CPP 179; DS II, CPP 186-187), as well as 
underlying its imagery and contemplation as it does in „Burnt Norton‟ I. But the most 
direct articulation of the splitting point of view is the ghost scene of „Little Gidding,‟ 
the object of my attention immediately below. 
 
 
A NARRATIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE EXPERIENCING-AND-LINGUISTIC POINT OF 
VIEW: ELIOT’S GHOST IN THE ACT OF READING 
 
Eliot‟s readers disagree about the aesthetic effect of the ghost scene in Four Quartets, 
but very few readings leave the scene out of the scope of their attention. This scene 
indeed stands out in the poem in a similar way as does the Tiresias episode in The Waste 
Land. It is the longest passage in Four Quartets written in a consistent metrical pattern, 
and it is the only one that presents a clearly developed, conventional narrative line. Just 
as in The Waste Land, these two characteristics foreground the scene as an island of 
coherence in a poetic sequence that as a whole does not rely on any immediately 
identifiable structure of aesthetic unity. To complete the list of correspondences, the 
ghost scene in Four Quartets also, like the figure of Tiresias, presents a structure of 
meta-commentary. In The Waste Land, Eliot ensures this status for Tiresias‟s figure by 
explicitly stating it in the Notes, in itself a paratextual supplement to the main body of a 
poem that is defined generically by the function of a critical reflection on the text to 
which it is attached. The ghost scene in Four Quartets, as one would expect in a poem 
of inclusion, has a structure of self-reflection integrated into its narrative. The ghost 
speaks to the poetic persona as the voice of memory and reflection on the life 
experience now past – „I may not comprehend, may not remember,‟ the persona says to 
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the ghost in asking it to speak – and then predicts what is ahead for the poet, as the 
ghost goes on to „disclose the gifts reserved for age / To set a crown upon [the poet‟s] 
lifetime‟s effort‟ (LG II, CPP 194). Four Quartets in itself is commonly seen as a poem 
that closes up Eliot‟s poetic career, both because it is the last poetic sequence he wrote 
and because it resolves a range of aesthetic tensions that may be observed developing in 
the earlier poems. The dialogue between Eliot‟s persona and the ghost makes an explicit 
claim for this function: it stages a discursive structure in which this kind of reflection is 
performed. It is not just „the substance of the poem‟ (WL, CPP 78) that the ghost‟s eye 
sees and comments on in Four Quartets but the entire life experience of the poet who 
wrote it. 
Critics inscribe this scene into the biographical narrative of Eliot‟s poetic 
development, trying to identify the ghost with literary voices that are significant to 
Eliot‟s self-conception as a poet, this move encouraged by direct and implicit references 
to them that turn the ghost into a composite figure of authority, an imagined poet-master 
of Eliot. Thus the associations of the ghost with Dante and Yeats are even more explicit 
in Eliot‟s drafts than in the final version of the poem (Gardner, The Composition of Four 
Quartets 67; 174, 186-189) which, when read on its own terms, still contains allusions 
that make the presence of these voices unmissable. Dante is heard throughout the 
passage in the Eliotic rendering of the terza rima. And Yeats speaks most clearly in the 
metaphor of a poet having to „move in measure, like a dancer,‟ even if numerous other 
allusions to him escape instant identification by the reading eye (LG II, CPP 195). 
Alongside these two figures, the ghost just as often has been associated with Swift 
(Bush 230-234) but also Mallarmé and King Hamlet‟s spirit (Donoghue 234, 279-282), 
while one of the most extensive lists also includes Milton and Pound (Kenner 274). This 
is indeed „a familiar compound ghost / Both intimate and unidentifiable,‟ composed of 
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many figures Eliot „had known, forgotten, half recalled / Both one and many‟ (LG II, 
CPP 193). 
In contrast to these readings defining the significance of the ghost scene in the 
authorial context, I want to foreground its functional value in directing the significative 
process of the reading act, with a particular emphasis on the formal singularity of this 
scene in the context of the sequence of Four Quartets. The ghost episode stands out as 
the only instance of a fully staged dialogue in the whole poem. Though the poem has an 
assertive speaking „I‟ throughout its lines, the addressee of this speaking voice is always 
the reader, except for this one passage where the reader is an outside observer of the 
communicative act in which she is not involved. This scene also ascribes the viewpoint 
of reflection (this viewpoint manifest throughout the poem in its shifts of register and 
the explicitly self-reflective remarks of the speaking voice) to another persona than the 
speaker, the ghost. This articulates the full network of distinctions that distinguish the 
points of view involved in the discursive structure of the poem as a speech act in a 
clearly set representational structure. The reader is an outside observer, the speaking 
persona is the narrator and the character in the narrative he tells, and the event is his 
encounter with another narrative agent, the ghost. Distinctions between the narrating 
voice and the voices speaking in the space of the event narrated are clear: there is no 
ambiguity about the identities of the speaking voices, since all shifts are signalled by 
quotation marks, while the speaker is also identified by verbs of reporting. This clarity 
of distinctions between the points of view and the representational planes to which they 
belong is exceptional, for it appears nowhere else in Four Quartets, a poem that 
consistently builds its aesthetic effects on just the opposite, merging the representational 
planes in which it speaks, as I observed it happening in the opening movement of „Burnt 
Norton.‟ If the reader has been experiencing these ambiguities as a source of suspense 
demanding constant interpretative attention, the ghost scene appears as the culmination 
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and the resolution of this suspense, presenting an episode in which all points of view are 
clearly distinguished from one another. 
This clarity serves at least two other functions in the overall structure of the 
poem. The most obvious function is performative: in a most straightforward way, the 
ghost scene of „Little Gidding‟ performs for the reader the kind of action in which the 
reader herself is participating while reading the poem‟s lines. The poem thus articulates 
the reader‟s experience;, and parallels on the narrative plane between the reader‟s 
relationship with the poet and the poet‟s with the ghost are obvious. Just as the ghost of 
the dead master is a voice of authority to Eliot‟s poetic persona, so Eliot‟s voice (the 
voice of Four Quartets) is a poetic authority to the reader. And just as the ghost‟s poetic 
identity is composite, „[b]oth intimate and unidentifiable‟ (LG II, CPP 193), so is 
Eliot‟s, in this passage particularly assertively as his persona speaks in the voices of the 
poets that constitute the compound identity of the ghost. But more importantly, such a 
clear representational structure – every point of view, every voice located where it 
belongs – makes unmissable the point where the split of a viewpoint actually happens 
and multiplies until it is controlled by a representational structure such as that of the 
ghost scene. This event is marked by the ambiguous identity of the speaking viewpoint, 
such ambiguity inevitable at the moment of split, which singles it out as a point of 
departure from the norm of the episode in which it appears. The ghost scene stands out 
of the whole poem by manifesting a singularly clear network of distinctions between 
points of view participating in it in order to create the context for foregrounding the 
articulation of the core event, the splitting of the point of view, which appears as a point 
of ambiguity in the clear structure of the section. 
This split viewpoint results from the Eliotic premise of the irreducible 
experiential point of view. This irreducibility means that every moment of articulated 
„knowledge,‟ as soon as it is perceived as an articulation, appears against the 
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background of non-articulate experience manifest as the actuality of perception itself. 
This premise underlies the argument of Knowledge and Experience throughout as 
Eliot‟s insistence on the necessity for every epistemological system to take into account 
the experiential ground on which it inevitably builds. In „Little Gidding,‟ the premise of 
the irreducible experiential point of view is performed rather than philosophically 
argued. The model of the representational structure for this performance Eliot finds in 
Hamlet, King Hamlet‟s apparition comprising the crucial elements of the splitting point 
of view, as I have discussed in the previous chapter. „Little Gidding‟ gives a concise and 
modified version of this appearance, turning it into the event of the splitting viewpoint 
and compressing its articulation into four lines: 
 So I assumed a double part, and cried 
 And heard another‟s voice cry: „What! are you here? 
        Although we were not. I was still the same, 
 Knowing myself yet being someone other. 
(LG II, CPP 193) 
 
This compression eliminates the narrative suspense in which the Ghost appears 
in Hamlet: it directly articulates the structure of the split of the point of view instead of 
narrativising it and in this way focuses attention on the split itself. However, even 
though the appearance of the Ghost in Hamlet is spread over three acts of the play, it 
also contains a direct articulation giving the gist of what may be behind the larger 
narrative in which the ghost appears, in the form of what seems to be an almost 
accidental pun. Hamlet, while being unsure about the identity of the ghost, speaks to it, 
gives it a name and, with this name, a voice: it is after the Ghost is named King Hamlet 
that it is heard to speak (1.4-5). The act of naming in Hamlet‟s first address to the Ghost 
does not instantly mark the distinction between Prince Hamlet and King Hamlet: 
Hamlet says „I‟ll call thee Hamlet,‟ and only then specifies „King, father, royal Dane‟ 
(1.4.25-26). This pun on names is a concentrated expression of the Eliotic vision of the 
narrative function of the Ghost I have described. Naming the Ghost (a figure of an 
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indeterminate identity whose presence is nevertheless somehow felt) with his own 
name, Hamlet as if delegates a part of himself to it, marking a split in his subjectivity 
and yet simultaneously keeping a claim on this instated other viewpoint as his own 
through the sameness of the name. „Little Gidding‟ conceptualises this complex 
ambivalence in two lines, its persona saying: „So I assumed a double part, and cried / 
And heard another‟s voice cry: “What! are you here?”‟ (LG II, CPP 193). In the 
immediate reading of the ghost‟s reply, the emphasised „you‟ refers to the speaking 
persona, in the same structure in which King Hamlet‟s Ghost addresses Prince Hamlet 
the moment it has a voice to speak. But the Eliotic persona is already a split viewpoint, 
and this split is marked in the subsequent line by the persona‟s self-reference in first 
person plural rather than singular: „Although we were not,‟ the line says. This plural 
then again turns into singular, the speaking voice saying „I was still the same;‟ and its 
singularity is split again, now in terms that identify the kind of difference between the 
two viewpoints, inassimilable to one another and yet co-existing in one persona; the one 
that knows oneself and the other that is „someone other;‟ the one being the point of view 
of knowledge and the other that of immediate experience. 
This identification of the two viewpoints within the self-perception of the 
speaker is followed by a look at the ghost: 
I was still the same, 
Knowing myself yet being someone other –  
And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed 
        To compel the recognition they preceded. 
(LG II, CPP 193-194) 
 
In Dante, the persona looks into the face of Brunetto‟s spirit closely, „so that the 
scorching of his face could not / prevent my mind from recognizing him;‟ and he speaks 
to the spirit explicitly face to face, „lowering my face to meet his face‟ (Dante, Inferno 
XV.27-29). In Shakespeare, Hamlet‟s Ghost appears to Horatio with his beaver up 
(1.1.37-38), so that Horatio can see its face and describe it to Prince Hamlet as „more / 
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In sorrow than in anger‟ and „very pale,‟ having looked straight in the Ghost‟s eyes, 
able to say to Hamlet that the Ghost had „fixed his eyes‟ upon him „[m]ost constantly‟ 
(1.2.229-232). But the Eliotic ghost‟s face is „down-turned,‟ and it remains „a face still 
forming,‟ never emerging in a properly shaped form that would mark the ghost‟s 
identity. Instead, the ghost speaks in the voice of the fully fledged authority of a master 
poet in the rest of the terza rima passage. And the fact of the ghost‟s identity lying in 
the voice rather than in the face is stated as early as in the expository lines just quoted: 
„the words sufficed / To compel the recognition they preceded.‟ Recognition comes 
through words – words give the ghost its identity; while the face – the unique wholeness 
of one‟s non-linguistic, bodily identity – never forms: it is „a face still forming‟ before 
the ghost gives its speech, and it is never mentioned either in the course of the 
interaction or after. Instead of turning the ghost into a more definable figure, the closure 
of the scene lets its ghostly indeterminacy contaminate the persona‟s perception of 
everything he notes as perceived. The street where the ghost leaves him is „disfigured.‟ 
The ghost leaves „with a kind of valediction‟ rather than a proper farewell; and it goes 
away by fading, an indeterminate, unspecifiable kind of the decline in presence (LG II, 
CPP 195). Just as in the first, prototypical vision of the poem in the rose-garden of 
Burnt Norton (and in Hamlet, the Shakespearean ghostly presence in this passage) the 
ghost‟s disappearance is marked by an intrusion from without, now by „the blowing of 
the horn‟ (LG II, CPP 195). 
 
■ 
John Paul Riquelme reads the terza rima passage in continuity with the first half of the 
second movement of „Little Gidding,‟ the three verse paragraphs preceding the scene of 
the encounter with the ghost being the most extensive of all allusions to Heraclitus in 
Four Quartets (333). Eliot‟s description of the exchange between elements here 
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functions in a similar way as epigraphs: they are a commentary on the performative 
action that is about to begin, not as much on the thematic plane as structurally, the terza 
rima scene enacting the Heraclitean logic in Four Quartets. Heraclitus appears as 
another half-presence, though of a somewhat different kind from the ghosts of Dante 
and Yeats, for it is the communicative situation of writing itself that this poem models 
in the kind of indeterminacy Eliot creates through the mediation of the Heraclitean kind 
of discourse. „When Eliot echoes and translates Heraclitus, he echoes something as 
insubstantial and impalpable as a ghost,‟ says Riquelme, a process he sees enacted in 
the ghost scene. This scene, then, is an allegory of the writing situation where Eliot 
assumes „the persona of Dante, which turns out also to be a composite ghostly figure‟ 
that appears in „the curious process of both conjuring and echoing a ghost‟ (Riquelme 
208). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the Eliotic ghost of multiple identities is conjured up, 
so that it appears in the here-and-now of the writing-and-reading process; and yet it is 
simultaneously echoed – that is, it is not present in the here-and-now of the writing-and-
reading act, for an echo is heard only when the origin of the sound, the voice, is at a 
distance from the here-and-now of the field in the actual presence. This merging of 
presence and absence through the indeterminacy of the originating voice is, Riquelme 
goes on to explain, how this poem makes the experience it conveys in its lines 
happening here-and-now, enabling us to „experience the poem as if it were in some 
uncanny ways ours‟ (209). Though, Riquelme says, „it is not property in the ordinary 
sense, not even the poet‟s,‟ we appropriate it by investing the poem‟s language with 
past experiences that are memories of our own: „As we encounter and trace echoes in 
the reading process, the poem‟s language becomes ours to remember, even though we 
know its origins always through mediations‟ (209). Eliot enables this relocation of the 
experience of the language that the poem speaks from the authorial viewpoint to the 
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readerly by an implied „overlap between the reading and the writing of his poem since 
his experience of writing also took the form of recollecting something not his, including 
passages from the work of other writers, which his poem can cause us to remember‟ 
(209). 
This description indeed is fully compatible with the Eliotic understanding of 
how language, through memory, brings experience to life in the act of linguistic 
communication, as described in Knowledge and Experience (49-50). But there is more 
behind this process than the intertextual network of shared literary experiences 
permeating our linguistic memory, as Riquelme‟s description suggests. The memory 
that Four Quartets exploits is not only the memory of what we know to have been 
someone else‟s, the experience now past, but also – and perhaps primarily – the 
memory of what has been going in the poem itself. This poem works on the premise of 
the ghostly half-presence of meaning in language, assuming that the space which, in 
language, is given up to absence is the space of immediate experience, inaccessible to 
linguistic articulation. The half visible face of the ghost is the image through which it 
communicates the inaccessibility of another‟s experience, for experience is rooted in the 
body and the other‟s body is not accessible to me. And yet this face is visible to an 
extent, as another body similar to mine, and I can experience the reality it experiences 
by imagining my body being that other body and responding, in my body, to the 
immediate reality of that other body. That experience is other experience but it is also 
mine because I live it through my body. It is both observed by my perceiving eye and 
yet also immediately experienced through my sensory imagination. Four Quartets 
contemplates and enacts this split in point of view with the aim of unifying the distinct 
modes of apprehending reality that each of them marks into one meaningful experience, 
one meaning. The poem opens its vision by recognising, and explicitly identifying, the 
unstoppable splitting of the experiencing point of view whereby it understands the 
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reality present to it. But it also encloses all these points of view in the singularity of 
immediate experience the poem assumes to accompany all these splits in the reading 
act, until they implode in the paradoxical visionary oneness of the fire and the rose. 
The ground which enables this paradoxical oneness to take place is in the 
structure of the split of the point of view exposed in the play with pronouns as Eliot‟s 
persona gives the ghost a voice. The distinction that it articulates is not, as it might be 
thought of in a conventionally narrative interpretation of these lines, between Eliot‟s 
own consciousness and what Eliot would have imagined to be Dante‟s consciousness or 
Yeats‟s, but between two modes of apprehending reality, knowing and being. It is the 
distinction between and the unity of these two modes of being in the world that is 
enacted in the opening part of the encounter with the ghost, as Eliot‟s persona assumes 
„a double part,‟ speaks in two voices, simultaneously crying himself and hearing 
„another‟s voice cry‟ the same words, and then remarks, now in yet another voice, that 
of himself as the narrator who remembers and tells us about the event being staged for 
us in his narrative: „Although we were not. I was still the same, / Knowing myself yet 
being someone other‟ (LG II, CPP 193). This last sentence is an Eliotic definition of the 
meaningful wholeness of being. It grasps both the distinction between and the co-
existence of different modes of experiencing reality, opposed in the complementary 
dichotomy of knowledge and experience. The persona is („I was‟) the same, and knows 
this sameness as consisting of „knowing‟ himself and „being‟ someone other. 
This distinction between knowing oneself and being someone other is radical: 
„being‟ never assimilates into „knowing,‟ it is always „being someone other‟ than that 
which is known. On the narrative plane, the ghost marks the viewpoint of knowing: its 
speech is the poet‟s own reflection on his life, given in the voice of an imagined „dead 
master,‟ with the authority of wisdom and knowledge that it implies. But the identity of 
„someone other‟ is ambivalent. The same narrative logic suggests that this „someone 
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other‟ is the persona of whom the ghost speaks, the persona of the present of their 
interaction. Yet there is also the point of view that regards both the (ghost‟s) knowing 
viewpoint and the persona being known: the viewpoint speaking to the reader. The 
narrator says „I was the same:‟ he no longer is what he was at the moment of the 
interaction with the ghost, but the eye and the voice speaking to the reader in the here-
and-now in the poem‟s lines. Neither the stance of knowing nor the self on which it 
reflects and which it characterises is the experiencing point of view, for this point of 
view is the watching eye that perceives them all but cannot perceive itself because it is 
watching. 
Every split, every point of view this watching eye sees is no longer itself, but 
always already other, already at a remove from its own being per se actualised in the act 
of seeing. This watching eye knows itself as the experience of this immediate being, a 
residue of the actuality of perception, of seeing that is unobjectifiable, invisible to itself. 
„The patient‟ – the one who suffers, who endures – „is no longer here,‟ says „The Dry 
Salvages.‟ We, travellers whom the poem addresses „are not the same people who left 
that station / Or who will arrive at any terminus.‟ Instead, the poem says, 
You who come to port, and you whose bodies 
Will suffer the trial and judgement of the sea, 
Or whatever event, this is your real destination. 
(DS III, CPP 188) 
 
Krishna, to whom these words are ascribed by „The Dry Salvages,‟ never 
specifies the destination point as a location. It is not the port to which voyagers and 
seamen being addressed come in this sentence. And in the wider context of the adjacent 
lines in which Eliot‟s persona speaks in Krishna‟s voice as well as his own (in yet 
another variant of the performance of a ghostly presence), this destination appears as the 
indeterminate, indefinable present, its spatial and temporal limits visible as that which is 
not it: 
Here between the hither and the farther shore 
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While time is withdrawn, consider the future 
And the past with an equal mind. 
(DS III, CPP 188) 
 
„Here,‟ between two shores, is the destination. It is also the temporal present, the 
moment of being „now‟ which is without limits of its own but is located between the 
past and the future, or rather in their overlapping, in the extended moment in which the 
past and the future are treated „with an equal mind‟ because they are thought of as the 
present.
12
 To „consider the „future / And the past with an equal mind‟ is to live this 
present. This present is lived in the body: the grammar of the elusive sentence by which 
Krishna addresses the travellers – „you‟ the seamen, but also us, human beings sailing 
through life – suggests that the destination he refers to is ultimately „[y]ou who come to 
port, and you whose bodies / Will suffer.‟ There is only one suffering body available to 
the poem, the reader‟s who is involved in the reading act. It is an eye that the poem 
knows to be out there to experience the reality that the poem speaks, but this eye cannot 
be specified in any more precise way than the sheer presence of the experiencing body. 
The Waste Land is disturbed by this sense of the presence of an eye it cannot identify, 
anxiously asking „Who is the third who walks always beside you? [...] Gliding wrapt in 
a brown mantle, hooded / I do not know whether a man or a woman‟ (CPP 73). But 
Four Quartets knows that it is being seen and relies on this vision, creates a network of 
paths it can take and manipulates them for this watching to reach the experience of the 
implosion of the multiple meanings of the poem into one. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 St. Augustine describes this ungraspability of the present. Since every interval of time that denotes the 
present can be split into smaller intervals (weeks into days, days into hours, hours into minutes and so 
on), it is only the indivisible fraction that can be validly called time present. „But this flies so rapidly from 
future to past that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it is extended, it is then divided into past and 
future. But the present has no extension whatever.‟ For „extension‟ here Augustine uses „spatium,‟ in 
Latin denoting extension in both space and time (256). 
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TOWARDS ‘THE END OF ALL OUR EXPLORING:’ THE ELIOTIC ONENESS OF THE FIRE 
AND THE ROSE 
 
The articulation of the split of the experiencing and understanding point of view is a 
constituent element of the poem‟s larger movement towards closure. It is these two 
points of view, as two modes of the meaningful perception of reality that the poem will 
aim to bring together at the end. This movement begins, however, much earlier than the 
ghost scene, as soon as Four Quartets steps over the middle point of its textual 
sequence, in „The Dry Salvages.‟ These signals manifest the poem‟s awareness of its 
own sequentiality in the process of reading. „Burnt Norton‟ opens by presenting the 
„first world‟ in the vision of the roses in the garden pool (BN I, CPP 171). „East Coker‟ 
opens by stating the circularity of being. „In my beginning is my end. In succession / 
Houses rise and fall‟ (EC I, CPP 177), it says implying that the moment of speaking, 
and so of present existence, is in the middle, between the beginning and the end. And it 
reasserts this directly in the closing movement, the speaker placing himself „in the 
middle way‟ (EC V, CPP 182). Here, in the middle part of its own speaking act, Four 
Quartets also explicitly reflects on the fact that it is a sequence of repetitions saying the 
same, one „way of putting it‟ following another, turning the poem itself into „a 
periphrastic study‟ (EC II, CPP 179). Again, now as it has begun approaching its close, 
the poem is more straightforward about its own intentions: „a raid on the inarticulate‟ it 
is, an effort to make sense of „the general mess of imprecision of feeling / Undisciplined 
squads of emotion,‟ this effort itself the only mode of existence there is. „For us, there is 
only the trying. The rest is not our business‟ (EC V, CPP 182). 
„The Dry Salvages‟ contemplates another kind of pattern in which reality 
appears delimited in experience while known to be all-inclusive, as the circularity of 
being thought of in the lines of „East Coker‟ is. „The Dry Salvages‟ thinks of the 
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givenness of the existential perspective in which we live, while knowing that there is an 
inexhaustible multiplicity of others. This contrast is the one between the river and the 
sea, the images with which „The Dry Salvages‟ opens: „the river / Is a strong brown 
god‟ living „within us,‟ unlike the sea which is „all about us,‟ with its „many voices, / 
Many gods and many voices.‟ This multiplicity of the voices of the sea is a metaphor of 
the multivocality that underlies the Eliotic sense of immediate reality, the bread and 
butter of The Waste Land‟s poetic structure and effect. In Four Quartets just as well 
these multiple voices are „[o]ften together heard,‟ but at least one of them „[m]easures 
time not our time [...], a time / Older than the time of chronometers.‟ The sea contains 
all there has ever been, all „that is and was from the beginning,‟ and yet its voyagers 
will fare forward; „Not fare well, / But fare forward‟ (DS I, V, CPP 184-185, 188). 
Though reality presents an inexhaustible multiplicity of perspectives, one‟s own 
existence flows in a given direction. It may be, like the river, „sullen, untamed and 
intractable,‟ but it is nevertheless „recognised as a frontier.‟ Four Quartets reminds us 
of this delimiting force which, once accepted, „[t]he problem once solved,‟ „is almost 
forgotten‟ (DS I, CPP 184). 
In „The Dry Salvages‟ the poem also shows signs of awareness of its own 
delimited perspective as seen from the present moment in which it speaks. This present 
in the poem‟s textual linearity – also the timeline of the reading act in which the poem 
lives – is the moment just after the middle point. The poetic sequence has just stepped 
into the latter half of its textual line and, consequently, of the experience of its life in the 
reading process, and it begins contemplating the nature of what it sees coming for itself, 
the end. „Where is there an end of it, the soundless wailing, / The silent withering of 
autumn flowers / Dropping their petals and remaining motionless [...]?‟ it asks, knowing 
that its own lines are soon to turn into a kind of „soundless wailing,‟ their words silently 
withering like those autumn flowers and turning into „the drifting wreckage‟ of letters 
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on the page (DS II, 185). The poem answers these questions from multiple points of 
view at once, but their summary is encapsulated at the close of „The Dry Salvages‟ in 
the name of Incarnation. „These are only hints and guesses, / Hints followed by 
guesses,‟ the poem again, while saying what it wants to say, reflects on what the act of 
saying is in itself. „[B]ut you are the music / While the music lasts:‟ you, the reader, are 
the experiencing body of the meaning of your own being played out by these words 
while they are heard, while their music lasts. 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
Of spheres of existence is actual. 
(DS V, CPP 190) 
 
There is more to the experience of this „impossible union‟ than understanding: it 
is „the gift half understood.‟ The actuality of this gift draws on other „spheres of 
existence‟ too, while the miracle of their union – „the impossible union,‟ a union that 
cannot be, for it is not known nor can be imagined to exist, and yet may be given as „the 
gift‟ – lies in the experience of the actuality itself, in its givenness to the irreducible 
„here‟ of immediate being. This actuality of the impossible union that is born in the 
merging of „spheres of existence‟ is the focus of „Little Gidding‟ where the ghost, the 
pre-figuration of the miracle of incarnation and the proto-structure of the experience of 
the event of meaning that this poem aims to convey, finally appears. 
If „The Dry Salvages‟ only hints to the coming closure while developing a 
subject matter of its own, „Little Gidding‟ weaves the texture of its poetry by tying up 
threads that have been the matter of the poem‟s pattern so far. „Burnt Norton,‟ for 
example, „can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where. / And I cannot say, 
how long, for this is to place it in time‟ (BN I, CPP 173). But „Little Gidding‟ – though 
knowing, as it would coming after „The Dry Salvages,‟ that „[t]here are other places / 
Which also are the world‟s end, some at the sea jaws‟ – assertively points to the locus of 
its being: „this is the nearest, in place and time, / Now and in England‟ (LG I, CPP 192). 
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„East Coker‟ asserts the imperative of „the fight to recover what has been lost / And 
found and lost again and again‟ against the background of doubt about the success of 
the ceaseless „trying‟ to make sense of the world. This ongoing effort is what „East 
Coker‟ understands to be its existential given, an effort pursued regardless of the 
awareness that it brings „perhaps neither gain nor loss‟ (EC V, CPP 182). But „Little 
Gidding‟ does not have to kill its own hope as does „East Coker‟ by stating its 
commitment while renouncing the hope of accomplishing its own attempt. „Little 
Gidding‟ – a textual analogue, a linguistic map of the „significant soil‟ that Little 
Gidding has been – is the place „[w]here the prayer has been valid‟ and, having had this 
experience and remembering it, it knows exactly what needs to be done for the miracle 
to happen: 
If you came this way, 
Taking any route, starting from anywhere, 
At any time or at any season, 
It would always be the same: you would have to put off 
Sense and notion. 
(LG I, CPP 192) 
 
On the textual plane, in „Little Gidding‟ rather than in Little Gidding, where the 
poem weaves its network of self-referentiality, this is a greeting of the reader at the final 
destination of the reading journey that is approaching its end. The poem marks the 
reader‟s encounter with itself in the perspective of the reader‟s existence and in that of 
its own. To have come „this way‟ means to have read the poem this far, keeping the 
expectation the poem knows it has not fulfilled yet, whatever routes of building 
coherence have been taken and wherever they have began: in the first world of „Burnt 
Norton‟ as the textual linearity of the poem sets it out for us, or in the middle way of 
„East Coker,‟ or in „The Dry Salvages‟ foreseeing the poem‟s end. This multiplicity of 
routes is enabled by the split between, on the one hand, what is textually given as the 
defined sequence of the poem‟s words that must be read in this given linearity in order 
to understand what the poem is saying and, on the other, the experience of this given 
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texture of words, which can and inescapably does take multiple routes to understand 
what it means. This split extends to a reference to the reader‟s existence outside the 
experience of the poem in the reading act. Any routes could have been taken, starting 
anywhere, to approach the poem and this point in its textual linearity, but the poem 
itself and the experience expected „would always be the same,‟ in the same way as one‟s 
being in Little Gidding is always „now and in England.‟ 
To appreciate this place for what it is, to experience a moment of 
meaningfulness for which we have come this way, we „would have to put off / Sense 
and notion:‟ to forget ourself, suspend our awareness of the body and mind – sense and 
notion, experience and knowledge – that shape the meaning of reality for us, and trust 
the place where we are – „Little Gidding‟ as well as Little Gidding – to shape its reality 
for us to experience while we are here. Giving up everything we know and submitting 
to the poem‟s language is the „condition of complete simplicity / (Costing no less than 
everything)‟ that the poem wants us to accept, promising that „all shall be well‟ (LG V, 
198). This is the kind of humility that is endless, as spoken about in „East Coker,‟ „[t]he 
only wisdom we can hope to acquire,‟ if only we overcome our „fear of possession, of 
belonging to another, or to others, or to God‟ (EC II, CPP 179). This humility in the 
anticipation of the otherness it is about to bring demands elimination of any vision of 
what might be coming, so that the unknown reality can be experienced for what it is but 
not for what we want it to be: 
Or when, under ether, the mind is conscious but conscious of nothing – 
I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope 
For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without love 
For love would be love of the wrong thing; there is yet faith 
But the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting. 
Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought: 
So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing. 
(EC III, CPP180) 
 
This anticipation without imagining an object being anticipated is an 
anticipation of the gift, of the impossible union experienced as the actuality of spheres 
215 
 
of existence that „The Dry Salvages‟ names Incarnation. „Little Gidding‟ rearticulates 
the inarticulability of its miracle, and the condition for it to take place. All knowledge 
we already have, all preconceived assumptions, and even a wilful disposition to learn 
what we do not know yet, accepting in advance the authority of this newly discovered 
knowledge, are only a hindrance for the miracle we have come to experience: „You are 
not here to verify, / Instruct yourself, or inform curiosity / Or carry report.‟ This is the 
answer of Four Quartets to the question Eliot asked in Knowledge and Experience of 
„how and how far we come into contact with [the] world of absolute order‟ (KE 90): it is 
out of immediate experience – „a felt whole‟ (KE 155, emphasis mine) of the pre-
linguistic real, also the totality of the perceived „before distinctions and relations have 
been developed‟ (KE 16) – that „moments of knowledge‟ (KE 155) arise as if by 
themselves. These moments of insight cannot be predicted or expected, for they are 
shaped by experience itself in the process of the direct pre-reflective perception of that 
which is given. Our journey always begins with immediate experience, while 
knowledge – „complete experience‟ which is the Absolute (KE 31) – is the end of this 
journey through our experience of the post-immediate „world of objects [in which] we 
have time and space and selves‟ (KE 31). Only on this condition of the primacy of 
experience our knowledge is the knowledge of truth. 
In his theoretical writing, as we have seen, Eliot identifies this knowledge of 
truth that is rooted in immediate experience with faith. And so poetry, the Eliotic 
discourse of truth, is a form of prayer. Like prayer, poetry „is more than an order of 
words, the conscious occupation / Of the praying mind, or the sound of the voice 
praying.‟ The language („an order of words‟), its understanding („the conscious 
occupation of the praying mind‟) and even the immediate enactment of the pattern the 
language sets out in speaking it (in „the sound of the voice praying‟) are not what the 
promised experience is about. This list exhausts the constituents of the linguistic act, 
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leaving the only possibility of locating experience: it can only be an inconceivable 
supplement, or the supplement of the inconceivable. This unconceptualisable 
supplement of immediate experience – now in the form of „complete experience at the 
end [...] of our journey‟ which is the „harmony and cohesion‟ of the Absolute rather 
than the „annihilation and utter night‟ of the „merely immediate‟ (KE 31) – in „Little 
Gidding‟ appears in the image of the most intense bodily experience imaginable: fire. 
    And prayer is more 
Than an order of words, the conscious occupation 
Of the praying mind, or the sound of the voice praying. 
And what the dead had no speech for, when living, 
They can tell you, being dead: the communication 
Of the dead is tongued by fire beyond the language of the living. 
(LG I, CPP 192) 
 
The defining aspect of the prayer – the „more‟ that makes the prayer what it is – 
is communicated only by the dead, those who are not in the reality we know, not in the 
world of the living. And this communication comes as the inarticulable itself, not in the 
name but as the permeating pain of „fire beyond the language of the living.‟ 
This fire marking the transcendental, incommunicable experience, in its direct 
association with the dead, directly invites the Biblical frame of reference, as do the 
numerous other allusions to fire throughout Four Quartets. But at this point „Little 
Gidding‟ speaks of fire in a pun that is about to be taken further in the speech of the 
ghost, the dead master of Eliot‟s poetic persona. The communication of the dead, the 
immediate experience of the transcendental unity of the Absolute as Incarnation, is 
„tongued by fire beyond the language of the living.‟ Read in the context of the Bible, 
this word choice evokes the symbolism of Pentecost (it is „pentecostal fire‟ that marks 
the midwinter spring of the opening verse paragraph of „Little Gidding‟ [CPP 191]), a 
festival celebrating the descent of the Holy Spirit, in itself an event of Incarnation. The 
apostles first hear a strong wind that fills in the house where they are, then „there 
appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them,‟ filling 
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them with the Holy Spirit and enabling their tongues to speak in the languages of those 
they speak to, bringing them the message (Acts 2:1-11). The Holy Spirit appears to the 
apostles in „cloven tongues like as of fire:‟ it is something unnameable in form like fire, 
identified in language through a simile with something it is not. And these tongues like 
as of fire do not burn but fill the apostles with the Holy Spirit itself that comes out in 
their capacity for meaningful speech. The incarnation happens in the bodies of the 
apostles, in the perceiving bodies, and its experience is the experience of 
meaningfulness that then is spoken in languages that had been never known. 
It is this infusion of the incommunicable, immediately experienced meaning into 
the language being spoken (in itself dead, merely „an order of words, the conscious 
occupation / Of the praying mind, or the sound of the voice praying‟) that is the only 
justification of the „lifetime‟s effort‟ of Eliot‟s poetic persona. Knowledge and 
Experience has witnessed to us Eliot‟s effort to understand how „an order of words, the 
conscious occupation‟ of an inquiring mind relates to the real, immediately lived 
background of existence. And The Waste Land has conveyed, in its disorderly „order of 
words,‟ a vision of reality in which this infusion of experience into language does not 
happen. In the now of Four Quartets, these works appear as documents of past 
experiences, shaped as they are into „thoughts and theory which [have been] forgotten.‟ 
„These things have served their purpose,‟ the poem says, in a similar way as „[l]ast 
season‟s fruit‟ has, eaten by now. These things are spoken of in „last year‟s words [that] 
belong to last year‟s language,‟ while „next year‟s words await another voice‟ (LG II, 
CPP 194). It is only in the present, in the present of the experiencing and speaking 
body, that „an order of words‟ articulates meaningful experience: this experience is a 
fruit being eaten now, and once it has been eaten, „the fullfed beast shall kick the empty 
pail.‟ The meaning of this experience is spoken in the voice of the now, finding „words 
[one] never thought to speak‟ (LG II, CPP 194) – as do the apostles, speaking in 
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languages they had never known to convey their message to those by whom they want 
to be heard. 
The ghost, Eliot‟s own voice of reflection and knowledge, gives the list of the 
disillusionments that every poet is to face, every one of those disillusionments in one 
way or another denoting a failure to communicate, bring meaningful experience that 
once was there to life: in „the cold friction of expiring sense‟ or in „the laceration / Of 
laughter at what ceases to amuse‟ or, most powerfully, in „the rending pain of re-
enactment / Of all that you have done, and been.‟ The ghost concludes: 
From wrong to wrong the exasperated spirit 
Proceeds, unless restored by that refining fire 
Where you must move in measure like a dancer. 
(LG II, CPP 195) 
 
This measure of a dance does not have to be read in the voice of Yeats, since 
Four Quartets gives its own articulations of its meaning. „At the still point of the 
turning world,‟ it is the paradoxical stillness of being that is also movement; „Except for 
the point, the still point, / There would be no dance, and there is only the dance‟ (BN II, 
CPP 173). „Burnt Norton‟ has danced this dance in the enactment of the flow of 
transformations within the same field of perception in its vision of the roses reflected in 
the pool, „surrounded / By a grace of sense‟ that turned the world into a harmonious 
whole of existents present in the here-and-now of immediate being, even if only for a 
moment (BN II, CPP 173). This dance is of words that move, like music, in time, and 
yet can „after speech, reach, / Into the silence,‟ by bringing existents into the space of 
nothingness, and hold the fragile stillness of a Chinese jar that „still / Moves perpetually 
in its stillness‟ (BN V, CPP 175). And „Little Gidding‟ describes in detail this dance of 
sense that words bring to life, if only the sentence is „right,‟ 
(where every word is at home, 
Taking its place to support the others, 
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious, 
An easy commerce of the old and the new, 
The common word exact without vulgarity, 
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The formal word precise but not pedantic, 
The complete consort dancing together) 
(LG V, CPP 197) 
 
Fire marks the union of the two points of view, or modes of experiencing reality: 
the pre-articulate immediate perception and its articulated understanding merge in one 
moment of experienced meaning. Fire in Four Quartets stands for this complementary 
unity, for the immediacy of experiencing the meaning that is conveyed – somewhat 
paradoxically – through the mediation of language, in both the Christian and the poetic 
contexts that Four Quartets evokes. For Eliot, relying on the premise he elaborates in 
his anthropological papers, the premise that linguistic meaning and religious belief are 
intrinsically linked, immediacy is one and its experience is the same even though its 
meaningfulness may come through different forms of significative mediation. And so 
„Little Gidding‟ speaks of a choice that, though it must be made, is irrelevant because it 
is the choice between two versions of the same, their „tongues‟ bring the only „discharge 
from sin and error,‟ the immediate experience of truth: 
The dove descending breaks the air 
With flame of incandescent terror 
Of which the tongues declare 
The one discharge of sin and error. 
The only hope, or else despair 
 Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre –  
 To be redeemed from fire by fire. 
(LG IV, CPP 196) 
 
While the first verse paragraph of this movement of „Little Gidding‟ revokes the 
imagery of the Pentecostal gift of tongues, the Holy Spirit first announcing its presence 
by a terrifying sound and then appearing as flames, the second verse paragraph adds to 
this imagery yet another point of view, the one where fire is immediately experienced in 
the literal sense of the word, as the pain of burning: 
Who then devised the torment? Love. 
Love is the unfamiliar Name 
Behind the hands that wove 
The intolerable shirt of flame 
Which human power cannot remove. 
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 We only live, only suspire 
 Consumed by either fire or fire. 
(LG IV, CPP 196) 
 
The legend to which these lines allude is of Hercules‟s death (Ovid, 
Metamorphoses IX). Hercules‟s wife Deïanira sends him a shirt believing it to have 
been soaked in a love charm while in fact it is poisoned with the blood of the hydra 
Nessus. The moment Hercules wears the shirt he is inflamed with excruciating pain 
which, however, does not kill him, nor can he remove the shirt or find a remedy. The 
torture Hercules goes through makes him wish for death, so he entreats the gods to let 
him die (IX.176-210). He has his revenge on Lichas who tricked Deïanira into sending 
Hercules the poisoned shirt (IX.211-228), and builds for himself a pyre on which his 
body is burnt, now in the actual flames of fire rather than flames of pain, while his soul 
is turned immortal and taken to the stars (IX.229-272). Hercules‟s pain, in Ovid, is 
described in the vocabulary of fire throughout: this pain is referred to as „flames,‟ and 
pictured in the image of his blood hissing „in the burning poison‟ like „a white-hot metal 
strip [when] dipped / Into a cold tank‟ (IX.170-171). Flames of fire in which Hercules 
burns on the pyre, after the pain he has endured, are a relief: he lies down resting, „with 
no other expression than if [he] were lying down as a dinner guest / wreathed with 
garlands among full cups of undiluted wine‟ (IX.237-238).13 
There are two kinds of flames in Ovid, the flames of Hercules‟s pain and the 
flames of fire in which his body finally burns. Neither of them can be removed by 
human power, nor that of gods: they take Hercules‟s soul to the stars, but his body must 
burn to ashes. The pain he endures is prolonged, it is one, and it is the most immediate 
                                                 
13
 Feder highlights the Christian subtext in Eliot‟s use of the image of the „intolerable shirt of flame:‟ the 
fact that „he is the one mortal in Greek myth who, through his own labors and sufferings, was raised to 
the level of gods;‟ „the blindness of Deïanira‟s “human” love, the agony of the deceived and poisoned 
hero, his final consumption in the funeral pyre, which he himself commanded to be lighted, and the 
implication that, as Heracles‟ suffering was caused by a superhuman agent, so “human power” could not 
remove it”‟ (317; 316-317) – these narrative turns of the myth about Hercules‟s death make the Greek 
hero a figure of Christ. While admitting the fact of the narrative parallels that increase the density of the 
allusion, I see the effect of the lines in which the allusion appears as relying primarily on the literal 
meaning of the image before its symbolic implications are evoked. 
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one can imagine, his flesh burning to the bone. Eliot encapsulates all this narrative in 
two lines, in one image of „the intolerable shirt of flame.‟ Even without the context of 
Ovid‟s Hercules in mind, the reading eye is invited to visualise a body wearing a shirt 
made of flames, intolerable for its burning pain. This pain can only be imagined, for fire 
indeed is the experience beyond the language of the living: no one who has gone 
through it can speak it because this experience brings death. In Eliot, however, this 
imagined pain is a figure for the experience of the body itself, the kind of experience 
that is given with it and through it, the experience that „human power cannot remove‟ 
for we do not choose it, in the same way as we do not choose to live and breathe: „We 
only live, only suspire / Consumed by either fire or fire.‟ 
Love, Christopher Ricks aptly notes, is given an ambivalent status by these lines. 
Unlike the word „Name,‟ „Love‟ is capitalised following syntactic conventions, the first 
time because it begins a new sentence and the second time because it opens a line, so 
„we shall never know whether or not it is personified to the Absolute here‟ (249). Yet 
„Love‟ is capitalised in the subsequent movement of „Little Gidding,‟ the line 
containing the word singled out so that it is impossible to miss: „With the drawing of 
this Love and the voice of this Calling,‟ it says, standing between the two verse 
paragraphs of the closing movement of „Little Gidding‟ and of Four Quartets (LG V, 
CPP 197). And the poem has described love as the completeness of being, the absolute 
unity of the oscillation between „un-being and being,‟ including desire which „itself is 
movement / Not in itself desirable‟ and yet „in itself unmoving, / Only the cause and the 
end of movement, / Timeless and undesiring‟ (BN V, CPP 175) like the Aristotelian 
God, the Unmoved Mover, also interpreted as Incarnation (Donoghue 240-241). In 
„Little Gidding,‟ this experience of complete being, love, is called „the unfamiliar 
Name,‟ this word capitalised unambiguously, as if all that the all-inclusive, complete 
experience of love needed to be turned into a personification of the Absolute was to be 
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given the name. There are many names in Four Quartets, functioning insistently to 
mark the singularity of their meaning, their rootedness in the specific, particular soil 
where they exercise their power of naming. Every one of the poem‟s titles realises this 
singularity of meaning, for they are references to specific places.
14
 And „East Coker‟ 
intensifies the sense of specificity by speaking in the voice of Eliot‟s forefather and 
namesake, Sir Thomas Elyot (EC I, CPP 177-178). But the word „name‟ is never used 
except for this one instance in which the poem capitalises it to give the authority of the 
Absolute. 
The poem will keep this „Name‟ unfamiliar to the end. It will not thematise its 
meaning, will not fill in the gap between the singularity of the immediate experience in 
which this name appears and its all-inclusive, complete absoluteness. The reading eye 
itself will make this irrelevant choice of the pyre that will immerse it in the experience 
of meaningfulness. The poem will only recollect its own images through which it has 
been trying to convey what this experience is. It will remind us of the imperative of the 
search for meaningfulness, in the face of which „[w]e shall not cease from exploration,‟ 
even though we know that we are doomed to the endless circularity in which „the end of 
our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first 
time‟ (EC V, CPP 197). It will mention again the gate that must be crossed to enter the 
unfamiliar world and will recall the ghostly presence we have half-seen in „our first 
world,‟ the garden of „Burnt Norton,‟ in the image of „the children in the apple tree, / 
Not known, because not looked for / But heard, half-heard‟ (EC V, CPP 197-198). It 
will reproduce the sense of presence itself, the fragility of the completeness of its 
meaningfulness, voiced by the bird of that same „first world‟ and echoed in the closing 
                                                 
14
 Manganaro interprets the fact the Eliot sets his poems in sacred sites – not only Little Gidding seen as 
such, but all four locations of Four Quartets – with the purpose of pointing to the kind of significance that 
does not lend itself to a specific meaning but, instead, is transfigured in an unstoppable interpretative 
process; these sacred sites are ritual and also „linguistic markers for the inarticulate, indeterminable, or 
transcendent‟ (Myth, Rhetoric and the Voice of Authority 108-109), the „unfigurable‟ (68) field for the 
figuration that the poem performs. 
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movement of „Burnt Norton‟ and now, in the closing of the whole poem, once again, 
„Quick now, here, now, always‟ (EC V, CPP 198). It will repeat the other imperative, of 
giving up all we are, in the wisdom of humility as we follow the „condition of complete 
simplicity / (Costing no less than everything)‟ (EC V, CPP 198). And it will reassert the 
belief in the harmony of being that is about to come, with the gift of the impossible 
union of spheres of existence, as the poem reiterates yet again that „all shall be well and 
/ All manner of thing shall be well‟ (EG V, CPP 198). 
But it is in the three closing lines that Four Quartets brings its own visionary 
experiences, experiences that in their complexity involve every sense of the perceiving-
and-signifying body the poem has inflamed, into one image. Now it is not a locus of 
experience, as it was in „Burnt Norton,‟ that placed its definition of complete being „[a]t 
the still point.‟ Now it is a point in time, a belief and a promise that this moment of bliss 
will come: „All manner of things shall be well,‟ the poem says, when it comes (EC V, 
CPP 198). In this moment in time, „the tongues of flame are in-folded:‟ it is the inside 
of the burning shirt of flame that the poem directs the reading eye to look into. This 
gaze makes the perceiving body imagine and feel the embrace of „the tongues of flame‟ 
piercing every cell with the pain of being that we do not choose, nor have the power, to 
remove. The poem holds this imaginary experience held for just a moment longer by the 
hyphen – „in-folded‟ – that makes the eye pause, focus, think, live through the image 
and only then move on. And then the poem wants us to see this fire from a distance: „the 
tongues of flame are in-folded / Into the crowned knot of fire,‟ this visual image 
instantly identified as the crown of the flower that was the centre of the visionary 
experience with which the poem began its course, the rose. The poem closes, in-folds 
into the crowned knot of the tongues of fire that has been burning while it was being 
read. 
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As for the reader, „all shall be well and / All manner of things shall be well / 
When [...] the fire and the rose are one‟ (EC V, CPP 198). This oneness of the fire and 
the rose is a composite figure for the complementarity of immediate pre-signified 
experience, permeating the experiencing body, as the fire does, and an image that 
signifies this experience as a meaning, recognisable in its identity when observed from 
afar as an entity in itself, as the poem has made us see the rose. In this complementarity 
– when the experienced is also a meaning, when the in-folded tongues of flame burning 
the experiencing body appear to the eye as the crowned knot of the rose – immediate 
reality is known for what it is. Four Quartets closes with this composite image, a poetic 
encapsulation of the Eliotic vision of reality; but the experience that this composite 
figure presents, is not the figure. The moment of this experience is located in the 
indeterminable „when‟ of the event of meaningfulness, experienced and known as such 
experience – if at all – by the only burning body and the only watching eye available to 
the poem: the reader. „The poetry does not matter‟ (EC II, CPP 179); it is this 
experience that counts. 
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CODA: 
A REFLECTION ON FIERCE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
Eliot has taught me a great many things, but the sense of surprise has been recurrent: 
many a time I could not believe how contemporary he read to me. The event of my true 
encounter with him lives in the memory of reading his essays, a little after I had a 
chance to struggle through some of Jacques Derrida‟s writing, with a growing sense of 
awareness as I went on how uncomfortably deconstructionist Eliot sounded to me at 
times. Sometimes he even seemed to speak as if after deconstruction, as if trying to 
qualify, make more precise, or reply to some questions that Derrida had left for me 
disturbingly open. Now I interpret that experience as a half-realised recognition of a 
common ground in the shared concern with the relationship, in its many forms, between 
language and reality. I have learned since then that this common concern gives Eliot a 
voice to speak to the entire paradigm of the twentieth century‟s thought: the ontological 
hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer; the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty; the pragmatist philosophy of Richard Rorty; the structural linguistics of 
Saussure; and the psychoanalysis of Freud and its Lacanian and post-Lacanian 
interpretations, to mention only those thinkers that repeatedly appeared in the field of 
my vision as possible frames for organising my argument in this thesis. 
Eliot‟s message to the post-structuralist thought about language, as I hear it, is a 
challenge to the underlying structuralist assumption that the universe of language works 
according to its own laws, and that the only way not to lose the sense of the real is to 
keep alive the awareness of the gap between what comes to us in language and reality. It 
is as if Eliot begins half a step before this awareness must be insisted on, at the point of 
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identifying the reason why there must be an effort to remember this gap between 
language and reality, for the necessity of such a reminder can arise only against the 
given that we are inclined to forget that linguistic meaning may not be the meaning of 
reality. In this forgetfulness, linguistic existents are real, and it is this reality that is the 
reality of Eliot‟s thought, theoretical and poetic. 
Richard Wollheim follows Eliot‟s deviations from Bradley‟s thinking with a 
meticulous precision, one by one, and arrives at a grotesque vision of reality that these 
deviations imply, as Eliot leaves no way to „avoid a monstrous overpopulation of 
Reality:‟ 
Monstrous not only in its scale but for its character. Every supposition, paradox, 
error, self-contradiction, will spawn a corresponding inhabitant of the world: 
Ivanhoe, the present king of France, the golden mountain and the round square 
exist. („Eliot and F. H. Bradley: An Account‟ 179) 
 
All Wollheim‟s examples of monstrous existents come from Knowledge and 
Experience, and the monstrosity that he describes is the monstrosity of The Waste 
Land‟s vision. Knowledge and Experience points to at least two answers as to how this 
monstrously overpopulated reality is controlled. One of these answers says that reality is 
not in language alone but in language as it shapes and is directed by perception, and 
perception has its own unbreakable laws, such as a given perspective and the limits of 
one‟s vision in both space and time, and the selectivity of memory. It is these laws that 
control the aesthetic vision of Four Quartets. 
But the other answer does not go so smoothly. The other answer has to do with 
the issue of the sameness and difference in point of view. It is by way of perceiving the 
sameness of reality from different points of view that we know that our reality is real, 
and it is by way of communication with others that we know that our reality is not an 
invention of our individual mind. This is the other answer Knowledge and Experience 
gives to Wollheim‟s question of how the monstrous overpopulation of reality is to be 
controlled. Much has been said in Eliot criticism about multivocality and the 
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multiplicity of perspectives, appreciating the destabilising, energising force of Eliot‟s 
remarkable capacity to keep a myriad of viewpoints alive within one sentence and 
sometimes within a phrase. But the anthropological background on which Eliot builds 
his world-vision points to the limit he might have overlooked. This multiplicity of 
points of view is ultimately located in the sameness of the viewpoint of a culture, and 
that sameness Eliot associates with the inexplicable phenomenon of faith. To recall 
Eliot‟s reading of Durkheim in 1916, „group consciousness‟ – in a „civilised‟ society as 
well as in a totemic one – is „not merely defensive or economic‟ but „a religious 
instinct,‟ the need for „periodic refuge in another consciousness which is supra-
individual‟ satisfied in rites („Durkheim‟ 314). According to this definition, culture is 
rooted in the soil where it lives and understood as „group consciousness‟ united by a 
religious instinct that is at the core of shared cultural practices and values. And this 
definition reappears in Eliot‟s lectures on culture of 1933, around the time of his writing 
of „Burnt Norton.‟ It is this description of the „civilised‟ society in the Durkheimian 
terms that holds the notorious anti-Semitic remark: 
What we can do is to use our minds, remembering that a tradition without 
intelligence is not worth having, to discover what is the best life for us not as a 
political abstraction, but as a particular people in a particular place. [...] The 
population should be homogeneous; where two or more cultures exist in the 
same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become 
adulterate. What is still more important is unity of religious background; and 
reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking 
Jews undesirable. (After Strange Gods 19-20) 
 
This and other expressions of Eliot‟s anti-Semitism have been considered as an 
outcome of the kind of aesthetic force that his language produces, in instances such as 
this appearing as a failure to control its energy (Ricks). And it has been addressed 
directly, read in far more emphatically political terms, with the fullest imaginable 
picture of the manifestations of anti-Semitic views in mind, including the instances of 
compliance with its expressions that may be observed in Eliot criticism (Julius). In the 
narrative I have been trying to tell about Eliot, this question is about the pre-logical 
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dimensions of our mentality, our direct – immediate – responses to the world which is 
embedded in – appears to us in the medium of – the culture into which we are born and 
in which we learn our forms of behaviour before there is a possibility of understanding 
and self-consciousness. It follows from Eliot‟s views on the significative force of 
aesthetic communication that our reality is living culture, its values inscribed in our 
direct perception of the world through language and faith, and that the meanings this 
language produces trigger our immediate responses to them before we know what they 
are („the true origin of [cultural] practices are unknown to the savage just as they are to 
the scientist‟ [„Durkheim‟ 313]). The question Eliot asks in 1913 but not in 1933 is how, 
in this reality determined by the given cultural system of values, we conceive otherness, 
if at all. Perhaps Eliot‟s failures can tell us something about the ugly side of immediate 
experience, just as the failures of anthropology told Eliot about the nature of beauty. 
Some gaps perhaps need to be invented to make reality bearable for human kind. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
BN  „Burnt Norton,‟ quoted from CPP. 
CPP Eliot, Thomas Stearns. The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot. 
London: Book Club Associates by arrangement with Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1975 (1969). 
DS „The Dry Salvages,‟ quoted from CPP. 
EC „East Coker,‟ quoted from CPP. 
EL I, II ----. „The Development of Shakespeare‟s Verse.‟ Two lectures delivered 
at Edinburgh in 1937. Hayward Bequest to King‟s College, Archives 
Centre, Cambridge University. 
IPR ----. „The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual.‟ Gray, Piers. T. S. Eliot’s 
Intellectual and Poetic Development. 1909-1922. Sussex: The Harvester 
Press; New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982. 108-142. 
KE ----. Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley. 
London; Faber and Faber, 1964. 
LG „Little Gidding,‟ quoted from CPP. 
OPP ----. On Poetry and Poets. London, Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986 
(1957). 
SE  ----. Selected Essays. London: Faber and Faber, 1961 (1932). 
WL  ----. The Waste Land, quoted from CPP. 
WLF ----. The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts 
Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound. Edited with and Introduction 
by Valerie Eliot. London and New York: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, 
1971. 
 
  
230 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
 
Eliot, Thomas Stearns. „Degrees of Reality.‟ Manuscript. Harvard, 1913. Hayward 
Bequest to King‟s College, Archives Centre, Cambridge University. 
----. „Durkheim.‟ Review of É. Durkheim. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A 
Study in Religious Sociology. Westminster Gazette 48. 7235 19 Aug. 1916: 2. 
Menand, Louis & Sanford Schwartz. „T. S. Eliot and Durkheim: A New 
Attribution.‟ Modern Philology 79.3 Feb. 1982: 309-315. 
----. Review of Clement C. J. Webb. Group Theories of Religion and the Religion of the 
Individual. International Journal of Ethics 27.1 Oct. 1916: 115-117. 
----. „The Noh and the Image.‟ Egoist Aug. 1917: 102-103. 
----. „Tarr.‟ Egoist Sept. 1918: 105-106. 
----. „Hamlet and His Problems.‟ Athenaeum 26 Sept. 1919: 940-941. 
----. „War-Paint and Feathers.‟ Athenaeum 17 Oct. 1919: 1036. 
----. The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1976 (1920, 1928). 
----. „London Letter.‟ Dial 70 Nov. 1922: 659-663. 
----. „Dramatis Personæ.‟ Criterion Apr. 1923: 303-249. 
----. „The Beating of a Drum.‟ Nation and Athenaeum 6 Oct. 1923: 11-12. 
----. „Ulysses, Order, and Myth.‟ Dial 75.5 Nov. 1923. Modernism: An Anthology. Ed. 
Lawrence Rainey. Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 165-167. 
----. „A Prediction in Regard to Three English Authors: Writers Who, Though Masters 
of Thought, are Likewise Masters of Art.‟ Vanity Fair 21 (Feb. 1924): 29, 98. 
----. Review of W. J. Perry. The Growth of Civilisation; The Origin of Magic and 
Religion (Methuen & Co., Ltd.). Criterion July 1924: 489-491. 
----. „Introduction.‟ Savonarola. Eliot, Charlotte. London: R. Cobden-Sanderson, 1926. 
vii-xii. 
----. Selected Essays. London: Faber and Faber, 1961 (1932). 
----. After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy. London: Faber and Faber, 1934. 
231 
 
----. „The Development of Shakespeare‟s Verse.‟ Two lectures delivered at Edinburgh 
in 1937. Hayward Bequest to King‟s College, Archives Centre, Cambridge 
University. 
----. „The Aims of Poetic Drama.‟ Adam 17.200 Nov. 1949: 10-16. 
----. „Shakespeares Verkunst.‟ Monat II. 20 May 1950: 198-207. 
----. On Poetry and Poets. London, Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986 (1957). 
----. Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley. London: Faber and 
Faber, 1964. 
----. The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts Including the 
Annotations of Ezra Pound. Edited with and Introduction by Valerie Eliot. 
London and New York: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, 1971. 
----. The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot. London: Book Club Associates by 
arrangement with Faber and Faber Limited, 1975 (1969). 
----. The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry. London: Faber and Faber, 1993. 
 
 
Augustine. Confessions and Enchiridion. Tr. Albert C. Outler. Vol. VII. Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1955. 
Austin, William J. A Deconstruction of T. S. Eliot: The Fire and the Rose. Lewiston, 
New York / Salzburg, Austria: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996. 
The Bible. Authorized King James Version. With an Introduction and Notes by Robert 
Carroll and Stephen Prickett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Bolgan, Anne C. What the Thunder Really Said. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press, 1973. 
Bornstein, George. Transformation of Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
Brooker, Jewel Spears. „F. H. Bradley‟s Doctrine of Immediate Experience in T. S. 
Eliot‟s “The Waste Land” and “Four Quartets”.‟ Modern Philology 77.2 (Nov. 
1979): 146-157. 
----. „The Case of the Missing Abstraction: Eliot, Frazer, and Modernism.‟ The 
Massachusetts Review 25.4 (Winter 1984): 539-552. 
----. Mastery and Escape: T. S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1994. 
Brooker, Jewel Spears & Joseph Bentley. Reading The Waste Land: Modernism and the 
Limits of Interpretation. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990. 
232 
 
Brooks, Cleanth. „The Waste Land: Critique of the Myth.‟ Modern Poetry and the 
Tradition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939. 136-172. 
Bush, Ronald. T. S. Eliot: A Study in Character and Style. New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983. 
Carpentier, Martha C. Ritual, Myth, and the Modernist Text: The Influence of Jane Ellen 
Harrison on Joyce, Eliot, and Woolf. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach 
Publishers, 1998. 
Corcoran, Neil. Shakespeare and the Modern Poet. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
Crawford, Robert. The Savage and the City in the Work of T. S. Eliot. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001. 
Dante, Alighieri. The Divine Comedy. Transl. Allen Mandelbaum. New York, London, 
Toronto: Everyman‟s Library, 1995. 
Davidson, Harriet. T. S. Eliot and Hermeneutics: Absence and Interpretation in The 
Waste Land. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana University Press, 1985. 
Derrida, Jacques. „Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.‟ 
The Structuralist Controversy: The Language of Criticism & the Sciences of 
Man. Ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2007. 247-272. 
Donoghue, Denis. Words Alone: The Poet T. S. Eliot. New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2000. 
Ellmann, Maud. The Poetics of Impersonality: The Question of the Subject in T. S. Eliot 
and Ezra Pound. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1987. 
Feder, Lillian. Ancient Myth in Modern Poetry. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971. 
Frazer, James. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Ware: Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd, 1993. 
Freed, Lewis. T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 1979. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London, New York: Continuum, 2006 
(1975). 
Gardner, Helen. The Art of T. S. Eliot. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1975 (1949). 
----. The Composition of Four Quartets. London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1978. 
Gray, Piers. T. S. Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development. 1909-1922. Sussex: The 
Harvester Press; New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982. 
Greene, Gayle. „Shakespeare‟s The Tempest and Eliot‟s Waste Land: “What the 
Thunder Said”.‟ Orbis Litterarum 34 (1979): 287-300. 
233 
 
Gould, Eric. Mythical Intentions in Modern Literature. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1981. 
Hansen, Eric Arne. „T. S. Eliot‟s “Landscapes”.‟ English Studies 50.4 (Aug. 1969): 363-
379. 
Harmon, William. „T. S. Eliot, Anthropologist and Primitive.‟ American 
Anthropologist, New Series 78.4 (Dec. 1976): 797-811. 
Heidegger, Martin. Existence and Being. With an Introduction by Werner Brock. 
London: Vision, 1956. 
----. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1962. 
James, William. The Principles of Psychology. Vol. 2. London: Macmillan and Co., 
1891. 
Jay, Gregory S. T. S. Eliot and the Poetics of Literary History. Baton Rouge and 
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1983. 
Julius, Anthony. T. S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism, and Literary Form. London: Thames & 
Hudson, 2003 (1995). 
Kearns, Cleo McNelly. T. S. Eliot and Indic Traditions: A Study in Poetry and Belief. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 (1987). 
Kelly, Lionel. „“What are the Roots that Clutch?”: Eliot‟s The Waste Land and Frazer‟s 
The Golden Bough.‟ Sir James Frazer and the Literary Imagination: Essays in 
Affinity and Influence. Ed. Robert Frazer. London: Macmillan, 1990. 192-206. 
Kenner, Hugh. The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1969 
(1959). 
Kumar, Jitendra. „Consciousness and Its Correlates: Eliot and Husserl.‟ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 28 (Mar. 1968). 332-352. 
----. Time and T. S. Eliot: His Poetry, Plays and Philosophy. New York: Apt Books, 
1985. 
Lamos, Coleen. Deviant Modernism: Sexual and Textual Errancy in T. S. Eliot, James 
Joyce and Marcel Proust. Cambridge: CUP, 1998. 
Leavis, Frank Raymond. The Living Principle: ‘English’ as a Discipline of Thought. 
London: Chatto and Windus, 1977. 
Lobb, Edward (ed.). Words in Time: New Essays on Eliot’s Four Quartets. London: The 
Athlone Press, 1993. 
Manganaro, Marc. „T. S. Eliot and the Primitive Mind.‟ PhD Diss. University of North 
Carolina, 1985. 
----. „Dissociation in the “Dead Land”:‟ The Primitive Mind in the Early Poetry of T. S. 
Eliot.” Journal of Modern Literature XIII (1986): 97-110. 
234 
 
----. „“Beating a Drum in a Jungle”: T. S. Eliot on the Artist as “Primitive”.‟ MLQ 47 
(4) (1986): 393-421. 
----. Myth, Rhetoric, and the Voice of Authority: A Critique of Frazer, Eliot, Frye & 
Campbell. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1992. 
----. Culture, 1922: The Emergence of a Concept. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002. 
Marathe, Sudhakar. T. S. Eliot’s Shakespeare Criticism: A Perfect Form of 
Development. Delhi-110007: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1989. 
Michaels, Walter Benn. „Philosophy in Kinkanja: Eliot‟s Pragmatism.‟ Glyph 8 (1981): 
170-202. 
Milward, Peter. „Shakespeare in The Waste Land.‟ Poetry and Drama in the Age of 
Shakespeare: Essays in Honour of Professor Shonosuke Ishii’s Seventieth 
Birthday. Ed. Peter Milward and Tetsue Anzai. Tokyo: The Renaissance 
Institute, 1982. 218-226. 
Nevo, Ruth. „The Waste Land: Ur-Text of Deconstruction.‟ New Literary History 13.3: 
Theory: Parodies, Puzzles, Paradigms (Spring 1982): 453-461. 
Nitchie, George W. „Eliot‟s Borrowing: A Note.‟ The Massachusetts Review 6.2. 
(1965): 403-406. 
Olney, James. Metaphors of Self: The Meaning of Autobiography. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973 (1972). 
Ovid. Metamorphoses IX-XII. Edited with an introduction, translation and notes by D. 
E. Hill. Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1999. 
Perl, Jefrey M. & Andrew P. Tuck. „Foreign Metaphysics: The Significance of T. S. 
Eliot‟s Philosophical Notebooks, Part One.‟ The Southern Review 21.2 (Jan. 
1985): 79-88. 
Perl, Jeffrey M. „The Language of Theory and the Language of Poetry: The 
Significance of T. S. Eliot‟s Philosophical Notebooks, Part Two.‟ The Southern 
Review 21.4 (Oct. 1985): 1012-1023. 
----. Skepticism and Modern Enmity: Before and After Eliot. Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
Pound, Ezra & Ernest Fenollosa. The Classic Noh Theatre of Japan. New York: New 
Directions Publishing Corporation, 1959. 
Quillian, William Howell. Hamlet and the New Poetic. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI 
Reserach Press. 
Rainey, Lawrence. Revisiting The Waste Land. New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2005. 
---- (ed.). The Annotated Waste Land with Eliot’s Contemporary Prose. New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2006 (2005). 
235 
 
Ricks, Christopher. T. S. Eliot and Prejudice. London, Boston: Faber and Faber, 1994. 
Riquelme, John Paul. Harmony of Dissonances: T. S. Eliot, Romanticism, and 
Imagination. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991. 
Robertson, John Mackinnon. The Problem of ‘Hamlet.’ London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1919. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1959 (1915). 
Schwartz, Sanford. The Matrix of Modernism. Pound, Eliot, & Early 20
th
-Century 
Thought. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Shakespeare, William. The Complete Works. Ed. Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988. 
Shusterman, Richard. T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988. 
Skaff, William. T. S. Eliot: From Scepticism to a Surrealist Poetic. 1909-1927. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. 
Smith, Grover (ed.). T. S. Eliot’s Poetry and Plays: A Study in Sources and Meaning. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971 (1950, 1956). 
----. Josiah Royce’s Seminar, 1913-1914: As Recorded in the Notebooks of Harry T. 
Costello.  Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishers, 1963. 
----. The Waste Land. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. 
Spanos, William. „Hermeneutics and Memory: Destroying T. S. Eliot‟s Four Quartets.‟ 
Genre 5.11 (1978): 523-573. 
----. „Repetition in The Waste Land: A Phenomenological De-struction.‟ boundary 2 
7.3. Revisions of the Anglo-American Tradition: Part 2 (Spring 1979): 225-285. 
Spurr, David. Conflicts in Consciousness: T. S. Eliot’s Poetry and Criticism. Urbana, 
Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1984. 
Stead, Christian Karlson. The New Poetic: Yeats to Eliot. London: Hutchinson 
University Library, 1975 (1964). 
Still, Colin. Shakespeare’s Mystery Play: A Study of The Tempest. London: Cecil 
Palmer, 1921. 
Tamplin, Ronald. „The Tempest and The Waste Land.‟ American Literature 39.3 (Nov. 
1967): 352-372. 
Thomson, Stephen. „The Adjective, My Daughter: Staging T. S. Eliot‟s “Marina”.‟ The 
Yearbook of English Studies 32: Children in Literature (2002): 110-126. 
236 
 
Vickery, John B. „T. S. Eliot: The Anthropology of Religious Consciousness.‟ The 
Literary Impact of The Golden Bough. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1973. 233-279. 
Warren, Charles. T. S. Eliot on Shakespeare. London: UMI Research Press, 1987. 
Weston, Jessie Laidlay. From Ritual to Romance. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005 
(1920). 
Wilson, Gary H. „The Shakespearean Design in T. S. Eliot‟s Poetry.‟ PhD thesis. 
Temple University, 1973. 
Wollheim, Richard. „Eliot, Bradley and Immediate Experience.‟ New Statesman 13 
March 1964: 401-402. 
----. „Eliot and F. H. Bradley: An Account.‟ Eliot in Perspective: A Symposium. Ed. 
Graham Martin. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. 169-193. 
